The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economics and Social Interaction: Accounting for Interpersonal Relations
Abstract
First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a difficult field in a consistent manner, sensitive to insights from other behavioural and social sciences. This collection represents an important contribution to a growing research agenda in the social sciences.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Worker Motivations, Job Satisfaction, and Loyalty in Public and Nonprofit Social Services
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
Baldo, M. D. (2013) · European J. of International Management · doi:10.1504/ejim.2013.052835 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2005-09-15
- OpenAlex
- W1552854378
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 8.50
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.