The perspective matters! Multisensory integration in ego-centric reference frames determines full body ownership.
Open accessAbstract
Recent advances in experimental science have made it possible to investigate the perceptual processes involved in generating a sense of owning an entire body. This is achieved by full-body ownership illusions which make use of specific patterns of visual and somatic stimuli integration. Here we investigate the fundamental question of the reference frames used in the process of attributing an entire body to the self. We quantified the strength of the body-swap illusion in conditions where the participants were observing this artificial body from the perspective of the first or third person. Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of this full-body ownership illusion. This demonstrates that the multisensory integration processes producing the sense of corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper tests whether full-body ownership induced by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation depends on visual perspective. Across three experiments, the body-swap illusion was consistently stronger when participants viewed the artificial body from a first-person perspective (1PP) than from a third-person perspective (3PP), supporting ego-centric multisensory integration for body ownership.
Key findings
- In Experiment 1 (n = 20), 17/20 participants reported that the mannequin’s body was their own when viewed from 1PP, versus only 7/20 from 3PP; a two-way ANOVA showed a significant Perspective × Question type interaction, F(1,19) = 10.226, p = 0.005.
- In Experiment 2 (n = 13), threat-evoked skin conductance responses (SCRs) were significantly greater for synchronous touches in 1PP than in 3PP, with a significant Perspective × Timing interaction, F(1,12) = 6.876, p = 0.022; pairwise synchronous vs. asynchronous comparison was significant only in 1PP (p = 0.017).
- In Experiment 3 (n = 17), the illusion was reproduced without head-mounted displays or video: SCR threat responses again showed a significant Perspective × Timing interaction, F(1,16) = 4.727, p = 0.045, with significant main effects of Perspective, F(1,16) = 12.195, p = 0.003, and Timing, F(1,16) = 48.963, p < 0.001; pairwise synchronous vs. asynchronous was significant only in 1PP (p < 0.01).
- The authors conclude that the first-person visual perspective is critical for full-body ownership and that multisensory integration producing the corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.
Methods
- Three behavioral experiments with a total of 50 naive healthy male participants: Experiment 1 n = 20 (mean age 24 ± 5 years), Experiment 2 n = 13 (27 ± 4 years), Experiment 3 n = 17 (24 ± 4 years); all were male because both mannequins were male.
- Experiments 1 and 2 used head-mounted displays connected to cameras on a mannequin’s head, allowing participants to view the mannequin from 1PP or 3PP while receiving synchronous or asynchronous touches to the mannequin and their own abdomen. Experiment 1 measured subjective illusion via a nine-item questionnaire on a seven-point Likert scale; Experiment 2 measured threat-evoked SCRs after a knife was moved along the mannequin’s abdomen.
- Experiment 3 used a direct-view set-up without HMDs or video: participants lay on a tilted bed with a mannequin body positioned over them for 1PP, or viewed a second mannequin on an adjacent bed for 3PP, with synchronous/asynchronous touches and threat-evoked SCRs. Main analyses were two-way ANOVAs and pairwise comparisons.
Limitations
- Stated: the 3PP condition differed from 1PP not only in perspective but also in that the mannequin was observed in far extrapersonal space rather than peripersonal space; the authors note future experiments could test a mannequin placed close and facing the participant within reaching distance.
- Evident: all participants were male and both mannequins were male, so the findings may not generalize to female participants or female bodies.
- Evident: the paper relies on subjective questionnaire ratings in Experiment 1 and threat-evoked SCRs in Experiments 2 and 3; the authors interpret weak 3PP affirmative ratings as possible general self-recognition rather than genuine body ownership, but this distinction is inferential.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 51 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data
The full-body illusion can be evoked without the help of head-mounted displays and video-technology.
“Experiment #3: The full-body illusion can be evoked without the help of HMDs and video-technology.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Experiment #2, there was a significant interaction between the main factors Perspective (first vs. third) and Timing of the visual and tactile stimuli [synchronous vs. asynchronous; F(1,12) = 6.876, p = 0.022, two-way ANOVA].
“Statistically, this corresponded to a significant interaction between the main factors “Perspective” (first vs. third) and “Timing of the visual and tactile stimuli” [synchronous vs. asynchronous; F(1,12) = 6.876, p = 0.022, two-way ANOVA].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Experiment 3, pairwise comparisons of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions were only significant when the first-person perspective was adopted (p < 0.01).
“The pairwise comparisons of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions were only significant when the 1PP was adopted (p < 0.01; Figure 1C).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In Experiment 2, direct pairwise comparisons of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions reached significance only when the mannequin was observed from the first-person perspective (p = 0.017).
“Direct pairwise comparisons of the synchronous and asynchronous conditions reached significance only when the mannequin was observed from the 1PP (p = 0.017; see Figure 1B).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Objective evidence for the effect of visual perspective on the full-body illusion was obtained in a second experiment using a different group of 13 naïve participants.
“Objective evidence for this effect was obtained in a second experiment using a different group of 13 naïve participants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
In Experiment 3, there was a significant interaction between perspective (first vs. third) and timing of visual and tactile stimulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous) on threat-evoked SCRs (F(1,16) = 4.727, p = 0.045).
“As expected, we observed significantly greater threat-evoked responses in the condition when the body was observed from the 1PP and the touches on the two bodies were synchronized (a significant interaction between the main factors “Perspective” (first vs. third) and “Timing of visual and tactile stimulation” [synchronous vs. asynchronous; F(1,16) = 4.727, p = 0.045, two-way ANOVA].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In Experiment 3, there was a significant main effect of perspective on threat-evoked SCRs (F(1,16) = 12.195, p = 0.003).
“There were significant differences between the levels of the factors “Perspective” [F(1, 16) = 12.195, p = 0.003], and “Timing” [F(1,16) = 48.963, p < 0.001; Figure 3C].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In Experiment 3, threat-evoked SCRs were significantly greater in the condition when the body was observed from the first-person perspective and the touches on the two bodies were synchronized.
“As expected, we observed significantly greater threat-evoked responses in the condition when the body was observed from the 1PP and the touches on the two bodies were synchronized (a significant interaction between the main factors “Perspective” (first vs. third) and “Timing of visual and tactile stimulation” [synchronous vs. asynchronous; F(1,16) = 4.727, p = 0.045, two-way ANOVA].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In Experiment #2, the threat-evoked increase in skin conductance responses was significant only in the condition in which the participant observed the synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation from the first person perspective.
“Experiment #2: The threat-evoked increase in the skin conductance responses (SCR) was significant only in the condition in which the participant observed the synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation from the first person perspective.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Experiment 3, there was a significant main effect of timing of visual and tactile stimulation on threat-evoked SCRs (F(1,16) = 48.963, p < 0.001).
“There were significant differences between the levels of the factors “Perspective” [F(1, 16) = 12.195, p = 0.003], and “Timing” [F(1,16) = 48.963, p < 0.001; Figure 3C].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In Experiment #2, the threat-evoked physiological reaction was significantly greater in the condition with synchronous touches when the mannequin was observed from the 1PP than when it was seen from the 3PP.
“We found that the threat-evoked physiological reaction was significantly greater in the condition with synchronous touches when the mannequin was observed from the 1PP than when it was seen from the 3PP.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The body-swap illusion can be elicited without the use of video technology.
“This is in stark contrast to the body-swap illusion, which can be elicited without the use of video-technology, as we have demonstrated here.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the first two experiments, weak affirmative rating scores for the statement that the mannequin body was one's own were observed in the third-person visual perspective condition with synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.
“In the first two experiments, reported here, where the participants were wearing the HMDs, we observed weak affirmative rating scores for the statement that the mannequin body was one's own also in the third person visual perspective condition with synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (Figure 3A).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the first two experiments, questionnaire ratings were significantly lower in the third-person perspective condition compared to the first-person perspective condition.
“However, the ratings scores were significantly lower in comparison to the condition where the 1PP was adopted and there were no significant changes in the threat-evoked SCRs (see Figures 3B,C).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Findingown data
In the first two experiments, there were no significant changes in threat-evoked SCRs in the third-person perspective condition.
“However, the ratings scores were significantly lower in comparison to the condition where the 1PP was adopted and there were no significant changes in the threat-evoked SCRs (see Figures 3B,C).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Interpretationown data
Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of the full-body ownership illusion.
“Consistent results from subjective reports and physiological recordings show that the first person visual perspective is critical for the induction of this full-body ownership illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire ratings validly measure the subjective experience of body ownership.
- Interpretationown data
The multisensory integration processes producing the sense of corporeal self operate in an ego-centric reference frame.
“This demonstrates that the multisensory integration processes producing the sense of corporeal self operates in an ego-centric reference frame.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
At the core of the body-swap perceptual phenomenon is the integration of multiple sources of sensory information centered on the spatial location of the new body.
“This findings suggest at the core of this perceptual phenomenon is the integration of multiple sources of sensory information centered on the spatial location of the “new” body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- Premisecitation
In the body-swap illusion, participants are able to sense touches applied to the body of a shop mannequin and experience this body as their own.
“In one such full-body illusion, the “body-swap illusion” (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), the participants are able to sense the touches applied to the body of a shop mannequin and experience this body as their own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- Interpretationcitation
The illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on the new body having a sufficiently humanoid body shape.
“The results of the present study, together with those from a previous report from our lab (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), show that the illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on: (i) temporal congruency of the visual and tactile signals applied in peripersonal space (i.e., within reaching distance); (ii) the “new” body having a sufficiently humanoid body shape; and (iii”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- Interpretationown data
The illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on using the first-person visual perspective.
“The results of the present study, together with those from a previous report from our lab (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), show that the illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on: (i) temporal congruency of the visual and tactile signals applied in peripersonal space (i.e., within reaching distance); (ii) the “new” body having a sufficiently humanoid body shape; and (iii”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The same constraints apply to the experience of the rubber hand illusion.
“The same constraints apply to the experience of the rubber hand illusion, which is an experimental model to study the self-attribution of a single body limb (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007; Tsakiris, 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Botvinick and Cohen, 1998
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- cites Ehrsson et al., 2004
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- cites Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005
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- Premisecitation
Asynchronous touches on the two bodies have been shown to eliminate or significantly reduce the full-body illusion.
“because asynchronous touches on the two bodies have been shown to eliminate or significantly reduce the illusion (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- Premisecitation
In the enfacement effect experiments, the face of the other person was viewed from a third-person perspective.
“However, in these experiments the face of the other person was viewed from a 3PP, which is consistent with the fact that this effect was not associated with a consciously experienced body (face) illusion, as evident from the rather low questionnaire rating scores when potential illusory experiences were probed (Sforza et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sforza et al., 2010
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- Interpretationcitation
The integration of temporally and spatially congruent visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals generates a perceptually coherent percept of one's own body.
“In this multisensory framework, the integration of temporally, and spatially congruent visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals generates a perceptually coherent percept of one's own body (Makin et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Ehrsson, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Makin et al., 2008
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- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- cites Ehrsson, 2011
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- Interpretationreasoning
The very basic sensation of owning one's body is the result of a constructive process where visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals are integrated in ego-centric coordinates.
“This is an important observation as it shows that the very basic sensation of owning one's body is the result of a constructive process where visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals are integrated in ego-centric coordinates.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Two principally different experimental set-ups have been used to induce full-body illusions associated with changes in perceived body ownership in healthy participants.
“More directly relevant for the question of how a normally functioning mind creates a multisensory experience of one's own body, as is under consideration here, is the fact that two principally different experimental set-ups have been used to induce “full-body illusions” associated with changes in perceived body ownership in healthy participants (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lenggenhager et al., 2007
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- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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- Premisecitation
Multisensory integration in body-part-centered reference frames is a crucial mechanism for the self-attribution of limbs as well as entire bodies.
“corroborate models that emphasize that multisensory integration in body-part-centered reference frames is a crucial mechanism for the self-attribution of limbs as well as entire bodies (Makin et al., 2008; Ehrsson, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Makin et al., 2008
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- cites Ehrsson, 2011
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- Interpretationown data
The specific threat-evoked increase in the skin conductance response when the body was observed from the first person perspective emphasizes the importance of this visual perspective for the mechanism of attributing a body to oneself.
“The specific threat-evoked increase in the SCR when the body was observed from the first person perspective again emphasizes the importance of this visual perspective for the mechanism of attributing a body to oneself.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The enfacement effect was not associated with a consciously experienced body (face) illusion, as evident from low questionnaire rating scores.
“However, in these experiments the face of the other person was viewed from a 3PP, which is consistent with the fact that this effect was not associated with a consciously experienced body (face) illusion, as evident from the rather low questionnaire rating scores when potential illusory experiences were probed (Sforza et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sforza et al., 2010
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- Premisecitation
In Lenggenhager et al. (2007), participants reported self-attribution of the seen body only when visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronized.
“According to the questionnaire data, the participants reported a self-attribution of the seen (own vs. mannequin's) body only when the visuo-tactile stimulation was synchronized.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lenggenhager et al., 2007
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- Interpretationown data
The first-person visual perspective is critical for triggering the illusion of full-body ownership.
“Thus, both the physiological and the questionnaire data showed that the first person visual perspective is an important factor for attributing the body of a mannequin to one's self.”
- Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
“Our results demonstrated that the first person visual perspective is critical for triggering the illusion of full-body ownership.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Discussion · boosted
- Interpretationreasoning
Both the full-body illusion and the rubber hand illusion likely rely on similar multisensory mechanisms.
“Thus, it is likely that both phenomena rely on similar multisensory mechanisms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on temporal congruency of the visual and tactile signals applied in peripersonal space.
“The results of the present study, together with those from a previous report from our lab (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008), show that the illusion of perceiving an entire body as belonging to oneself depends on: (i) temporal congruency of the visual and tactile signals applied in peripersonal space (i.e., within reaching distance); (ii) the “new” body having a sufficiently humanoid body shape; and (iii”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationown data
The egocentric reference frame is important for the emergence of the corporeal sense of self.
“In summary, the present experiments have revealed that the egocentric reference frame is important for the emergence of the corporeal sense of self.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The perceptual principles of the full-body illusion might derive from the multisensory integration mechanisms in operation in these brain areas.
“Thus, the perceptual principles of the full-body illusion might derive from the multisensory integration mechanisms in operation in these areas (Ehrsson, 2010; Petkova et al., submitted).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ehrsson, 2010
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- cites Petkova et al., submitted
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- Premisecitation
In the primate brain, regions in the intraparietal cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, the premotor cortex, and the putamen are implicated in integrating visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information in body-centered reference frames.
“In the primate brain, regions in the intraparietal cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, the premotor cortex, and the putamen are implicated in integrating visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information in body-centered reference frames (Fogassi et al., 1992; Graziano and Gross, 1993; Graziano et al., 1997; Graziano, 1999; Graziano and Botvinick, 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Fogassi et al., 1992
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- cites Graziano and Gross, 1993
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- cites Graziano et al., 1997
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- Interpretationown data
When observing a mannequin in far extrapersonal space from a third-person perspective, a somatic illusion of full-body ownership is absent, or at least significantly weaker.
“According to the results presented here, when observing a mannequin in far extrapersonal space from a 3PP, as in the study by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), a somatic illusion of this kind is absent, or at least significantly weaker.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The full-body illusion presented here is compatible with the neurophysiological and neuroimaging literature on multisensory integration of sensory information from the body.
“The full-body illusion presented here is compatible with the neurophysiological and neuroimaging literature on multisensory integration of sensory information from the body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
It is very unlikely that the significant reduction in the strength of the illusion in the third-person perspective condition was simply due to the mannequin being positioned in far extrapersonal space.
“When designing the experiments we found it very unlikely that the significant reduction in the strength of the illusion in the 3PP condition could simply be due to the fact the mannequin was positioned in the far extrapersonal space.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The illusion presented here involves a complete perceptual binding of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information onto the mannequin's body, which is experienced somatically to be one's own body.
“The key difference is that the illusion presented here involves a complete perceptual binding of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information onto the mannequin's body, which is experienced, somatically, to be one's own body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
It is plausible that participants in Lenggenhager et al. (2007) recognized the virtual body as a visual representation of their own body without necessarily experiencing a somatic illusion of ownership.
“Thus, it is plausible that the participants in this experiment recognized the virtual body they saw as a visual representation of their own body, without necessarily experiencing a somatic illusion of ownership in the same way as in the rubber hand illusion or in the body-swap illusion described here and in Petkova and Ehrsson (2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Rotations of the model hand so that it no longer matches the posture of the hidden real hand eliminate the rubber hand illusion even when the rubber hand is positioned in peripersonal space.
“Research in the rubber hand illusion has shown that rotations of the model hand so that it is no longer matches the posture of the hidden real hand eliminates the illusion even when the rubber hand is positioned in the peripersonal space (Pavani et al., 2000; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Pavani et al., 2000
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- cites Ehrsson et al., 2005
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- cites Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005
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- Interpretationown data
The weak affirmative ratings in the third-person perspective condition are interpreted as a form of general self-recognition rather than a genuine body illusion.
“Thus, we interpreted this effect as a form of general self-recognition rather than a genuine body illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The rubber hand illusion breaks down if the rubber hand is placed in far extrapersonal space.
“In addition, it has been shown that the rubber hand illusion breaks down if the rubber hand is placed in far extrapersonal space (Lloyd, 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lloyd, 2007
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- May combine two claims. 18
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 18
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Experiment #2, the main effect of the factor Perspective did not reach significance [F(1,12) = 2.761, p = 0.122], whereas the levels of the factor Timing were significantly different [F(1,12) = 5.160, p = 0.042].
“The main effect of the factor “Perspective” did not reach significance F(1,12) = 2.761, p = 0.122, however the levels of the factor “Timing” were significantly different F(1,12) = 5.160, p = 0.042 (Figure 3B).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the 1PP condition of Experiment #1, the mean rating scores for the three illusion questions were greater than for the six control questions, and this difference was greater than in the 3PP condition.
“Importantly, in the 1PP condition, the mean rating scores for the three illusion questions were greater than for the six control questions, and this difference was greater than in the 3PP condition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire ratings validly measure the subjective experience of body ownership.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Experiment #1, there were significant differences between the levels of the factors Perspective [first vs. third; F(1, 19) = 5.787, p = 0.026] and Question type [illusion vs. control; F(1,19) = 111.914, p < 0.001], and a significant interaction between the two factors [F(1,19) = 10.226, p = 0.005] in a two-way 2 × 2 ANOVA.
“Thus, there were significant differences between the levels of the factors “Perspective” [first vs. third; F(1, 19) = 5.787, p = 0.026], and “Question type” [illusion vs. control; F(1,19) = 111.914, p < 0.001] and, crucially, a significant interaction between the two factors [F(1,19) = 10.226, p = 0.005] in two-way 2 × 2 ANOVA.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire ratings validly measure the subjective experience of body ownership.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Experiment #1, 17 out of 20 participants perceived that the mannequin's body was their own body when viewed from the 1PP, whereas only 7 out of 20 affirmed this experience when they viewed the body from the third person visual perspective.
“The results showed that 17 out of the 20 participants perceived that the mannequin's body was their own body when viewed from the 1PP. In contrast, only seven out of 20 affirmed this experience when they viewed the body from the third person visual perspective (Figure 3A).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The questionnaire ratings validly measure the subjective experience of body ownership.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThe self-recognition effect completely disappears if one tries to induce the illusion from a third-person perspective without HMDs.
“This conclusion would be consistent with our experience from pilot experiments (see also Ehrsson and Petkova's response to Meyer et al., 2008) that this “self-recognition” effect completely disappears if one tries to induce the illusion from a 3PP without HMDs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe body-swap illusion is abolished, or significantly reduced, if the human body is replaced with an object that does not have a humanoid shape (e.g., a block of wood) or if asynchronous touches are applied to the two bodies.
“The illusion is abolished, or significantly reduced, if the human body is replaced with an object that does not have a humanoid shape (e.g., a block of wood) or if asynchronous touches are applied to the two bodies (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn spatial cognition research, a basic distinction is made between the first person perspective (1PP) and the third person perspective (3PP), related to ego-centric and allocentric reference frames, respectively.
“In spatial cognition research, a basic distinction is made between the first person perspective (1PP) and the third person perspective (3PP; Vogeley and Fink, 2003), related to ego-centric and allocentric reference frames, respectively (Klatzky, 1998; Burgess, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Vogeley and Fink, 2003
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- cites Klatzky, 1998
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- cites Burgess, 2006
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PremisecitationThe body-swap illusion is evoked when the experimenter applies identical synchronous touches to the body of the mannequin and the participant's body.
“The illusion is evoked when the experimenter applies identical synchronous touches to the body of the mannequin and the participant's body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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May combine two claims.
Study design and conductcitationThe threat-evoked skin conductance response is related to autonomic nervous system arousal when the own body is physically threatened and can be used as an objective index of the full-body illusion.
“The threat-evoked SCR is related to autonomic nervous system arousal when the own body is physically threatened and can be used as an objective index of the illusion (as described in detail in Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
InterpretationreasoningIf the visual perspective is irrelevant, one would anticipate that the body ownership illusion would be evoked equally well when the illusory body is viewed from a 3PP or from a 1PP.
“Logically, if the visual perspective is irrelevant, one would anticipate that the body ownership illusion would be evoked equally well in these two situations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn autoscopy, people perceive themselves as being outside their own body looking at it from an altered egocentric perspective, yet still report that the body they observe is their own, demonstrating intact body self-attribution despite viewing the body from a 3PP.
“For example, in evoked or spontaneous cases of autoscopy, a form of out-of-body experience in which people perceive themselves as being outside their own body looking at it from an altered egocentric perspective, people still report that the body they observe is their own, thus, they demonstrate intact body self-attribution, despite the fact that they are viewing the body from a 3PP (Blanke et al.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Blanke et al., 2002, 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Blanke and Mohr, 2005
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductcitationTo control for the unspecific effect of seeing a knife, a 2 × 2 factorial design was used where the visual perspective and the synchronicity of the applied touches to the mannequin's and the participant's bodies were systematically varied.
“To control for the unspecific effect of seeing a knife, we used a 2 × 2 factorial design where we systematically varied the visual perspective and the synchronicity of the applied touches to the mannequin's and the participant's bodies”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenIn Experiment #3, the four conditions (1PP Sync, 1PP Async, 3PP Sync, and 3PP Async) were repeated three times in an order that was balanced over all the participants.
“The four conditions (1PP Sync, 1PP Async, 3PP Sync, and 3PP Async) were repeated three times in an order that was balanced over all the participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenIn Experiment #3, a curtain was positioned over the body of mannequin #1 resting on top of the participant's body to hide it from the participant, and also occluded the experimenter.
“A curtain was positioned over the body of mannequin #1 resting on top of the participant's body (see previous paragraph) to hide it from the participant. The curtain was also occluding the experimenter, who applied synchronous (3PP sync) or asynchronous (3PP async) touches on the right lateral part of the abdomens of the participant and mannequin #2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe full-body ownership illusion can be induced in a real-life set-up without HMDs or video technology, but only when the mannequin is viewed from the first-person perspective.
“Thus, the illusion could be induced without the help of HMDs, but only when the mannequin was viewed from the 1PP.”
- Also stated in: § Experiment 3: Eliciting the illusion without using head-mounted displays and video-technology · plain
“Next, we reproduced our findings in a real life set-up and excluded the possibility that the illusion depends on the video-technology used.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
- Also stated in: § Experiment 3: Eliciting the illusion without using head-mounted displays and video-technology · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAn ego-centric reference frame is a coordinate system centered on the body, and is considered important for functions related to perception and to performing actions.
“An ego-centric reference frame is a coordinate system centered on the body, and is considered to be important for functions related to perception and to performing actions (Fogassi et al., 1992; Graziano and Gross, 1998).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Fogassi et al., 1992
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Graziano and Gross, 1998
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenIn Experiment #2, the four conditions were repeated three times in a pseudo-randomized order.
“The experiment consisted of four conditions, repeated three times in a pseudo-randomized order.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe sense of body ownership relies on multisensory integration mechanisms operating in body-part-centered reference frames.
“This would be in line with the proposed model that the sense of body ownership relies on multisensory integration mechanisms operating in body-part-centered reference frames (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Ehrsson, 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Ehrsson et al., 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Makin et al., 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn full-body illusion experiments, synchronous visual and tactile stimulation is always applied both to the artificial body in sight of the participant and the participant's own body which is out of sight.
“In these experiments, synchronous visual and tactile stimulation is always applied both to the artificial body in sight of the participant and the participant's own body which is out of sight.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lenggenhager et al., 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe order of the two conditions in Experiment #1 was balanced across the participants.
“The order of the conditions was balanced across the participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIn the enfacement effect, people show a self-bias on visual face recognition tasks after a period of looking at the face of another person sitting opposite themselves while synchronous touches are applied to both this face and their own.
“For example, in the “enfacement effect” (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010), people show a self-bias on visual face recognition tasks after a period of looking at the face of another person sitting opposite themselves while synchronous touches are applied to both this face and their own.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Tsakiris, 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Sforza et al., 2010
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductown dataIn Experiment #3, the experimenter was out of sight, hidden behind a curtain, to prevent the participants from seeing the experimenter's hand touching the participant's own abdomen.
“While this was going on, the experimenter was out of sight, hidden behind a curtain, to prevent the participants from seeing the experimenter's hand touching the participant's own abdomen.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe allocentric reference frame corresponds to world coordinates centered on a reference point in extrapersonal space, and is considered important for spatial cognitive functions such as determining one's location with respect to environmental landmarks, spatial navigation, and spatial memory.
“In contrast, the allocentric reference frame corresponds to world coordinates centered on a reference point in extrapersonal space. This coordinate system is considered important for spatial cognitive functions such as determining one's location with respect to environmental landmarks, spatial navigation, and spatial memory (Maguire et al., 1998; Burgess, 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Maguire et al., 1998
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Burgess, 2006
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningAll participants were male to exclude a possible confounding effect of gender because both mannequins used in the experiment were male.
“All participants were male to exclude possible confounding effect of gender as both mannequins used in the experiment were male.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe illusory own body in full-body illusions is either viewed from a 3PP, as though looking at another individual a couple of meters in front of oneself, or from a 1PP, as though directly looking down at one's body.
“However, the illusory “own” body is either viewed from a 3PP, as though looking at another individual a couple of meters in front of oneself (Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009; Aspell et al., 2009), or from a 1PP (Ehrsson, 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Slater et al., 2009, 2010), as though directly looking down at one's body.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Lenggenhager et al., 2007, 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Aspell et al., 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Ehrsson, 2007
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe present full-body illusion is a genuine body ownership illusion and not merely a more general form of self-recognition.
“It also corroborates the interpretation that the present illusion is a genuine body ownership illusion and not merely a more general form of self-recognition, as is the case when recognizing oneself in a mirror or on a CCTV screen.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBoth the first-person perspective and the presentation of the body in peripersonal space are necessary conditions to elicit a vivid full-body illusion.
“Thus, the most likely explanation is that both the 1PP and the presentation of the body in peripersonal space are necessary conditions to elicit a vivid full-body illusion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBoth perspective and spatial location could have contributed to the abolishment of the illusion observed in the third-person perspective conditions.
“Thus, in principle, both these factors could have contributed to the abolishment of the illusion observed in the 3PP conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThese brain areas are active during visuo-tactile stimulation of the human body and show activity associated with the rubber illusion and the present full-body illusion.
“These areas are active during visuo-tactile stimulation of the human body and show activity associated with the rubber illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005) and the present full-body illusion according to very recent data from our lab (Petkova et al., submitted).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Petkova et al., submitted
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningIn the experiments reported here, the third-person perspective condition differed from the first-person perspective condition both in terms of perspective and in that the mannequin was observed in far extrapersonal space rather than in peripersonal space.
“A careful reader might have noted that the 3PP condition in the experiments reported here differed from the 1PP condition both in terms of perspective as such, and in that the mannequin was observed in far extrapersonal space rather than in peripersonal space.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The questionnaire ratings validly measure the subjective experience of body ownership.
“After each condition, the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire, in which they had to affirm or deny nine possible perceptual effects using a seven-point Likert scale (Figure 3A).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Threat-evoked SCRs objectively quantify the full-body ownership illusion.
“In a new group of 17 naïve volunteers, we made use of the threat-evoked SCRs to quantify the illusion objectively.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
First person perspective dominates visual-tactile synchrony in its contribution towards body ownership illusions.
“Such an account is in line with the findings in [30], [31] that first person perspective dominates visual-tactile synchrony in its contribution towards body ownership illusions.”
From Extending body space in immersive virtual reality: a very long arm illusion (2012) · cites this paper as [31]
These bodily illusions demonstrate the efficiency of current multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal 1st person-perspective, self-location and self-identification.
“These bodily illusions demonstrate the efficiency of current multisensory input in determining the experience of a minimal 1st person-perspective [28], [29], self-location [27] and self-identification [28]–[30], three critical dimensions of the experience of selfhood [31].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [29]
First person perspective has been found to be an important factor in the illusion of body ownership.
“Such first person perspective has been found to be an important factor in the illusion of body ownership13565758.”
From Conversations between self and self as Sigmund Freud—A virtual body ownership paradigm for self counselling (2015) · cites this paper as [57]
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- ConsistentF(1, 19) = 5.787reported p = .026 · recomputed p = .026
“F(1, 19) = 5.787, p = .026”
- ConsistentF(1, 19) = 111.914reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1,19) = 111.914, p < .001”
- ConsistentF(1, 19) = 10.226reported p = .005 · recomputed p = .005
“F(1,19) = 10.226, p = .005”
- ConsistentF(1, 12) = 6.876reported p = .022 · recomputed p = .022
“F(1,12) = 6.876, p = .022”
- ConsistentF(1, 12) = 2.761reported p = .122 · recomputed p = .122
“F(1,12) = 2.761, p = .122”
- ConsistentF(1, 12) = 5.16reported p = .042 · recomputed p = .042
“F(1,12) = 5.160, p = .042”
- ConsistentF(1, 16) = 4.727reported p = .045 · recomputed p = .045
“F(1,16) = 4.727, p = .045”
- ConsistentF(1, 16) = 12.195reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .003
“F(1, 16) = 12.195, p = .003”
- ConsistentF(1, 16) = 48.963reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“F(1,16) = 48.963, p < .001”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.
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- Authors
- Petkova, V. I., Khoshnevis, M., & Ehrsson, H. H.
- Affiliations
- Karolinska Institutet (SE)
- Corresponding author
- Petkova, Valeria I.
- ORCID
- Ehrsson, H. Henrik
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 2
- Pages
- 35-35
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3108400
- OpenAlex
- W2140916178
- Semantic Scholar
- 51dbb83959c423821ad514e3b575f8181dfe506d
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 18 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 24.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- multisensory integration, first-person perspective, third-person perspective, body image, self-perception
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