First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate , an unfalsifiable principle , a natural law , and an imperative . While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences.
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“The FEP, which incorporates and extends the Bayesian brain hypothesis, has been especially subject to such criticism. As Williams (2020) and Colombo and Wright (2021) have persuasively argued, the FEP’s sweeping mathematical formalism and conceptual elasticity enable it to accommodate virtually any empirical outcome, rendering it difficult—if not impossible—to falsify (Fig. 2).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Colombo and Wright 2021
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“The present work maintains both that foregoing critiques—especially those by Colombo and Wright [12]—can be rejected on grounds other than MM and that the latter is a misleading basis for the FEP framework due to its circular reasoning.”
From The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
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“The present work maintains both that foregoing critiques—especially those by Colombo and Wright [12]—can be rejected on grounds other than MM and that the latter is a misleading basis for the FEP framework due to its circular reasoning.”
From The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Colombo, M., & Wright, C.
- Affiliations
- Tilburg University (NL)
- California State University, Long Beach (US)
- Corresponding author
- Colombo, Matteo
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2018-09-10
- Volume
- 198
- Issue
- S14
- Pages
- 3463-3488
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2808558823
- Cited by
- 101
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 48.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- free energy principle, organicism, mechanisms, first principles, epistemic status, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mind, brain evolution, perception, learning, action, natural law, unfalsifiability
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.