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Cited by 1,041Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsCognitive Science and Education ResearchClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

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Rationality and the Reflective Mind

Stanovich, Keith·2010·Oxford University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001
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Abstract

This book attempts to resolve the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science—the debate about how much irrationality to ascribe to human cognition. It shows how the insights of dual-process theory and evolutionary psychology can be combined to explain why humans are sometimes irrational even though they possess remarkably adaptive cognitive machinery. The book argues that to characterize fully differences in rational thinking, we need to replace dual-process theories with tripartite models of cognition. Using a unique individual differences approach, it shows that the traditional second system (System 2) of dual-process theory must be further divided into the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. Distinguishing them gives a better appreciation of the significant differences in their key functions: the key function of the reflective mind is to detect the need to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation activities, whereas that of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of decoupled secondary representations in cognitive simulation. The book then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. It presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using a tripartite model of cognition, the book shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. It then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been.

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Metadata

Authors
Stanovich, K.
Corresponding author
Stanovich, Keith
ORCID
Stanovich, Keith
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2010-12-03
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.001.0001
OpenAlex
W654145152
Cited by
1,041
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 67 · 2024: 57 · 2023: 95 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 111 · 2020: 82 · 2019: 111 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 65 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 55 · 2013: 47 · 2012: 34
FWCI
16.78
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
rationality, dual-process theory, cognitive simulation, cognitive errors, heuristics and biases, individual differences, intelligence, intelligence testing, System 2, evolutionary psychology

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