Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood

In the paper

“Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] Metzinger, 2003 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] Metzinger, 2003, Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, Phenom. Cogn. Sci. source
• Partly supported

  Theoretical considerations (page unavailable) describes a central representation of one’s body, and Discussion Phenomenology (page unavailable) reports preserved self-recognition during autoscopic experiences. The paper does not say that the body model is phenomenally transparent or that inability to recognize it introspectively causes full identification with its content. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [24] Metzinger, 2005, Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a “soul”, Mind and Matter

In the paper

“It is this bodily self or MPS which is altered and abnormal during out-of-body experiences [23-25], heautoscopy (see Box 2) [15,26,27] and experimentally manipulated during the full-body illusion [13,28].”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Abstract describes out-of-body experiences as disorders of body perception and cognition, and Theoretical considerations describes disrupted integration of body-related sensory information in both out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy. The full-body illusion is attributed to a separate citation group in the citing sentence, so it is not a claim this source needs to support. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [24] Metzinger, 2005, Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a “soul”, Mind and Matter
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [25] Blanke, 2002, Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions, Nature source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [15] Brugger, 2002, Reflective mirrors: perspective-taking in autoscopic phenomena, Cogn. Neuropsychiatry source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [26] Blanke, 2007, Clinical neuroimaging in epileptic patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experiences. Case report and review of the literature, Epileptologie
• Supported

  The cited paper supports the part of the sentence concerning heautoscopy: §5.1 describes difficulty locating the observing self and a possible reduplication of the self, while §4.2 reports body-schema disturbances in heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences. The full-body illusion has separate citations in the citing sentence and is not attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science source

In the paper

“Out-of-body experiences are highly realistic, and most often there is no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon [23].”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Visual phenomenology section describes the patients’ out-of-body experiences as vivid and veridical, with high visual clarity. The Discussion Phenomenology section concludes that out-of-body experiences are mostly experienced as veridical, supporting the claim that people generally do not recognize them as illusory while they occur. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both in alternation [23,27,49] (Box 2).”

• Also stated in: § Heautoscopy · plain

  “Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both, in alternation or simultaneously.”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Discussion (Phenomenology) and Fig. 5 (Theoretical considerations; page not provided) describe heautoscopy as involving visual perspectives from the physical and illusory bodies, sometimes in alternation. They do not establish the more specific claim that self-identification shifts between those bodies; visual perspective and self-identification are not the same finding. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Supported

  Section 2.1 (Classification; page not provided) says that in heautoscopy the self may be localized in the physical body or the autoscopic body. Section 5 (Discussion; page not provided) describes bilocation occurring in rapid succession between those bodies, supporting the claim about alternation. (LLM, conf=0.92)

  cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [49] Brugger, 1997, Illusory reduplication of one's own body: phenomenology and classification of autoscopic phenomena, Cogn. Neuropsychiatry source

In the paper

“Autoscopic phenomena are associated with multisensory disintegration and can be caused by focal brain damage (Figure 2) [26,27].”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [26] Blanke, 2007, Clinical neuroimaging in epileptic patients with autoscopic hallucinations and out-of-body experiences. Case report and review of the literature, Epileptologie
• Supported

  Section 5.1 states that autoscopic phenomena result from multisensory disintegration. The patient table describes 41 cases of autoscopic phenomena due to circumscribed brain damage. Page numbers were not provided in the excerpts. (LLM, conf=0.93)

  cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. source

In the paper

“Out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment and people always self-identify with the illusory body as represented.”

• Also stated in: § Out-of-body experience · plain

  “Self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are never at the position of the physical body as represented, and out-of-body experiences are associated with a sense of disembodiment (the experience that the subject of conscious experience is localized outside the person's bodily borders) [23].”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Theoretical considerations section links OBEs with disembodiment, and Visual phenomenology reports that all three OBE patients localized their perspective in a second, parasomatic body. This supports the self-location aspect, but the paper does not establish that people always self-identify with an illusory body across OBEs generally; its observation is limited to the patients studied. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Recent neuroanatomical analysis indicated that autoscopic hallucinations are preferentially caused by damage to right parieto-occipital or right temporo-occipital cortex, whereas heautoscopy and out-of-body experience are caused by damage to temporoparietal cortex of the left and right hemisphere, respectively [27,47].”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites [27] Blanke, 2005, Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-consciousness, Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites [47] Blanke, 2008, Illusory reduplications of the human body and self, Handbook of Clinical Neurology sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Another sensory system important for global body representation and MPS is the vestibular system because it encodes translation and rotation of the body in addition to orientation with respect to gravity [45,46].”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The section on the multisensory vestibular cortex links vestibular cues to body movement, body position in space, and an accurate representation of body location. The section on microgravity also describes illusory rotation, translation, and verticality. These passages support the body-representation rationale, but our copy does not establish the claimed importance of the vestibular system for MPS specifically. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  cites [45] Lopez, 2008, Body ownership and embodiment: vestibular and multisensory mechanisms, Neurophysiol. Clin. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [46] Lopez, 2007, Neuropsychology and Neurophysiology of Self-Consciousness. Multisensory and vestibular mechanisms

In the paper

“Moreover, self-location and weak 1PP might change their experienced position (between the position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in rapid alternation.”

• Also stated in: § Heautoscopy · plain

  “Both MPS dimensions can change their experienced position (between the position of the illusory and the physical body as represented) and this can occur in rapid alternation [23].”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Discussion Phenomenology section reports rapid alternation between parasomatic and physical visuo-spatial perspectives in heautoscopy, supporting the first-person-perspective part of the claim. It also says these patients did not feel out of their bodies, so the paper does not establish that their experienced self-location alternated between the two bodies. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Heautoscopy is highly realistic and the person has most often no insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  In Discussion Phenomenology (page not provided), the paper says the seen body in heautoscopy can be highly realistic and that heautoscopy is mostly experienced as veridical. Experiencing it as real supports the claim that people most often do not recognize its illusory character during the experience. (LLM, conf=0.90)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“Heautoscopy is often associated with the sensation of 'being split in two selves' [23].”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Discussion Phenomenology section describes heautoscopy as experiencing both a physical and a parasomatic visual perspective. In the patient account headed “AS (after the operation),” the patient says, “I am at both positions at the same time.” These passages support “split in two selves” as a paraphrase of the experience, though the paper does not use that exact phrase; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“Self-identification either refers to the illusory body as represented, the physical body as represented or to both.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Introduction and Theoretical considerations distinguish autoscopy, in which the observer remains within the physical body, from out-of-body experience, in which the viewpoint is parasomatic. The Visual phenomenology section reports a patient experiencing both perspectives simultaneously, while others alternated between them. These descriptions support the three possibilities in the claim, although the paper describes them chiefly as visuo-spatial perspectives rather than using the term ‘self-identification’. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“The experience of being the author of one's actions and to be able to selectively control a body at will with the help of explicit goal-repres-entations certainly is a central enabling condition for the development of MPS [11].”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Section 6, “Sense of agency,” defines agency as the sense of being the author of an action; Sections 2.3 and 3 describe how goals and intentions guide action selection and control. The paper does not say that these experiences are a central enabling condition for the development of MPS. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites [11] Pacherie, 2008, The phenomenology of action: a conceptual framework, Cognition sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The patient has the impression to see the environment from the physical body as represented in the case of autoscopic hallucination, from the illusory body as represented in the case of out-of-body experience and alternatively or simultaneously from the physical and the illusory body as represented in the case of heautoscopy (after [23]).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Figure 5 description in Theoretical considerations identifies the viewpoint as from the physical body in autoscopic hallucination, from the parasomatic body in out-of-body experience, and alternating between the two in heautoscopy. Visual phenomenology also reports simultaneous perspectives in one patient and alternating perspectives in others. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“autoscopic phenomena indicate that conscious experience can also be characterized by the absence of a unitary visual weak 1PP, or by two simultaneous or rapidly alternating visual weak 1PPs.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Visual phenomenology section reports that one patient experienced two visuo-spatial perspectives simultaneously, while two others experienced alternation between them. The Discussion Phenomenology section describes the alternation as rapid. These observations support the claim that visual first-person perspective need not be unitary. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source
• Supported

  The patient account (SHORT REPORT > Abstract; page not given) describes bodily awareness switching between the standing and lying bodies, with the patient unable to tell which was himself. The Discussion (page not given) likewise says the location of the ego can be unstable, shifting from one’s body to seeing one’s body from outside. These passages support the claim’s alternative of alternating perspectives, without establishing simultaneous ones. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites [50] Brugger, 1994, Heautoscopy, epilepsy, and suicide, J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry source

In the paper

“Heautoscopy is an intermediate form and self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are either at the position of the physical body as represented or at the position of the illusory body as represented or at both positions.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Theoretical considerations section describes he-autoscopy as intermediate between autoscopy and out-of-body experience, with perspectives alternating between the physical and parasomatic body. The Visual phenomenology section also reports a patient who experienced two perspectives simultaneously. The paper describes these as visuo-spatial perspectives rather than using the citing sentence’s term “weak 1PP.” (LLM, conf=0.87)

  cites [23] Blanke, 2004, Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin, Brain source

In the paper

“Brain imaging studies associated the RHI with bilateral activations in several brain regions [34,35], yet this is only partly compatible with data on somatoparaphrenia that highlight the importance of temporo-parietal cortex and the right hemisphere.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [34] Ehrsson, 2004, That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb, Science source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [35] Tsakiris, 2007, Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness, Cereb. Cortex source

In the paper

“The strong 1PP is also pathological because out-of-body experiences are characterized by an error through misidentification (consistent selfidentification with the incorrect content of a global body representation [55,63]).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [55] Mizumoto, 2005, Immunity to error through misidentification and the bodily illusion experiment, J. Conscious. Stud.
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [63] Shoemaker, 1968, Self-reference and self-awareness, J. Philos. source

In the paper

“Heautoscopy is sometimes associated with 'bi-location' (the experience that self-location and the origin of the weak 1PP are simultaneously at different positions).”

In the paper

“Somatoparaphrenia affects only the contralesional (mostly left) hand (or foot), and never ipsilesional body parts.”

In the paper

“All three dimensions of the MPS are pathological as is the strong 1PP.”

In the paper

“In out-of-body experiences the weak 1PP, self-location and self-identification with an illusory body as represented at an extracorporeal position are complete: self-location and weak 1PP are localized outside one's bodily borders and people have the experience of seeing their body from this disembodied location (Figure 1).”

In the paper

“The person sees an illusory own body in front of him, but has preserved insight into the illusory character of the phenomenon.”

In the paper

“we indicated in the figure the hemisphere of predominant involvement in autoscopic hallucination (right), heautoscopy (left) and out-of-body experience (right).”

In the paper

“MPS or any selfrepresentation are not static internal copies of some mysterious thing or individual substance ('the' self), but only ongoing processes of tracking and controlling global bodily propertiesfor example with the help of an explicit, integrated body-model.”

In the paper

“A strong 1PP is exactly what makes consciousness subjective: the fact that a system represents itself not only as a self but also as 'a self in the act of knowing' [20] (Box 1).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [20] Damasio, 1999

In the paper

“We claim that spatiotemporal self-location, self-identification and weak 1PP are necessary and sufficient for MPS.”

• Also stated in: § Sufficient conditions that are not necessary · plain

  “Weak 1PP, self location and self identification are jointly sufficient for MPS.”

In the paper

“A conscious body model defines a volume within a spatial frame of reference (the dimension of 'self-location') within which the origin of the weak 1PP is localized (for temporal aspects of self-location see Refs [6,18]).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] Metzinger, 2003
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [18] Arzy, 2006, Neural basis of embodiment: distinct contributions of temporoparietal junction and extrastriate body area, J. Neurosci. source

In the paper

“The essence of selfhood, the representational content of MPS, is that it indicates to the system that a specific state in its internal neural dynamics has been reached, namely an integrated functional state, which for the first time makes the body available for attention and global control.”

In the paper

“In philosophy of mind, there is widespread agreement that the core of the problem consists of understanding the pre-reflective bodily foundations of phenomenal selfhood (defined here as all those levels which are independent of explicit cognition and linguistic abilities, and which give rise to the subjective experience of being a self), but which can function as enabling conditions for a concept”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [3][4][5][6][7][8]

In the paper

“Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour.”

In the paper

“The existence of a conscious, transparent and global body-representation available for attentional access is a sufficient condition for MPS.”

In the paper

“Here, we argue that from a strategic point of view, future research should focus on what we call 'minimal phenomenal selfhood' (MPS), which is related to the concept of embodiment and the simplest form of self-consciousness.”

In the paper

“It is important to differentiate between a weak and at least two stronger readings of 'first-person perspective', with MPS being partly constituted by the weak 1PP, and a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for stronger versions [14][15][16][17][18][19].”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites [14][15][16][17][18][19]

In the paper

“MPS, characterized by self-identification, self-location, and weak 1PP, is the outcome of this process on the level of conscious experience.”

In the paper

“MPS, the simplest form of selfhood, is a representation of the entire body, being functionally available for global control: a form of abstract (yet nonpropositional) knowledge about oneself and provides information about new causal properties.”

In the paper

“Central defining features are, (i) a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole (as opposed to ownership for body parts), (ii) spatiotemporal self-location and (iii) a first-person perspective (1PP).”

In the paper

“Having MPS is a necessary condition for the strong (and the cognitive) 1PP, but not for the weak 1PP because the weak 1PP is itself a constituting factor for MPS.”

• Also stated in: § Box 1. Conceptual distinctions · plain

  “We propose that MPS is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive 1PP.”

In the paper

“We argue that only the latter enables investigations of MPS, with MPS being a clearer concept to guide future research.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source

In the paper

“MPS is associated with global, fully embodied self-consciousness and is experienced as a single feature, namely a coherent representation of the whole, spatially situated bodyand not as multiple representations of separate body parts (i.e.finger [33,36], hand [12] or hemibody [37]).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [33] Tsakiris, 2005, The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution, J. Exp. Psychol. source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [36] Tastevin, 1937, En partant de l’expérience d’Aristote: les déplacements artificiels des parties du corps ne sont pas suivis par le sentiment de ces parties ni pas les sensations qu’on peut y produire, Encephale
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [37] Brugger, 2006, From phantom limb to phantom body. Varieties of extracorporeal awareness source

In the paper

“Accordingly, MPS is not altered in somatoparaphrenic patients and not manipulated in healthy subjects during the RHI because these studies do not experimentally manipulate self-location, self-identification or the weak 1PP [38].”

What the sources say

• Not checked yetcites [38] Blanke, 2008, Multiple self locations and perspectives, Science E-letters

In the paper

“The temporally preceding experience of agency and of global motor control (e.g. in childhood) causally enables MPS in practically all humans, but it is not causally necessary (because there are other causal routes to the same phenomenon).”

In the paper

“Therefore, it is not a metaphysically necessary condition for the target phenomenon to come into existence, nor part of the minimal supervenience base.”

In the paper

“Despite their importance for the study of body ownership, somatoparaphrenia and RHI are only associated with changes in partial ownership and do not enable the investigation of MPS as the most fundamental sense of selfhood.”

In the paper

“Conceptually, what constitutes MPS is something different or less that could also take place in a disembodied, non-neural, artificial system possessing no effectors.”

In the paper

“To summarize, heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences are examples of abnormal MPS, also extending to impairments of the strong 1PP (characterized by selfidentification with an incorrect content of a global body representation).”

In the paper

“Agency might be a sufficient condition for MPS, but it does not belong to the metaphysically necessary part of the minimal supervenience base for phenomenal selfhood”

In the paper

“In the majority of such autoscopic phenomena, MPS is characterized by a single visual weak 1PP, spatially overlapping self-location and non-ambiguous self-identification.”

In the paper

“Participants' self-identification and self-location was modified, leading to self-identification only with the virtual body and a drift in self-location towards the virtual body to an extracorporeal position, especially during synchronous stroking.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source

In the paper

“This induced the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body and diminished selfidentification with the virtual body during synchronous stroking.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science source

In the paper

“When the participants saw their body in front of themselves, being stroked synchronously (with their own back), they felt as if the virtual body was their own (illusory self-identification) and showed drift towards it (illusory self-location).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source

In the paper

“In a study by Lenggenhager and colleagues [13], an experimental protocol similar to that in the RHI [12] was developed for the full body (full-body illusion; Figure 3b).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [12] Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see, Nature source

In the paper

“Both full-body illusion measures were also observed for a fake body (Figure 3c), but not (or less so) for a rectangular object.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Lenggenhager, 2007, Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness, Science source

In the paper

“Especially during heautoscopy (with rapidly alternating or two simultaneous centres of projection for the weak 1PP), patients can report to 'be split in two parts or selves', feeling as if 'I were two persons' [52] or a 'split personality' [53].”

What the sources say

• Not checked yetcites [52] Pearson, 1954, Sur deux cas de phénomenes héautoscopiques consecutifs à lésions organiques, Encephale
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [53] Lunn, 1970, Autoscopic phenomena, Acta Psychiatr. Scand. source

In the paper

“Ehrsson [28] used a similar set-up but stroked subjects on their chests (hidden from the view of the camera).In this full-body illusion version, subjects saw the synchronous stroking in front of the camera, inducing the experience of being at the position of the camera that was behind the subjects' body (illusory self-identification; Figure 3d).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] Ehrsson, 2007, The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences, Science source

In the paper

“In particular, there seems to be a continuum between transparency and opacity, which determines how realistically the content of a body representation is experienced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification is expressed [6,7].”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] Metzinger, 2003
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] Metzinger, 2003, Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference, Phenom. Cogn. Sci. source

In the paper

“He described changes in selflocation and self-identification that progressively increased over the three days of exposure.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [54] Stratton, 1899, The spatial harmony of touch and sight, Mind source

In the paper

“Recent studies have extended clinical data on illusory global own body perceptions and studied MPS experimentally, refining the seminal self-observations made at the end of the 19th century by G.M. Stratton (Figure 3a) [54].”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [54] Stratton, 1899, The spatial harmony of touch and sight, Mind source

In the paper

“In particular, the presentation of stimuli in virtual reality set-ups has enabled systematic manipulations of different sensory dimensions including somatosensory, visual and perspectival cues.”

In the paper

“Global motor control or cognitive selfreference are not necessary conditions.”

In the paper

“From the definition of out-of-body experiences (Box 2) it also follows that both study protocols did neither induce an out-of-body experience nor an autoscopic hallucination, but rather a state that is comparable to heautoscopy.”

In the paper

“Both study protocols enabled the manipulation of the key MPS-dimensions self-identification, self-location or weak 1PP, yet neither of them managed to manipulate what we have called the strong 1PP that is disturbed in heautoscopy and out-of-body experience.”

In the paper

“Both studies revealed visual capture by showing that the location of the visual stroking dominates over the location of tactile stroking, leading in both cases to abnormal self-identification and, in the study of Lenggenhager et al., also to abnormal self-location [38,57].”

What the sources say

• Not checked yetcites [38] Blanke, 2008, Multiple self locations and perspectives, Science E-letters
• Not checked yetcites [57] Meyer, 2008, How does the brain localize the self?, Science E-letters

In the paper

“With respect to self-identification, these observations indicate that there seems to be a transient, but nevertheless complete, heautoscopic dissociation into two objects of identification, leading to a brief double instantiation of MPS (two selves) and the strong 1PP (a reduplication of the experience of being directed) that does not occur in any other form of autoscopic phenomenon.”

In the paper

“If, as we propose, 'global owning' -functionally defined as availability of an integrated, transparent and global representation of the spatiotemporally situated bodyis the simplest form of self-consciousness, then it follows that MPS is constituted by something 'less' than agency.”