CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 1,096Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationLanguage and cultural evolutionExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation

Henrich, Joseph·2004·Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
DOI 10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5

Cites

0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 116

  1. Alexander, 1974, The evolution of social behavior, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 5, 325, 10.1146/annurev.es.05.110174.001545 · DOI
  2. Alexander, R., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine De Gruyter, New York.
  3. Aoki, 1982, A condition for group selection to prevail over counteracting individual selection, Evolution, 36, 832, 10.2307/2407896 · DOI
  4. Asch, S.E., 1951. Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. In: Guetzkow, H. (Ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Carnegie, Pittsburgh, pp. 177–190.
  5. Axelrod, 1986, An evolutionary approach to norms, American Political Science Review, 80, 1095, 10.2307/1960858 · DOI
  6. Axelrod, 1981, The evolution of cooperation, Science, 211, 1390, 10.1126/science.7466396 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Axelrod, 1988, The further evolution of cooperation, Science, 242, 1385, 10.1126/science.242.4884.1385 · DOI
  8. Ball, 2001, Status in markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 155, 161, 10.1162/003355301556374 · DOI
  9. Baron, 1996, The forgotten variable in conformity research: impact of task importance on social influence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 915, 10.1037/0022-3514.71.5.915 · DOI
  10. Batson, 1991, Evidence for alturism: toward a pluralism of prosocial motives, Psychological Inquiry, 2, 107, 10.1207/s15327965pli0202_1 · DOI
  11. Bendor, 1987, Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action, The American Political Science Review, 81, 129, 10.2307/1960782 · DOI
  12. Ben-Ner, 2000, Some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, 91, 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00110-4 · DOI
  13. Bliege Bird, 1997, Delayed reciprocity and tolerated theft: the behavioral ecology of food-sharing strategies, Current Anthropology, 38, 49, 10.1086/204581 · DOI
  14. Bolton, 1998, Dictator game giving: rules of fairness versus acts of kindness, International Journal of Game Theory, 27, 269, 10.1007/s001820050072 · DOI · Paper page
  15. Boorman, S., Levitt, P., 1980. The Genetics of Altruism. Academic Press, New York.
  16. Bowles, S., 2001. Individual interactions, group conflicts, and the evolution of preferences. In: Durlauf, S., Young, P. (Eds.), Social Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 155–190. · DOI
  17. Boyd, 1988, Is the repeated prisoner’s dilemma a good model of reciprocal altruism?, Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 211, 10.1016/0162-3095(88)90022-2 · DOI
  18. Boyd, 1989, Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 136, 47, 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80188-2 · DOI
  19. Boyd, 1987, No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma game, Nature, 32, 58, 10.1038/327058a0 · DOI
  20. Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J., 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
  21. Boyd, 1987, The evolution of ethnic markers, Cultural Anthropology, 2, 27, 10.1525/can.1987.2.1.02a00070 · DOI
  22. Boyd, 1988, The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 132, 337, 10.1016/S0022-5193(88)80219-4 · DOI
  23. Boyd, 1989, The evolution of indirect reciprocity, Social Networks, 11, 213, 10.1016/0378-8733(89)90003-8 · DOI · Paper page
  24. Boyd, 1990, Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 145, 331, 10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80113-4 · DOI
  25. Boyd, 1992, Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups, Ethology and Sociobiology, 13, 171, 10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y · DOI · Paper page
  26. Boyd, 1996, Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare, Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 77
  27. Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J., 2000. Memes: universal acid or a better mouse trap. In: Aunger, R. (Ed.), Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 143–162. · DOI
  28. Boyd, 2002, Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 215, 287, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515 · DOI · Paper page
  29. Boyd, R., Richerson, P., 2002b. Solving the puzzle of human cooperation. In: Levinson, S. (Ed.), Evolution and Culture. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  30. Brown, 2001, Apportionment of racial diversity: a review, Evolutionary Anthropology, 10, 34, 10.1002/1520-6505(2001)10:1<34::AID-EVAN1011>3.0.CO;2-P · DOI
  31. Brown, 2002, Smile asymmetries and reputation as reliable indicators of likelihood to cooperate: an evolutionary analysis, Advances in Psychological Research, 11, 59
  32. Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Menozzi, P., Piazza, A., 1994. The History and Geography of Human Genes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  33. Crow, 1982, Group selection for a polygenic behavioral trait: a differential proliferation model, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 79, 2628, 10.1073/pnas.79.8.2628 · DOI
  34. Davis, D.D., Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  35. Dawkins, R., 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  36. Dawkins, R., 1982. The Extended Phenotype. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  37. Ekman, 1991, Who can catch a liar?, American Psychologist, 46, 913, 10.1037/0003-066X.46.9.913 · DOI
  38. Ellison, 1993, Rules of thumb for social learning, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 612, 10.1086/261890 · DOI
  39. Fehr, E., Henrich, J. (forthcoming). Is strong reciprocity a maladaption? In: Hammerstein, P. (Ed.), Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  40. Fehr, 2002, Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement of social norms, Human Nature, 13, 1, 10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 · DOI
  41. Fletcher, D.J.C., Michener, C.D., 1987. Kin Recognition in Animals. Wiley, New York.
  42. Frank, 1995, George price’s contributions to evolutionary genetics, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 175, 373, 10.1006/jtbi.1995.0148 · DOI
  43. Frank, S.A., 1998. Foundations of Social Evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  44. Frank, 1993, The evolution of one-shot cooperation: an experiment, Ethology and Sociobiology, 14, 247, 10.1016/0162-3095(93)90020-I · DOI
  45. Fudenberg, 1986, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information, Econometrica, 54, 533, 10.2307/1911307 · DOI · Paper page
  46. Furnham, 1984, Studies of cross-cultural conformity: a brief and critical review, Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient, 27, 65
  47. Gintis, 2000, Strong reciprocity and human sociality, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206, 169, 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2111 · DOI
  48. Gintis, 2001, Costly signaling and cooperation, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 213, 103, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · DOI
  49. Hamilton, 1972, Altruism and related phenomena, mainly in the social insects, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 3, 192, 10.1146/annurev.es.03.110172.001205 · DOI
  50. Hamilton, W.D., 1975. Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics. In: Fox, R. (Ed.), Biosocial Anthropology. Malaby Press, London, pp. 133–156.
  51. Hayek, F., 1979. The political order of a free people. Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. · DOI
  52. Henrich, 1998, The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences, Evolution and Human Behavior, 19, 215, 10.1016/S1090-5138(98)00018-X · DOI
  53. Henrich, 2001, Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208, 79, 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · DOI
  54. Henrich, 2002, On modeling cultural evolution: why replicators are not necessary for cultural evolution, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2, 87, 10.1163/156853702320281836 · DOI
  55. Henrich, J., Smith, N., in press. Comparative experimental evidence from Peru, Chile and the US shows substantial variation among social groups. In: Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., Fehr, E., Camerer, C. (Eds.), Cooperation, Punishment and Self Interest: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small Scale Societies. Oxford University Press, New York, and University of Michigan.
  56. Henrich, 2001, In search of Homo economicus: experiments in 15 small-scale societies, American Economic Review, 91, 73, 10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · DOI
  57. Hirshleifer, 1982, Evolutionary models in economics and law: cooperation vs. conflict strategies, Research in Law and Economics, 4, 1
  58. Hirshleifer, 1988, What strategies can support the evolutionary emergence of cooperation, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32, 367, 10.1177/0022002788032002006 · DOI
  59. Hirshleifer, 1989, Cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with ostracism, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12, 87, 10.1016/0167-2681(89)90078-4 · DOI · Paper page
  60. Hoffman, 1998, Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: experimental economics and evolutionary psychology, Economic Inquiry, 36, 335, 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x · DOI
  61. Insko, 1985, Conformity and group size: the concern with being right and the concern with being liked, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 41, 10.1177/0146167285111004 · DOI
  62. Johnson, A., 2003. Families of the Forest: Matsigenka Indians of the Peruvian Amazon. University of California, Berkeley, CA. · DOI
  63. Johnson, A., Earle, T., 1987. The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
  64. Joshi, 1987, Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes, Journal of Genetics, 66, 69, 10.1007/BF02934456 · DOI
  65. Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E., 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. · DOI
  66. Keller, 1998, Reasoning about relationships and obligations in close relationships: a comparison across two cultures, Developmental Psychology, 34, 731, 10.1037/0012-1649.34.4.731 · DOI
  67. Kelly, R.C., 1985. The Nuer Conquest. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
  68. Kelly, 1992, Restricted migration and the evolution of altruism, Evolution, 46, 1492, 10.2307/2409952 · DOI
  69. Kroll, 1992, Further tests of the separation theorem and the capital asset pricing model, American Economic Review, 82, 664
  70. Ledyard, J.O., 1995. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 111–194. · DOI · Paper page
  71. Lee, R.B., 1979. The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  72. Lorberbaum, 1994, No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 168, 117, 10.1006/jtbi.1994.1092 · DOI
  73. Lorberbaum, 2002, Are there really no evolutionary stable strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 214, 155, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2455 · DOI
  74. Low, B.S., 2000. Why Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  75. Maynard Smith, 1998, The origin of altruism, Nature, 393, 639, 10.1038/31383 · DOI
  76. McAdams, 1998, The origin, development and regulation of norms, Michigan Law Review, 96, 338, 10.2307/1290070 · DOI
  77. McCabe, 2000, Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: why does game form matter?, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, 4404, 10.1073/pnas.97.8.4404 · DOI
  78. McElreath, 2003, Shared norms can lead to the evolution of ethnic markers, Current Anthropology, 44, 123, 10.1086/345689 · DOI
  79. Neto, 1995, Conformity and independence revisited, Social Behavior and Personality, 23, 217, 10.2224/sbp.1995.23.3.217 · DOI
  80. Ockenfels, 2000, An experiment on the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signaling in bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 90, 10.1006/game.1999.0762 · DOI
  81. Offerman, 1998, Learning by experience and learning by imitating others, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34, 559, 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00109-1 · DOI
  82. Patton, J.Q., 2000. Reciprocal altruism and warfare: a case from the Ecuadorian Amazon. In: Cronk, L., Chagnon, N., Irons, W. (Eds.), Adaption and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective. Aldine de Gruyter, New York, pp. 417–436. · DOI
  83. Pingle, 1995, Imitation vs. rationality: an experimental perspective on decision-making, Journal of Socio-economics, 24, 281, 10.1016/1053-5357(95)90023-3 · DOI
  84. Pingle, 1996, Modes of economizing behavior: experimental evidence, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29, 191, 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00059-3 · DOI
  85. Price, 1970, Selection and covariance, Nature, 227, 520, 10.1038/227520a0 · DOI · Paper page
  86. Price, 1972, Extensions of covariance selection mathematics, Annals of Human Genetics, 35, 485, 10.1111/j.1469-1809.1957.tb01874.x · DOI
  87. Queller, 1992, A general model for kin selection, Evolution, 46, 376, 10.2307/2409858 · DOI
  88. Queller, 1992, Quantitative genetics, inclusive fitness, and group selection, The American Naturalist, 139, 541, 10.1086/285343 · DOI
  89. Rappaport, R.A., 1984. Pigs for the Ancestors. Yale University Press, New Haven.
  90. Richerson, 2000, Complex societies: the evolutionary dynamics of a crude superorganism, Human Nature, 10, 253, 10.1007/s12110-999-1004-y · DOI · Paper page
  91. Ridley, M., 1993. The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature. Penguin Books, New York.
  92. Rogers, 1990, Group selection by selective emigration: the effects of migration and kin structure, The American Naturalist, 135, 339, 10.1086/285053 · DOI
  93. Rogers, E.M., 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press, New York.
  94. Roscoe, 2002, The hunters and gatherers of new guinea, Current Anthropology, 43, 153, 10.1086/338289 · DOI
  95. Rosekrans, 1967, Imitation in children as a function of perceived similarity to a social model and vicarious reinforcement, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 307, 10.1037/h0025072 · DOI
  96. Roth, 1991, Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study, American Economic Review, 81, 1068
  97. Sepher, J., 1983. Incest, the Biosocial View. Academic Press, New York. · DOI
  98. Smith, 1994, Conformity as a determinant of behavior in a resource dilemma, Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 191, 10.1080/00224545.1994.9711382 · DOI
  99. Sober, E., Wilson, D.S., 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
  100. Soltis, 1995, Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? An empirical test, Current Anthropology, 36, 473, 10.1086/204381 · DOI
  101. Stotland, 1962, Identification, “oppositeness,” authoritarianism, self-esteem, and birth order, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 76, 1, 10.1037/h0093841 · DOI
  102. Stotland, 1963, Empathy, self-esteem and birth order, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 532, 10.1037/h0042891 · DOI
  103. Tomasello, M., 1994. The question of chimpanzee culture. In: Wrangham, R., McGrew, W.C., de Waal, F.B.M., Heltne, P.G. (Eds.), Chimpanzee Cultures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 301–317.
  104. Tomasello, M., 2000. The Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. · DOI · Paper page
  105. Tooby, 1989, Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture: theoretical considerations, Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 29, 10.1016/0162-3095(89)90012-5 · DOI
  106. Trivers, 1971, The evolution of reciprocal alturism, The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 34, 10.1086/406755 · DOI · Paper page
  107. Vayda, 1971, Phases of the process of war and peace among the Marings of new Guinea, Oceania, 42, 1, 10.1002/j.1834-4461.1971.tb00295.x · DOI
  108. Wade, 1985, Soft selection, hard selection, kin selection, and group selection, The American Naturalist, 125, 61, 10.1086/284328 · DOI
  109. Wedekind, 2000, Cooperation through image scoring in humans, Science, 288, 850, 10.1126/science.288.5467.850 · DOI · Paper page
  110. Weinmann, 1994, Individual behavior in a free riding experiment, Journal of Public Economics, 54, 185, 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90059-0 · DOI
  111. Wiessner, 1983, Style and social information in kalahari san projectile points, American Antiquity, 48, 253, 10.2307/280450 · DOI
  112. Williams, G., 1966. Adaption and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  113. Wilson, 1997, Group selection and assortative interactions, The American Naturalist, 149, 336, 10.1086/285993 · DOI
  114. Wit, 1999, Social learning in a common interest voting game, Games and Economic Behavior, 26, 131, 10.1006/game.1998.0634 · DOI
  115. Wolf, 1970, Childhood association and sexual attraction: a further test of the Westermarck hypothesis, American Anthropologists, 72, 503, 10.1525/aa.1970.72.3.02a00010 · DOI
  116. Young, 1992, The numic spread: a computer simulation, American Antiquity, 57, 85, 10.2307/2694836 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 1,096

Metadata

Authors
Henrich, J.
Affiliations
Emory University (US)
Corresponding author
Henrich, Joseph
ORCID
Henrich, Joseph
Venue
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004-01
Volume
53
Issue
1
Pages
3-35
ISSN
0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5
OpenAlex
W2167287869
Cited by
1,096
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
FWCI
104.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review