Cited by 109Memory Processes and InfluencesCognitive Functions and MemoryEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

But I Was So Sure! Metacognitive Judgments Are Less Accurate Given Prospectively than Retrospectively

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Siedlecka, Marta, Paulewicz, Borysław, Wierzchoń, Michał·2016·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

Prospective and retrospective metacognitive judgments have been studied extensively in the field of memory; however, their accuracy has not been systematically compared. Such a comparison is important for studying how metacognitive judgments are formed. Here, we present the results of an experiment aiming to investigate the relation between performance in an anagram task and the accuracy of prospective and retrospective confidence judgments. Participants worked on anagrams and were then asked to respond whether a presented word was the solution. They also rated their confidence, either before or after the response and either before or after seeing the suggested solution. The results showed that although response accuracy always correlated with confidence, this relationship was weaker when metacognitive judgements were given before the response. We discuss the theoretical and methodological implications of this finding for studies on metacognition and consciousness.

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  • Metacognitive sensitivity is often better when confidence judgments are provided after, compared to before, an explicit decision has been made.

    “Telltale signs of this effect have been confirmed empirically: Metacognitive sensitivity is often better when confidence judgments are provided after, compared to before, an explicit decision has been made (Pereira et al. 2020, Siedlecka et al. 2016, Wokke et al. 2020)”

    From Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis (2024) · cites this paper as Siedlecka et al. 2016

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Authors
Siedlecka, M., Paulewicz, B., & Wierzchoń, M.
Affiliations
  • Jagiellonian University (PL)
  • Uniwersytet SWPS (PL)
Corresponding author
Wierzchoń, Michał
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2016-02-19
Volume
7
Pages
218-218
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2294911664
Cited by
109
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3
FWCI
4.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Jagiellonian University Repository (Jagiellonian University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Narodowe Centrum Nauki (2014/14/M/HS6/00911)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
metacognition, retrospective evaluation, judgment accuracy, anagram task, confidence calibration, consciousness

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