How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We develop an informational theory of dictatorship.Dictators survive not because of their use of force or ideology but because they convince the public-rightly or wrongly-that they are competent.Citizens do not observe the dictator's type but infer it from signals inherent in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media.If citizens conclude that the dictator is incompetent, they overthrow him in a revolution.The dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings-but he must finance such spending at the expense of the public's living standards.We show that incompetent dictators can survive as long as economic shocks are not too large.Moreover, their reputations for competence may grow over time-even if living standards fall.Censorship and co-optation of the elite are substitutes, but both are complements of propaganda.Due to coordination failure among members of the elite, multiple equilibria emerge.In some equilibria the ruler uses propaganda and co-opts the elite; in others, propaganda is combined with censorship.In the equilibrium with censorship, difficult economic times prompt higher relative spending on censorship and propaganda.The results illuminate tradeoffs faced by various recent dictatorships.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 1×
“These works examine how the dictator chooses the size and characteristics of his inner circle, and how these variables in turn determine the dictator’s policy choices and survival odds (Egorov and Sonin 2011, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).”
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule
Svolik, M. W. (2012) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139176040 · Cited by 2,611 · cited 1×
“…certain policies—repaying state debts and respecting property rights (North and Weingast 1989, Gehlbach and Keefer 2011), redistributing income to the poor (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), or sharing power with members of his ruling group (Myerson 2008, Svolik 2012, Boix and Svolik 2013).”
How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000014 · Cited by 2,415 · cited 2×
“…political controversy and meets the party’s propaganda requirements,” one analyst wrote in 2005 (Esarey 2005, pp.57-9).8 Censorship of the internet, meanwhile, focused on blocking collective action rather than on suppressing criticism of the government and party (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).”
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
Lohmann, S. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950679 · Cited by 1,035
Lorentzen, P. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12065 · Cited by 602
Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data
EGOROV, G., GURIEV, S., & SONIN, K. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990219 · Cited by 546
Self-citationInformation Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship
Wintrobe, R. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962769 · Cited by 430
Frantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A. (2014) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343313519808 · Cited by 266
Communication Technology and Protest
Little, A. T. (2016) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/683187 · Cited by 192
The Internet and Political Control in Singapore
Rodan, G. (1998) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2657651 · Cited by 187
Reflections on Putin and the Media
Gehlbach, S. (2010) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.2747/1060-586x.26.1.77 · Cited by 97
Cited by
Svolik, M. W. (2020) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00018132 · Cited by 340
The Pathology of Hard Propaganda
Huang, H. (2018) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/696863 · Cited by 233
A theory of informational autocracy
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205
Self-citationNews Consumption of Russian Vkontakte Users: Polarization and News Avoidance
Urman, A. (2019) · University of Bern · doi:10.7892/boris.142408 · Cited by 15
“…regimes shows that the aim of propaganda is not only indoctrination but also a signal to the public that the state is strong enough, thus discouraging citizens from revolting (Huang, 2015) and convincing them that the autocrat is sufficiently competent to govern (Guriev & Treisman, 2015).”
BackgroundMedia Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup
Boleslavsky, R., Shadmehr, M., & Sonin, K. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3251019 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Guriev, S., & Treisman, D.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2015-04
- OpenAlex
- W1595758747
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 15
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.