The cognitive neuroscience revolution
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“278 A vehicle represents a source just in case it has the function of carrying information 279 about the source (Dretske 1988; Morgan 2014).”
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“…putative alternative to mechanistic explanation, except to point out that mechanistic explanations are often dynamical in the relevant sense (cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2013) and thus are consistent with describing the dynamics of a system, whereas dynamical descriptions may or may not be…”
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Physical Computation and Cognitive Science
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Investigating neural representations: the tale of place cells
Bechtel, W. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0480-8 · Cited by 109
Piccinini, G. (2007) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400601176494 · Cited by 99 · cited 1×
“…to represent systems to desired degrees of approximation while maintainingmathematical solubility or computational tractability (cf. Humphreys 2004; Piccinini 2007; Winsberg 2010; Weisberg 2013).7 Explanations of computational or information processing mechanisms often require these forms of…”
BackgroundSelf-citationMarr on Computational-Level Theories
Shagrir, O. (2010) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/656005 · Cited by 92 · cited 2×
“A somewhat independent view, which also stands in contrast to our framework, is that computational explanation is not mechanistic (Rusanen and Lappi 2007; Shagrir 2010a; Chirimuuta 2014).”
BackgroundResultCauses without Mechanisms: Experimental Regularities, Physical Laws, and Neuroscientific Explanation
Weber, M. (2008) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/594541 · Cited by 84 · cited 1×
“The Hodgkin-Huxley model has been described as non-explanatory (Bogen 2005), as providing a non-mechanistic explanation (Weber 2005, 2008), and as a mere sketch because it omits information about the role of ion channels in allowing membrane permeability (Craver 2007).”
MethodInformation as a Probabilistic Difference Maker
Scarantino, A. (2015) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.993665 · Cited by 83 · cited 1×
“A vehicle carries semantic information about a source just in case it reliably correlates with the states of the source (Dretske 1981; Piccinini and Scarantino 2011; Scarantino 2015).”
BackgroundWhat was Hodgkin and Huxley’s Achievement?
Levy, A. (2013) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axs043 · Cited by 83 · cited 3×
“A number of recent criticisms have 317 been developed along these lines (Barberis 2013; Barrett 2014; Levy and Bechtel 318 2013; Levy 2013; Chirimuuta 2014; Weiskopf 2011).”
BackgroundPiccinini, G. (2008) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00309.x · Cited by 61
Self-citationFunctional analysis and mechanistic explanation
Barrett, D. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0410-9 · Cited by 52 · cited 2×
“A number of recent criticisms have 317 been developed along these lines (Barberis 2013; Barrett 2014; Levy and Bechtel 318 2013; Levy 2013; Chirimuuta 2014; Weiskopf 2011).”
BackgroundComputer Science as Empirical Inquiry
dell’informatica, T. F., Simon, 。., Simon, H. A., & Newell, A. (2011) · Cited by 51
The Metaphysics of Mind and the Multiple Sources of Multiple Realizability
Piccinini, G., & Maley, C. J. (2014) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9781137286734_7 · Cited by 46 · cited 2×
“) We reject the account of realization adopted by Craver; we hold that each level of mechanistic organization realizes the mechanistic level above it and is realized by the mechanistic level below it (Piccinini and Maley 2014).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSchaffner, K. F. (2008) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/594542 · Cited by 45 · cited 1×
“…details about how changes inmembrane permeability arise were omitted from the model, initially because they were unknown (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952, p. 541), but also later because this omission affords the model greater generality (Schaffner 2008; Levy 2013; Chirimuuta 2014, p. 141).”
BackgroundBrain metaphor and brain theory
Daugman, J. G. (1993) · Cited by 44
Brains as analog-model computers
Shagrir, O. (2010) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.007 · Cited by 41 · cited 3×
“A somewhat independent view, which also stands in contrast to our framework, is that computational explanation is not mechanistic (Rusanen and Lappi 2007; Shagrir 2010a; Chirimuuta 2014).”
BackgroundResultBrain-Mind and Structure-Function Relationships: A Methodological Response to Coltheart
Roskies, A. L. (2009) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/605815 · Cited by 40 · cited 1×
“…as cognitive functions cannot be simply read off of tasks and functional neuroimaging still has limits on spatial and temporal resolution that place corresponding limits on fine-grained attribution of functions to lower-level neural structures (see, e.g., Roskies 2009 for further discussion).”
BackgroundDoing cognitive neuroscience: a third way
Egan, F., & Matthews, R. J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9098-9 · Cited by 30
Australian Journal of Philosophy
Hamblin, C. L., & Presley, C. F. (1963) · Cited by 30
Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1
Maley, C. J., & Piccinini, G. (2013) · Philosophia Scientae · doi:10.4000/philosophiascientiae.861 · Cited by 28 · cited 2×
“13 The resulting framework for explaining cognition is a mechanistic version of homuncular functionalism, whereby higher-level cognitive capacities are iteratively explained by lower-level cognitive capacities until we reach a level at which the lowerlevel capacities are no longer cognitive in the relevant sense (Attn…”
BackgroundSelf-citationFunctional Analyses, Mechanistic Explanations, and Explanatory Tradeoffs
Barberis, S. D. (2013) · Journal of Cognitive Science · doi:10.17791/jcs.2013.14.3.229 · Cited by 28
Activities Are Manifestations of Causal Powers
Piccinini, G. (2017) · The Western Ontario series in philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-52768-0_12 · Cited by 24
Self-citationvan Eck, D., & Weber, E. (2014) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1 · Cited by 18 · cited 1×
“Explaining a deviation from normal functioning may require simply pointing out what’s different in the relevant case, while omitting the rest of the mechanism (Van Eck and Weber 2014).”
BackgroundMechanisms and Model-based fMRI
Povich, M. (2014) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 2
Cited by
From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1578-6 · Cited by 69
Abstract Concepts and the Embodied Mind: Rethinking Grounded Cognition
Dove, G. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190061975.001.0001 · Cited by 40
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Boone, W., & Piccinini, G.
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2015-06-10
- Volume
- 193
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1509-1534
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W650321614
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 127
- FWCI
- 76.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.