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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Abstract
Chapter 1 Preface Chapter 2 The Problems of Knowledge Chapter 3 Foundations Theories Chapter 4 Coherence Theories Chapter 5 Externalism Chapter 6 Epistemic Norms Chapter 7 Epistemology and Rationality Chapter 8 Direct Realism Chapter 9 Bibliography Chapter 10 Index Chapter 11 About the Authors
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Citations
Cited by
Pryor, J. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 · Cited by 1,127
Contemporary debates in epistemology
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Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons
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What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
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Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
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Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2012) · Collected Papers, Volume 2 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008 · Cited by 520
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
TURRI, J. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00331.x · Cited by 446
Aarnio, M. L. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00183.x · Cited by 444
Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice
Anderson, J., & Honneth, A. (2005) · Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610325.008 · Cited by 437
Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission
Lackey, J. (1999) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00154 · Cited by 414
Lawrence, J., & Reed, C. (2020) · Computational Linguistics · doi:10.1162/coli_a_00364 · Cited by 396
CHRISTENSEN, D. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x · Cited by 385
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Douven, I. (2006) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010 · Cited by 357
Schurz, G. (2008) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9223-4 · Cited by 337
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
Giere, R. N. (2010) · University of Minnesota Press eBooks · doi:10.5749/9780816683963 · Cited by 317
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
Kahane, G. (2011) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00770.x · Cited by 282
Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs
Nagel, J., Juan, V. S., & Mar, R. A. (2013) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.02.008 · Cited by 273
GREENE, J. A., AZEVEDO, R., & TORNEY-PURTA, J. (2008) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520802178458 · Cited by 270
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From Appropriate Emotions to Values
Mulligan, K. (1998) · Swiss Philosophical Preprint Series · doi:10.48106/spps.00050 · Cited by 262
Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment
Bishop, M. A., & Trout, J. D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0195162293.001.0001 · Cited by 253
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170
Barzilai, S., & Zohar, A. (2014) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2013.863265 · Cited by 169
Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice
Spear, A. D. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610051 · Cited by 97
“A subject S has a defeater D for belief in the proposition P just in case D makes it all things considered likely that P is false (a ‘rebutting defeater’) or D undermines S’s original reason for believing that P (an ‘undercutting defeater’) (Pollock 1986; Plantinga 1993, Ch. 12).”
BackgroundThe erosion of a method: examples from grounded theory
Greckhamer, T., & Koro‐Ljungberg, M. (2005) · International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education · doi:10.1080/09518390500298204 · Cited by 95
Metadata
- Authors
- Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-09
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 167
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1988477946
- Cited by
- 1,152
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 94.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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