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Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Human populations are both extremely cooperative and highly structured. Mathematical models have shown that fixed network interaction structures can lead to cooperation under certain conditions, by allowing cooperators to cluster together. Here, we provide empirical evidence of this phenomenon. We explore how different fixed social network structures can promote cooperation using economic game experiments. We find that people cooperate at high stable levels, as long as the benefits created by cooperation are larger than the number of neighbors in the network. This empirical result is consistent with a rule predicted by mathematical models of evolution. Our findings show the important role social networks can play in human cooperation and provide guidance for promoting cooperative behavior.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2014-11-17
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 48
- Pages
- 17093-17098
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2105123723
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 63
- FWCI
- 86.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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