The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Abstract
This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman's approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior. The first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion; the second assumes that Congress controls agency decisions. The recent behavior of the Federal Trade Commission provides the empirical setting. Substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model, including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over FTC decisions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior
McFadden, D. L. (1972) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 14,203
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.
Meade, J. E., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1963) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228407 · Cited by 3,361
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
Groves, H. M., & Wildavsky, A. (1965) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055574 · Cited by 1,638
Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, by Richard F. Fenno, Jr.
Leuthold, D. A. (1979) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150167 · Cited by 1,601
Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment
Hečlo, H. (1978) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,239
Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Ross, R. S., & Fiorina, M. P. (1977) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447661 · Cited by 1,228
Cited by
Legislative leviathan: party government in the House
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0579 · Cited by 2,313
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081899551048 · Cited by 2,113
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
Self-citationDelegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Pollack, M. A. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550311 · Cited by 1,498
The Political Economy of Federalism
Chubb, J. E. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956245 · Cited by 1,444
Majone, G. (1997) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00003524 · Cited by 1,358
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791123 · Cited by 1,134
Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story
Moe, T. M. (1990) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.213 · Cited by 1,051
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
Pollack, M. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199251177.001.0001 · Cited by 888
THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS
Miller, G. J. (2005) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104840 · Cited by 865
(1994) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036849 · Cited by 841
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1960780 · Cited by 823
Self-citationThe Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963851 · Cited by 750
Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives
Panda, B., & Leepsa, N. M. (2017) · Indian Journal of Corporate Governance · doi:10.1177/0974686217701467 · Cited by 732
Political connections and SEC enforcement
Correia, M. M. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.004 · Cited by 693
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (2008) · The American Congress Reader · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816406.042 · Cited by 651
Self-citationPolitical Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
Bawn, K. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2083075 · Cited by 546
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB
Moe, T. M. (1985) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1956250 · Cited by 544
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
Weingast, B. R. (1984) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124821 · Cited by 503
Self-citationCongressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Ferejohn, J., & Shipan, C. (1990) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.1 · Cited by 500
Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple accountabilities disorder”
Koppell, J. G. (2005) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2005.00434.x · Cited by 495
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits
Roberts, B. E. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111510 · Cited by 473
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'
Moe, T. M. (1987) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439745 · Cited by 441
Studying Governance and Public Management: Challenges and Prospects
Lynn, L. E., Heinrich, C. J., & Hill, C. J. (2000) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024269 · Cited by 440
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
Wood, B. D. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958066 · Cited by 423
The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments
Garrett, T. A., & Sobel, R. S. (2003) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/cbg023 · Cited by 418
Jones, M. P., Saiegh, S., Spiller, P. T., & Tommasi, M. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088406 · Cited by 407
Hammond, T. H., & Knott, J. H. (1996) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023355 · Cited by 403
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation
McChesney, F. S. (1988) · The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15 · Cited by 397
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2005.16387892 · Cited by 395
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Gilligan, T. W., & Krehbiel, K. (1990) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111460 · Cited by 395
The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure
McCubbins, M. D. (1985) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111178 · Cited by 388
Nonmarket Strategy Performance: Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities
Bonardi, J.-P., Holburn, G. L. F., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.23478676 · Cited by 381
The principal-agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?
(2003) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/1350176032000046976 · Cited by 366
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress
Groseclose, T., Levitt, S. D., & Snyder, J. M. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585759 · Cited by 343
Hillman, A., & Keim, G. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258892 · Cited by 334
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Scholz, J. T. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962881 · Cited by 296
Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence
Lohmann, S., & O'Halloran, S. (1994) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300028320 · Cited by 292
Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?
Krehbiel, K. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963634 · Cited by 283
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Balla, S. J. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585488 · Cited by 281
Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (1994) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/10.1.96 · Cited by 278
Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System
Scholz, J. T., & Wei, F. H. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185090 · Cited by 277
The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Banks, J. S., & Weingast, B. R. (1992) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111488 · Cited by 270
Self-citationWest, W. F. (2004) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00347.x · Cited by 267
Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
Iyer, L., & Mani, A. (2012) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00183 · Cited by 261
What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis
Koop, C., & Lodge, M. (2017) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12094 · Cited by 257
The Political Economy of Market‐Based Environmental Policy: the U.S. Acid Rain Program
Joskow, P. L., & Schmalensee, R. (1998) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467384 · Cited by 257
Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence
Crandall, R. W., & Winston, C. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003772034871 · Cited by 256
Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
Moser, P. (1999) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00045-2 · Cited by 173
Krafft, T. D., Zweig, K. A., & König, P. D. (2022) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12369 · Cited by 95
“Thugs-for-Hire”: Subcontracting of State Coercion and State Capacity in China
Ong, L. H. (2018) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592718000981 · Cited by 74
Metadata
- Authors
- Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1983-10
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 765-800
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1978648732
- Cited by
- 1,431
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 48.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.