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Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies
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Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, Symposium on the Law and Economics of Bargaining (Mar., 1989), pp. 431-482
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Metadata
- Authors
- McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- Virginia Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1989-03
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431
- ISSN
- 0042-6601 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1595964953
- Cited by
- 1,207
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 71.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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