The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
“More specifically, we have argued that utilitarian moral judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes while non-utilitarian (characteristically deontological) judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses (Greene, 2007).”
BackgroundResultMind Perception Is the Essence of Morality
Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387 · Cited by 1,008
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
The development of intent-based moral judgment
Cushman, F., Sheketoff, R., Wharton, S., & Carey, S. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.008 · Cited by 396
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Knobe, J. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000907 · Cited by 375
Suter, R. S., & Hertwig, R. (2011) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.018 · Cited by 322
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Farias, M., & Savulescu, J. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005 · Cited by 315
Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making: A principled review
Christensen, J. F., & Gomila, A. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.008 · Cited by 307
Harshaw, C. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038101 · Cited by 302
Risk Communication, Public Engagement, and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions
Roeser, S. (2012) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01812.x · Cited by 294
A solution to the mysteries of morality.
DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0029065 · Cited by 289
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Kahane, G. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x · Cited by 282
Greene, J. D. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.003 · Cited by 277
No Compromise: Political Consequences of Moralized Attitudes
Ryan, T. J. (2017) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12248 · Cited by 273
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2009) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.008 · Cited by 264
Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
Schwitzgebel, E., & Rust, J. (2014) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135 · Cited by 175
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000 · Cited by 170
Religiosity, political orientation, and consequentialist moral thinking
Piazza, J., & Sousa, P. (2014) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550613492826 · Cited by 160
Byrd, N., & Conway, P. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.06.007 · Cited by 77
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Noradrenaline effects on social behaviour, intergroup relations, and moral decisions
Terbeck, S., Savulescu, J., Chesterman, L. P., & Cowen, P. J. (2016) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.03.031 · Cited by 68
The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2009) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-008-9145-3 · Cited by 61
McCall, C., Steinbeis, N., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2014) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00424 · Cited by 59
Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology
Klenk, M. (2019) · Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie · doi:10.1007/s42048-019-00040-9 · Cited by 59
“Finally, moral anthropology promises to enrich the recent debate about debunking arguments in moral philosophy (cf. Sauer 2018; e.g. Greene 2008; Klenk 2018a; Haidt 2001).”
BackgroundDo Theories of Implicit Race Bias Change Moral Judgments?
Cameron, C. D., Payne, B. K., & Knobe, J. (2010) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-010-0118-z · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Venue
- Moral Psychology
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2007
- OpenAlex
- W2942077597
- Cited by
- 491
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 225.36
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.