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Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Abstract
Cooperation is central to human social behaviour. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring 'rational' self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.
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“Individuals showing greater state intellectual humility are also more cooperative after thinking through their position in a public goods game - in which they have to decide how much to contribute to a common pool that will be redistributed to all players - an effect that contrasts with the typical finding that deliberation leads to greater selfishness 106,107 .”
From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [107]
In the citing paper
“Dual-process models suggest that intuitive processing may facilitate cooperation under conditions of immediacy (44).”
From Volunteerism as a multidimensional form of human prosocial engagement (2026) · cites this paper as [44]
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Statistical physics of human cooperation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rand, David G.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2012-09-19
- Volume
- 489
- Issue
- 7416
- Pages
- 427-430
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2152722155
- Cited by
- 1,334
- References
- 79
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 79 · 2024: 73 · 2023: 76 · 2022: 108 · 2021: 108 · 2020: 110 · 2019: 95 · 2018: 130 · 2017: 107 · 2016: 110 · 2015: 116 · 2014: 97 · 2013: 59 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 237.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- cooperation, intuition, reflection, dual-process theory, self-control, social dilemmas, economic games, decision-making speed, decision time, self-interest, collective action
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Cooperative Behavior, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Decision Making, Ego, Female, Game Theory, Humans, Impulsive Behavior, Male, Models, Psychological, Time Factors, Reproducibility of Results, Intuition, Gift Giving, Young Adult
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