Fairness and Retaliation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 64 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this chapter we examine evidence from different social sciences and argue that considerations of fairness and retaliation shape human behaviour to a very large degree. We contend that the importance of fairness and retaliation also extends to many important economic decisions. The incorporation of these motivations therefore helps us to understand economic outcomes in many different institutional environments.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism
- Publisher
- Palgrave Macmillan UK
- Published
- 2000
- Pages
- 153-173
- OpenAlex
- W2486146070
- Cited by
- 303
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 35.56
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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