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Cited by 358Virtual Reality Applications and ImpactsHallucinations in medical conditionsPsychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments

Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin

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Blanke, Olaf, Mohr, Christine·2005·Brain Research Reviews
DOI 10.1016/j.brainresrev.2005.05.008
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Abstract

Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are rare illusory visual experiences during which the subject has the impression of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space. AP consist of out-of-body experience (OBE), autoscopic hallucination (AH), and heautoscopy (HAS). The present article reviews and statistically analyzes phenomenological, functional, and anatomical variables in AP of neurological origin (n = 41 patients) that have been described over the last 100 years. This was carried out in order to further our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of AP, much as previous research into the neural bases of body part illusions has demystified these latter phenomena. Several variables could be extracted, which distinguish between or are comparable for the three AP providing testable hypotheses for subsequent research. Importantly, we believe that the scientific demystification of AP may be useful for the investigation of the cognitive functions and brain regions that mediate processing of the corporeal awareness and self consciousness under normal conditions.

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  • Autoscopic hallucinations are preferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporoparietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively.

    “Recent neuroanatomical analysis indicated that autoscopic hallucinations are preferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporoparietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively [27,47].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [27]

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  • For out-of-body experiences, damage was localized primarily in right temporo-parietal cortex.

    “For out-of-body experiences, damage was localized primarily in right temporo-parietal cortex (n= 12[27,51])”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [27]

    The Discussion reports that 67% of out-of-body experiences were associated with right-hemisphere damage, and Figure 3 says temporal-lobe involvement predominated. But the paper reports parietal involvement in only about half of cases and does not establish that damage was primarily localized to the right temporo-parietal cortex. Its analyzed group also comprised 11, not 12, out-of-body-experience cases. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • A breakdown of a single weak 1PP or the loss of spatial congruency between the weak 1PP and self-location has important consequences for MPS and the strong 1PP.

    “This indicates that a breakdown of a single weak 1PP or the loss of spatial congruency between the weak 1PP and self-location has important consequences for MPS and the strong 1PP [27].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [27]

    The Classification section (p. not available) describes heautoscopy as involving uncertain self-location and both body-centered and extracorporeal perspectives. The Conclusion (p. not available) links these disturbances to deficits in self-processing. The paper does not use the weak/strong 1PP or MPS framework or establish the specific relationship between those constructs asserted in the claim. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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  • The bodily self or MPS is altered and abnormal during out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy, and experimentally manipulated during the full-body illusion.

    “It is this bodily self or MPS which is altered and abnormal during out-of-body experiences [23-25], heautoscopy (see Box 2) [15,26,27] and experimentally manipulated during the full-body illusion [13,28].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [27]

  • MPS breaks down in neurological patients with illusory global own body perceptions, called autoscopic phenomena, characterized by seeing a second own body in extracorporeal space.

    “MPS breaks down in neurological patients with illusory global own body perceptions, called autoscopic phenomena [23,27,37,47-49], that are characterized by seeing a second own body in extracorporeal space: autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experience (Figure 1) (Box 2).”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [27]

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Cites

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11 of the 97 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. [37]37. Dewhurst and Pearson (1955, #2)
  2. [40]40. Dewhurst and Pearson (1955, #3)
  3. [51]51. Brugger et al. (in press) [19]
  4. [63]63. Zamboni et al. (in press) [104] The table shows all 41 published patients with either autoscopic hallucinations (n = 20), heautoscopy (n = 10), or an out-of-body experience (n = 11) due to circumscribed brain damage that were included and analyzed in the present study.
  5. [70]70. O. Blanke, Illusions visuelles, in: A.B. Safran, A. Vighetto, T. Landis, E. Cabanis (Eds.), Neurophtalmologie, Masson, Paris, 2004, pp. 147 -150.
  6. [82]82. P. Brugger. From phantom limb to phantom body, Perception of the Human Body Inside Out, in: G. Knoblich, I. Thornton, M. Grosjean, M. Shiffrar, (Eds.). Oxford, Oxford University Press (in press).
  7. [91]91. R. Crookall, More Astral Projections. Analyses of Case Histories, Aquarian Press, London, 1964.
  8. [113]113. H. He ´caen, J. Ajuriaguerra, L'He ´autoscopie, Me ´connassiances et hallucinations corporelles, Masson, Paris, 1952, pp. 310 -343.
  9. [120]120. S. Kamiya, S. Okamoto, Double consciousness in epileptics: a clinical picture and minor hemisphere specialization, in: H. Akimoto, H. Kzamatsuri, M. Seini, A. Wrad (Eds.), Advances in Epileptology, 13th Epilepsy International Symposium, Raven Press, New York, 1982, pp. 397 -401.
  10. [125]125. J. Lhermitte, Les phenome `nes he ´autoscopiques, les hallucinations spe ´culaires et autoscopiques, L'image de notre corps, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1939, pp. 170 -227.
  11. [136]136. E. Menninger-Lerchenthal, Das Truggebilde der eigenen Gestalt, Karger, Berlin, 1935.
  12. [138]138. T. Metzinger, Being No One, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003.
  13. [143]143. J. Pearson, K. Dewhurst, Sur deux cas de phe ´nomenes he ´auto- scopiques consecutifs a `le ´sions organiques, Ence ´phale 43 (1954) 166 -172.
  14. [152]152. P. Schilder, U ¨ber Autoskopie, u ¨ber die Lokalisation des Denkens und u ¨ber die ''Ichverdoppelungen'' der Hysterie, Selbstbewusstsein und Perso ¨nlichkeitsbewusstsein. Eine psychopathologische Studie, Springer, Berlin, 1914, pp. 229 -246.

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Authors
Blanke, O., & Mohr, C.
Affiliations
University Hospital of Geneva (CH)
Corresponding author
Blanke, Olaf
ORCID
Blanke, Olaf
Venue
Brain Research Reviews
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2005-12
Volume
50
Issue
1
Pages
184-199
ISSN
0165-0173 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.brainresrev.2005.05.008
OpenAlex
W2170517949
Semantic Scholar
d8bde2c5df837e82f76aabec6acc852dccc1f9ce
Cited by
358
References
97
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 16
FWCI
1.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Brain Research Reviews (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
Fondation Leenaards
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
Keywords
out-of-body experiences, body illusions, self-consciousness, visual perception, neural mechanisms
MeSH terms
Awareness, Body Image, Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Illusions, Functional Laterality, Psychophysiology

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