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Cited by 690

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Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?

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Gibbons, Robert·2005·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010
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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Gibbons, R.
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2005-10
Volume
58
Issue
2
Pages
200-245
ISSN
0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010
OpenAlex
W3122162510
Cited by
690
References
6
FWCI
77.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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