Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 73 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.
Abstract
Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects’ cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [23]
In the citing paper
“Therefore, reputation alone is not a strong factor in the emergence of cooperation within populations. Instead, it acts in collaboration with other mechanisms such as punishment [13, 15, 20, 21, 60].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [21]
In the citing paper
“Reputation plays an important role in enabling cooperation to emerge via partner selection by providing individuals with information about the prior behaviors of potential partners [16–21, 23].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [21]
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2007) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmsa066082 · Cited by 5,007
Self-citationEvolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2011) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/jbes.2010.07136 · Cited by 3,203
Szabó, G., & Fáth, G. (2007) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2007.04.004 · Cited by 2,974
The spread of behavior in an online social network experiment
Centola, D. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1185231 · Cited by 2,692
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395 · cited 1×
“Behavioral reciprocity is a central mechanism for the evolution of cooperation (1, 20, 21).”
BackgroundA simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208 · cited 1×
“This result is also consistent with theoretical predictions (11), given that the average number of neighbors exceeds the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation.”
ResultCovenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Coevolutionary games—A mini review
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003 · Cited by 1,971 · cited 1×
“We now evaluate the three additional theoretical predictions (33), all of which are supported by our data.”
ResultScale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the Emergence of Cooperation
Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2005) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.95.098104 · Cited by 1,804
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Quantifying social group evolution
Palla, G., Barabási, A.-L., & Vicsek, T. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05670 · Cited by 1,668 · cited 2×
“Exploring cooperation on very large static networks experimentally is an important direction for future study, particularly given the large scale of real-world social networks (18).”
BackgroundThe Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market∗Preprint
Zeckhauser, R. J. (2016) · Cited by 1,530
Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1182238 · Cited by 1,387
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070582 · Cited by 1,114 · cited 1×
“It has been shown both experimentally (58–60) and theoretically (61, 62) that allowing opting out promotes cooperation.”
BackgroundTit for tat in heterogeneous populations
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/355250a0 · Cited by 1,029 · cited 2×
“This observation suggests that subjects are willing to give potential new partners the benefit of the doubt, which is reminiscent of a form of forgiveness or leniency (20, 25).”
BackgroundCooperative behavior cascades in human social networks
Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0913149107 · Cited by 767
Self-citationVia Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1141588 · Cited by 725
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06723 · Cited by 718 · cited 1×
“8, and used the same set of 10 game lengths for the 10 games in each condition (as in (6, 7)).”
MethodSelf-citationPositive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177418 · Cited by 715
Self-citationThe evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1988) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(88)80219-4 · Cited by 712 · cited 1×
“However, reciprocity is problematic in group interactions involving more than two players: If the only way to sanction defectors is to defect, this action also harms the other cooperators in one’s group (26).”
BackgroundPunishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?
Nikiforakis, N. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008 · Cited by 711
Rand, D. G. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.004 · Cited by 683 · cited 10×
“Moreover, the sample of subjects in AMT experiments is restricted to people that participate in online labor markets (although most physical lab studies are restricted to college undergraduates, who are also far from representative).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationReputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
Fu, F., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A., & Wang, L. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.026117 · Cited by 682
THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS
SEFTON, M., SHUPP, R., & WALKER, J. M. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x · Cited by 649
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Bó, P. D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805775014434 · Cited by 618
Sigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570
The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market
Horton, J. J., Rand, D. G., & Zeckhauser, R. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9273-9 · Cited by 567 · cited 11×
“Moreover, the sample of subjects in AMT experiments is restricted to people that participate in online labor markets (although most physical lab studies are restricted to college undergraduates, who are also far from representative).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationCooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020140 · Cited by 556
A dynamic model of social network formation
Skyrms, B., & Pemantle, R. (2000) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.97.16.9340 · Cited by 553
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Cressman, R. (2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2884.001.0001 · Cited by 551
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
SUTTER, M., HAIGNER, S., & KOCHER, M. G. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x · Cited by 542
Social games in a social network
Abramson, G., & Kuperman, M. (2001) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.63.030901 · Cited by 535
Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0215 · Cited by 512
Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks
Zimmermann, M. G., Eguíluz, V. M., & San Miguel, M. (2004) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.69.065102 · Cited by 504
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 498
The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions
Helbing, D., & Yu, W. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0811503106 · Cited by 484
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107 · Cited by 412 · cited 1×
“And the comparison between our random and fixed conditions is again consistent with behavior in the physical laboratory (4, 5), where fixed interaction structure does little to prevent the breakdown of cooperation.”
ResultReplicator Dynamics for Optional Public Good Games
HAUERT, C., DE MONTE, S., HOFBAUER, J., & SIGMUND, K. (2002) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2002.3067 · Cited by 371 · cited 1×
“It has been shown both experimentally (58–60) and theoretically (61, 62) that allowing opting out promotes cooperation.”
BackgroundVolunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game
Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01986 · Cited by 362
Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments
Suri, S., & Watts, D. J. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016836 · Cited by 354
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350
Self-citationCooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011 · Cited by 338
Davis, J. A. (1970) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2093295 · Cited by 327 · cited 1×
“Therefore, a subject cannot be influenced explicitly by the behaviors her partners exhibit toward each other, a topic that has received considerable attention outside evolutionary game theory (44, 45).”
BackgroundCooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments
Suri, S., & Watts, D. J. (2011) · ACM SIGecom Exchanges · doi:10.1145/1998549.1998550 · Cited by 318 · cited 5×
“Rand DG (2011) The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments.”
BackgroundInfluentialContinuous-time model of structural balance
Marvel, S. A., Kleinberg, J., Kleinberg, R. D., & Strogatz, S. H. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1013213108 · Cited by 298 · cited 1×
“To the extent that cooperation and defection can be taken as forms of positive and negative ties, respectively, our experimental set-up can allow future exploration of the role of positive and negative valence as related to balance theory (46).”
BackgroundSocial Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game
Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1993) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095951 · Cited by 284
An Experimental Study of the Coloring Problem on Human Subject Networks
Kearns, M., Suri, S., & Montfort, N. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127207 · Cited by 269
Coevolutionary games on networks
Ebel, H., & Bornholdt, S. (2002) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.66.056118 · Cited by 267
Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks
Hanaki, N., Peterhansl, A., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0625 · Cited by 263
Model of genetic variation in human social networks
Fowler, J. H., Dawes, C. T., & Christakis, N. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0806746106 · Cited by 245
Self-citationCan second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z · Cited by 233
Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · Cited by 233
Self-citationContribution to the theory of random and biased nets
Rapoport, A. (1957) · The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics · doi:10.1007/bf02478417 · Cited by 227 · cited 1×
“Therefore, a subject cannot be influenced explicitly by the behaviors her partners exhibit toward each other, a topic that has received considerable attention outside evolutionary game theory (44, 45).”
BackgroundSocial Experiments in the Mesoscale: Humans Playing a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma
Grujić, J., Fosco, C., Araujo, L., Cuesta, J. A., & Sánchez, A. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013749 · Cited by 220 · cited 1×
“And the comparison between our random and fixed conditions is again consistent with behavior in the physical laboratory (4, 5), where fixed interaction structure does little to prevent the breakdown of cooperation.”
ResultFehl, K., van der Post, D. J., & Semmann, D. (2011) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x · Cited by 220 · cited 1×
“Our results showing the ability of dynamic networks to promote cooperation in group interactions are complemented by a recent experimental study exploring pairwise interactions (24).”
ResultCoordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence
Cassar, A. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.008 · Cited by 220
Correlated genotypes in friendship networks
Fowler, J. H., Settle, J. E., & Christakis, N. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1011687108 · Cited by 188 · cited 1×
“Our results also are consistent with the possibility that humans may have evolved to manipulate aspects of their social network structure to maximize their fitness (42, 43).”
ResultSelf-citationRepeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.040 · Cited by 162 · cited 1×
“Similar results also are found in theoretical models of repeated two-player games on dynamic networks (40, 41).”
ResultPunishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?Preprint
Nikiforakis, N. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.764185 · Cited by 104
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Fudenberg, D., Rand, D. G., & Dreber, A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.720 · Cited by 97
Self-citationChoosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma SituationsPreprint
HAIGNER, S. D., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 76
Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment
Masclet, D. (2003) · International Journal of Manpower · doi:10.1108/01437720310502177 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“Another form of punishment which has been shown to promote cooperation effectively is ostracism (56, 57).”
BackgroundCooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods ExperimentPreprint
Cinyabuguma, M. M., Putterman, L. G., & Page, T. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.724203 · Cited by 70 · cited 1×
“Another form of punishment which has been shown to promote cooperation effectively is ostracism (56, 57).”
BackgroundThird Party Reward and Punishment: Group Size, Efficiency and Public GoodsPreprint
Almenberg, J., Dreber, A., Apicella, C. L., & Rand, D. G. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 58
Self-citationAdoption of simultaneous different strategies against different opponents enhances cooperationPreprint
Wardil, L. L., & da Silva, J. K. L. (2009) · Nature Precedings · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/86/38001 · Cited by 53 · cited 1×
“Similar results also are found in theoretical models of repeated two-player games on dynamic networks (40, 41).”
ResultTHE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Maskin, E. S. (2008) · WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks · doi:10.1142/9789812818478_0011 · Cited by 48
No play: A means of conflict resolution.
Miller, R. R. (1967) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0024598 · Cited by 26
CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF RANDOM AND BIASED NETS
Rapoport, A. (1977) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-442450-0.50027-4 · Cited by 26
Cited by
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Self-citationRand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationSocial contagion theory: examining dynamic social networks and human behavior
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2013) · Statistics in Medicine · doi:10.1002/sim.5408 · Cited by 1,303
“While we have done work on the former [5, 7-13], here we will focus primarily on the latter, discussing analyses of the flow of behaviors, affective states, or germs.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationCollaborative environmental governance: Achieving collective action in social-ecological systems
Bodin, Ö. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan1114 · Cited by 1,088
“, how leaders directly or indirectly engage in creating, intervening in, and shaping networks [“network weaving,” see (43, 89, 94, 95)].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Rand, D. G., Arbesman, S., & Christakis, N. A.
- Affiliations
- Program for Evolutionary Dynamics,
- Institute for Quantitative Social Science, and
- Harvard University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2011-11-14
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 48
- Pages
- 19193-19198
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC3228461
- OpenAlex
- W2137724361
- Cited by
- 653
- References
- 73
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 37 · 2023: 46 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 44 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 51 · 2016: 49 · 2015: 63 · 2014: 42 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 112.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute on Aging (P01AG031093)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- human cooperation, dynamic social networks, network rewiring, conditional cooperation, evolutionary game theory, large-scale cooperation, social network structure, defection
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Group Processes, Humans, Social Support, Logistic Models
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.