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Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S.
- Venue
- Human Nature
- Published
- 2002-03
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 1045-6767
- 1936-4776
- OpenAlex
- W2083211140
- Cited by
- 1,372
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 83.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
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