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The evolution of misbelief
Open accessAbstract
From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting “culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – but doxastically 1 noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria.
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“However, misbelief that is directly adaptive turns out to be hard to find (McKay and Dennett 2009).”
From Natural Selection Does Care about Truth (2014) · cites this paper as McKay and Dennett 2009
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“Some cognitive illusions may be adaptive (McKay & Dennett, 2009).”
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“There has been evidence that optimistic updating serves as an advantageous mechanism for individuals’ social adaptation.”
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“Whereas optimistic updating is adaptive for mental health”
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“excessive optimism, especially ignoring undesirable information, can be maladaptive (1, 2, 55)”
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Metadata
- Authors
- McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Tufts University (US)
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2009-12
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 493-510
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2116598522
- Cited by
- 474
- References
- 521
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 32 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 35
- FWCI
- 28.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- reroDoc Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
- Funders
- University of Oxford
- European Commission
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- misconceptions, belief evolution, delusions, self-deception, positive illusions, belief formation, evolutionary design, epistemic error
- MeSH terms
- Adaptation, Psychological, Culture, Delusions, Biological Evolution, Humans, Deception, Psychological Theory, Religion and Psychology
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