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The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments
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Beyond the Turk: Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.01.006 · Cited by 2,957
Data collection in a flat world: the strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples
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Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 299
- Pages
- 172-179
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2169800142
- Cited by
- 683
- References
- 82
- FWCI
- 116.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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