The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation
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Citations
Cites
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“In the " image score " version (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998), Ego's reputation as a cooperator is enhanced if she cooperates (with any other player) and reduced if she defects.”
BackgroundSocial semantics: altruism, cooperation, mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection.
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The evolution of altruistic punishment
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“…may find itself " stuck with " a set of norms in some domain that are Pareto-inferior (yield lower collective benefits) to some alternative set (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004); for example, new modes of subsistence might favor a shift from communal land ownership to kin-group ownership, but…”
BackgroundNice Guys Finish First: The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis
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“Although the image score version of indirect reciprocity is simpler (both analytically and in terms of the cognitive mechanisms it presumes), analysis indicates it is not evolutionarily stable (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).”
BackgroundGroup Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism
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“Although some recent models and empirical estimates have argued for this possibility in human evolution (Bowles, 2006, 2009), the models reviewed here involve culturally transmitted variation in strategies. One special property of cultural transmission that can facilitate group selection is conformism; unlike the gene…”
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“Signaling via providing collective goods has also been reported or hypothesized for several noneconomic arenas, particularly various forms of religious ritual (Boone, 1998, 2000; Irons, 2001; Sosis, 2003; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Sosis & Bressler, 2003; Sosis, Kress & Boster, 2007; Wilson, 2008 ).”
BackgroundHow should we define goodness?—reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
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“Barclay and Willer (2007) used a dyadic prisoners dilemma game with varying opportunities for partner choice and signaling of cooperative intent for future rounds with observers; they found that subjects were more generous when they stood to benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships,…”
BackgroundGroup beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.
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Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons”
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“Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism”
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Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00154-1 · Cited by 388
The hunting handicap: costly signaling in human foraging strategies
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Self-citationCooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
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Multiple gossip statements and their effect on reputation and trustworthiness
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“Communication with third parties about the past behavior of others — in a word, gossip — could potentially fill this gap (Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Nowak, 2006, p. 1561; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003, p. 119; Smith, 2003, p. 419).”
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Cited by
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1400106x · Cited by 639
Cooperation and the evolution of hunter-gatherer storytelling
Smith, D., Schlaepfer, P., Major, K., Dyble, M., Page, A. E., Thompson, J., Chaudhary, N., Salali, G. D., Mace, R., Astete, L., et al. (2017) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02036-8 · Cited by 333
Storytelling as Adaptive Collective Sensemaking
Bietti, L. M., Tilston, O., & Bangerter, A. (2019) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12358 · Cited by 205
African elephants address one another with individually specific name-like calls
Pardo, M. A., Fristrup, K., Lolchuragi, D. S., Poole, J. H., Granli, P., Moss, C., Douglas-Hamilton, I., & Wittemyer, G. (2024) · Nature Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1038/s41559-024-02420-w · Cited by 62
Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Santos, F. C., & Trianni, V. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0635 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Smith, E. A.
- Venue
- Evolution and Human Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-07
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 231-245
- ISSN
- 1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035426384
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 26.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.