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Cited by 474Evolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 521 of the 521 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The evolution of misbelief

Open access
McKay, Ryan T., Dennett, Daniel C.·2009·Behavioral and Brain Sciences
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x09990975
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Abstract

From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting “culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – but doxastically 1 noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria.

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Metadata

Authors
McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • Tufts University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2009-12
Volume
32
Issue
6
Pages
493-510
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x09990975
OpenAlex
W2116598522
Cited by
474
References
521
Citations by year
2026: 27 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 32 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 35
FWCI
28.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • reroDoc Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Funders
  • University of Oxford
  • European Commission
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
misconceptions, belief evolution, delusions, self-deception, positive illusions, belief formation, evolutionary design, epistemic error
MeSH terms
Adaptation, Psychological, Culture, Delusions, Biological Evolution, Humans, Deception, Psychological Theory, Religion and Psychology

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