The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality
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“Distributing well-being and harm inevitably creates tradeoffs, whose resolution falls in the moral domain 1 , 2 , 3 .”
From The Moral Machine experiment (2018) · cites this paper as [3]
Citations
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“…five victims and onto a single victim, but unacceptable to push a single victim in front of a runaway trolley in order to stop its progress towards five victims (Cushman et al. 2006; Greene et al. 2004, 2001; Koenigs et al. 2007; Mikhail 2000; Petrinovich et al. 1993; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006).”
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“Research by Greene and colleagues shows that moral dilemmas are associated with longer periods of deliberation and the activation of brain regions associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive conflict (Greene et al. 2008, 2004, 2001).”
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“This pattern of judgments is consistent across a reasonably broad range of biological and cultural variation ( Hauser et al. 2007 ).”
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Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625 · cited 7×
“More recently, attention has focused on the diverse roles of conscious reasoning versus unconscious intuition in moral judgment (Cushman et al. 2006; Haidt 2001; Pizarro et al. 2003) as well as the role of ‘cold’ cognition versus affect (Greene et al. 2004, 2001; Koenigs et al. 2007; Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006).”
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Awad, E., Dsouza, S., Kim, R., Schulz, J., Henrich, J., Shariff, A., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Rahwan, I. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0637-6 · Cited by 1,859
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“Building on several recent proposals (Cushman & Young, 2009; Greene, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), we have argued that philosophical dilemmas often arise when two distinct psychological processes yield conflicting answers to a common representational or motivational problem.”
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“This intuitive response to accidents reflects cognitive conflict of the sort that characterizes much of moral psychology and especially moral dilemmas (Cushman & Young, 2009; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene & Paxton, 2009).”
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Salvador, R. O., & Folger, R. G. (2009) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq20091911 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F., & Young, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cushman, Fiery
- Venue
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Published
- 2009-01-10
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-24
- ISSN
- 1386-2820 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8447
- OpenAlex
- W2066579738
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 1.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- ethical dilemmas, moral judgment, moral theory, ethics, practical reasoning, moral psychology
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