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The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism
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Cited by
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
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Metadata
- Authors
- Andreoni, J., & Rao, J. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-08
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 7-8
- Pages
- 513-520
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2147798592
- Cited by
- 342
- References
- 63
- FWCI
- 51.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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