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Cited by 100Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceCognitive Science and Education Research

Affective Value in the Predictive Mind

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Van De Cruys, Sander·2017·Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz
DOI 10.15502/9783958573253
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Abstract

Although affective value is fundamental in explanations of behavior, it is still a somewhat alien concept in cognitive science. It implies a normativity or directionality that mere information processing models cannot seem to provide. In this paper we trace how affective value can emerge from information processing in the brain, as described by predictive processing. We explain the grounding of predictive processing in homeostasis, and articulate the implications this has for the concept of reward and motivation. However, at first sight, this new conceptualization creates a strong tension with conventional ideas on reward and affective experience. We propose this tension can be resolved by realizing that valence, a core component of all emotions, might be the reflection of a specific aspect of predictive information processing, namely the dynamics in prediction errors across time and the expectations we, in turn, form about these dynamics. Specifically, positive affect seems to be caused by positive rates of prediction error reduction, while negative affect is induced by a shift in a state with lower prediction errors to one with higher prediction errors (i.e., a negative rate of error reduction). We also consider how intense emotional episodes might be related to unexpected changes in prediction errors, suggesting that we also build (meta)predictions on error reduction rates. Hence in this account emotions appear as the continuous non-conceptual feedback on evolving —increasing or decreasing—uncertainties relative to our predictions. The upshot of this view is that the various emotions, from “basic” ones to the non-typical ones such as humor, curiosity and aesthetic affects, can be shown to follow a single underlying logic. Our analysis takes several cues from existing emotion theories but deviates from them in revealing ways. The account on offer does not just specify the interactions between emotion and cognition, rather it entails a deep integration of the two.

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  • Promoting self-evidencing outcomes on longer timescales requires organisms to be sensitive not only to prediction error reduction in the present, but to the rate of prediction error reduction over time.

    “Promoting self-evidencing outcomes on longer timescales requires organisms to be sensitive not only to prediction error reduction in the present, but the rate of prediction error reduction over time (Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Kiverstein et al. 2019; Van de Cruys 2017).”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Van de Cruys 2017

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Authors
Van De Cruys, S.
Venue
Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz
Publisher
Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz
Published
2017
DOI
10.15502/9783958573253
OpenAlex
W2605929261
Cited by
100
References
23
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3
FWCI
18.65
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
Lirias (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
emotional value, predictive processing, valence, homeostasis, reward, motivation, emotions, uncertainty, emotion-cognition integration, humor, curiosity

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