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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
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Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
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Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans
West, S. A., Mouden, C. E., & Gardner, A. (2010) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.001 · Cited by 568
“…Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Bowles et al., 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Boyd et al., 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000; Gintis et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006 Gardner & West, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2007c Cooperation Bowles, 2006; Taylor & Nowak, 2007; Traulsen & Nowak,…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to Collective ActionPreprint
Ostrom, E., & Ahn, T. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1304823 · Cited by 476
Atran, S., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot_a_00018 · Cited by 459
“These models permit within-group variation, and show that cultural group selection can operate even in the face of ample withingroup variation (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004; Boyd et al. 2003).,There are several reasons for this but three important ones revolve around: (1) the non-vertical nature of cultural i…”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
Henrich, J., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106 · Cited by 457
“First, such critiques often fail to appreciate that cultural evolutionary models involving intergroup competition usually solve the free-rider problem using purely withingroup selective processes (not ‘group selection’), such as those built on reputation, punishment and signaling (Boyd & Richerson 1990; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundSelf-citationNormative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2019) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0522-1 · Cited by 745
Self-citationToward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0
Szathmáry, E. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1421398112 · Cited by 415
“Intergroup competition and prestige-biased imitation of more successful groups offer the mechanism (110).”
Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency
Page, T., Putterman, L., & Unel, B. (2005) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x · Cited by 404
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364 · Cited by 83
Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics
Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0914631107 · Cited by 393
“For example, group selection on cultural variation plausibly played a leading role in the evolution of genes underpinning our unusual social systems, including cooperative breeding and cooperation among distantly related individuals (1, 30).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe emergence of human uniqueness: Characters underlying behavioral modernity
Hill, K., Barton, M., & Hurtado, A. M. (2009) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.20224 · Cited by 387
Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) predicts behavioral aggression following provocation
McDermott, R., Tingley, D., Cowden, J., Frazzetto, G., & Johnson, D. D. P. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0808376106 · Cited by 384
“An additional puzzle arises in the face of cross-cultural data suggesting that individuals in some societies do not engage in costly punishment as much as those in Western industrialized societies (4, 5).”
BackgroundPunishment sustains large-scale cooperation in prestate warfare
Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. T. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105604108 · Cited by 373
“An alternate view is that humans have evolved to cooperate in ethnolinguistic groups (groups with shared cultural norms and language), comprising thousands of unrelated strangers, even without formal coercive institutions (12, 13).”
BackgroundThe firm as an interactor: firms as vehicles for habits and routines
Hodgson, G. M., & Knudsen, T. (2004) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-004-0192-1 · Cited by 338
“11 Fisher (1930), Campbell (1965), Price (1970, 1972, 1995), Sober (1984), Hull (1980), Hull et al. (2001), Darden and Cain (1989), Sober and Wilson (1998), Frank (1998), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Nanay (2002), Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002b), Henrich (2004).”
BackgroundWhy people prefer unequal societies
Starmans, C., Sheskin, M., & Bloom, P. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0082 · Cited by 556
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0135 · Cited by 358
“Our approach is different since our goal is to understand a more fundamental issue—do we find evidence that comparable subjects from modern developed societies that are characterized by large-scale cooperation but differ strongly with regard to historical and cultural values behave differently in games of cooperation?…”
Five Misunderstandings About Cultural Evolution
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (2008) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-008-9037-1 · Cited by 360
Self-citationGame theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
Hagen, E. H., & Hammerstein, P. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005 · Cited by 339
“Henrich (2004) makes several reasonable verbal arguments that strategic non-conformism would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to evolve.”
BackgroundConformists and Mavericks: The Empirics of Frequency-Dependent Cultural Transmission
EFFERSON, C., LALIVE, R., RICHERSON, P., MCELREATH, R., & LUBELL, M. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.003 · Cited by 336
“Thus, in conjunction with the punishment of norm violations andtheimitationofsuccess,conformityplaysacriticalrolein the study of how prosocial tendencies could have evolved in humansviaculturalgroupselection(Boyd,Gintis,Bowles,& Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1982; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Gaechter,…”
BackgroundMurray, D. R., Trudeau, R., & Schaller, M. (2011) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167210394451 · Cited by 322
“Living in large groups requires some degree of behavioral coordination and conformity (Henrich, 2003).”
BackgroundDelton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1102131108 · Cited by 305
War’s Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group Biases
Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J., & Henrich, J. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613493444 · Cited by 324
“, Henrich, J., Povinelli, D. J., Richardson, A. S., et al. (2005). Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe burden of proof for a cultural group selection account
Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., Mathew, S., Newton, E. K., Naar, N., Newson, L., et al. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000047 · Cited by 301
Enfield, N., & Levinson, S. (2006) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003135517 · Cited by 299
“See Henrich (2004) and Henrich and Boyd (2002).”
BackgroundKeltner, D., Kogan, A., Piff, P. K., & Saturn, S. R. (2014) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115054 · Cited by 298
“…fitness and reciprocal altruism, and proximal forces, including tit-for-tat, altruistic punishment, and status seeking (Axelrod 1984; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Hamilton 1964; Hardy & Van Vugt 2006; Henrich 2004; Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Rand et al. 2009; Sober & Wilson 1998; Trivers 1971, 1972).”
BackgroundThe puzzle of monogamous marriage
Henrich, J., Boyd, R. T., & Richerson, P. J. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0290 · Cited by 369
Self-citationInnovation in the collective brain
Muthukrishna, M., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0192 · Cited by 441
Self-citationEerkens, J., & Lipo, C. P. (2007) · Journal of Archaeological Research · doi:10.1007/s10814-007-9013-z · Cited by 278
“…Bentley et al. 2004; Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1987, 1995, 2002; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, 1983; Eerkens and Lipo 2005; Hahn and Bentley 2003; Henrich 2001, 2004a; Henrich and Boyd 2002; Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Henrich and McElreath 2003; Lipo et al. 1997; McElreath et al. 2003; Shennan…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEconomic Theory and Experimental Economics
Samuelson, L. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051053737816 · Cited by 274
“What might might be the evolutionary origins of such “prosocial” behavior? Henrich [114] offers an explanation based on cultural group selection.”
BackgroundWhat is specific about evolutionary economics?
Witt, U. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0107-7 · Cited by 271
“It thus differs from the “dual inheritance hypothesis” in anthropology (see Henrich 2004; Richerson and Boyd 2005).”
BackgroundThe approach of ecological economics
Gowdy, J., & Erickson, J. (2005) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bei033 · Cited by 260
Not irrational but habitual: The importance of "behavioural lock-in" in energy consumption
Maréchal, K. (2010) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.12.004 · Cited by 252
Cognitive adaptations forn‐person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior
Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., & Price, M. E. (2006) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.1287 · Cited by 232
“that punishment of norm violation is altruistic in the biological sense (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundCan second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
Cinyabuguma, M. M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z · Cited by 246
“21 The argument is also presented in Henrich (2004) , which serves as the focus for 17 commentaries in a special issue (January, 2004, vol.”
BackgroundAnti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation
Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M., & Ohtsuki, H. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010 · Cited by 233
“Recent models of cultural evolution suggest that weak conformist transmission can stabilize punishment and hence promotes the evolution of cooperation (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
Culture rather than genes provides greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality
Bell, A. V., Richerson, P. J., & McElreath, R. L. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0903232106 · Cited by 301
“Selection for altruism in such large groups, however, remains a controversial topic in part because it is not clear that enough between-group variation existed in human societies to make it an appreciable evolutionary force (15).”
BackgroundSocietal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis
Roos, P., Gelfand, M., Nau, D., & Lun, J. (2015) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.01.003 · Cited by 232
“…cooperative behavior (e.g., Bowles, 2009; Nowak, 2006), our model is designed to capture a broad array of different types of threat and shows evolution toward strong cooperation or coordination norms without the requirement for group selection (Bowles, 2006; Henrich, 2004; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006).”
Vonk, J. M., Brosnan, S. F., Silk, J. B., Henrich, J., Richardson, A. S., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.09.036 · Cited by 208
“This pattern of findings indicates that while chimpanzees’ behaviour is consistent with standard evolutionary models based on kinship and reciprocity, human cooperation and prosociality may require an emerging class of evolutionary models, rooted in the coevolutionary interaction of genes and culture (Boyd et al. 2003…”
BackgroundSelf-citationTrust and leadership in virtual teamwork: A media naturalness perspective
DeRosa, D. M., Hantula, D. A., Kock, N., & D'Arcy, J. (2004) · Human Resource Management · doi:10.1002/hrm.20016 · Cited by 220
“And, to the extent that groups of individuals may be selected for or selected against culturally, if stable and identifiable subgroups or cultures of people are not prepared to enter a world of virtual work, relatively rapid within-group evolutionary processes will quickly favor those individuals with these new virtua…”
BackgroundChildren develop a veil of fairness.
Shaw, A., Montinari, N., Piovesan, M., Olson, K. R., Gino, F., & Norton, M. I. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0031247 · Cited by 239
“Concerns with fairness appear in nearly every culture in the world, even in small hunter-gatherer societies (Boehm, 2008; Gurven, 2004; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundThe cultural evolution of emergent group-level traits
Smaldino, P. E. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13001544 · Cited by 211
Turner, R., Morse-Jones, S., & Fisher, B. (2010) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05280.x · Cited by 211
Evolutionary theorizing and modeling of sustainability transitions
Safarzyńska, K., Frenken, K., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2012) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.10.014 · Cited by 209
The evolution of leader–follower reciprocity: the theory of service-for-prestige
Price, M. E., & van Vugt, M. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00363 · Cited by 205
“However, engagement in reciprocity, particularly in the complexly cooperative social environments of human beings, requires specially designed social-cognitive abilities that are uniquely sophisticated in humans (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996; Hammerstein, 2002; Frontiers in Human Neuroscience…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for Environmental Valuation and Policy
Gowdy, J. (2004) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3654741 · Cited by 181
“Good predictions can be made, however, using models of biased cultural transmission (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundFrom incremental to transformative adaptation in individual responses to climate-exacerbated hazards
Wilson, R. S., Herziger, A., Hamilton, M., & Brooks, J. S. (2020) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-020-0691-6 · Cited by 234
Regular rates of popular culture change reflect random copying
Bentley, R., Lipo, C. P., Herzog, H., & Hahn, M. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.002 · Cited by 175
“…strategy, as copying can tend toward baseless decisions, whereas independent decision making may lead to a rational, collective b wisdom Q of a group (Surowiecki, 2004) and/or optimal solutions through a process analogous to natural selection (e.g., Crow & Aoki, 1982a, 1982b, 1984; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundDong, B., Dulleck, U., & Torgler, B. (2009) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.001 · Cited by 172
“Alternatively, the concept of conformity (Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation.”
BackgroundCurtis, V. A. (2011) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0165 · Cited by 190
The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders
Henrich, J., Chudek, M., & Boyd, R. T. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0013 · Cited by 210
Self-citationDemography and ecology drive variation in cooperation across human populations
Lamba, S., & Mace, R. H. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105186108 · Cited by 173
“This behavioral variation is attributed to culturally inherited cooperative norms and taken as support for cultural group selection models of large-scale cooperation (1, 2, 7).”
BackgroundPutterman, L. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1189969 · Cited by 160
Culture, evolution and the puzzle of human cooperation
Henrich, J., & Henrich, N. S. (2006) · Cognitive Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.010 · Cited by 168
“As discussed below, this interaction may be critical for understanding some aspects of human cooperation, particularly largescale cooperation among non-relatives (Baldwin, 1896a; Boyd & Richerson, 2002b; Durham, 1991; Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 1998, 2000).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationTowards a Socio‐Cognitive Approach to Knowledge Transfer
Ringberg, T., & Reihlen, M. R. (2008) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00757.x · Cited by 147
Evolutionary thinking in environmental economics
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2007) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-006-0054-0 · Cited by 156
“26 psychology and experimental economics, as well as of group selection theory (Bergstrom, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
Division of Labor, Economic Specialization, and the Evolution of Social Stratification
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2008) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/587889 · Cited by 148
“The existence of different societies at stable equilibria with different total payoffs creates the conditions for cultural group selection (Henrich 2004a).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationAllen-Arave, W., Gurven, M., & Hill, K. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.03.002 · Cited by 147
“…of the " needy " may be a cooperative behavior backed by third party punishment (Hill and Gurven 2004), we must consider the possibility that this cultural convention has evolved through cultural group selection (see Bowles 2006; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; and Henrich 2004 ).”
Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory
Gurven, M., & Winking, J. (2008) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00024.x · Cited by 133
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights
Hodgson, G. M. (2015) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137414000630 · Cited by 225
“This evolutionary argument is supported by evidence from primates (De Waal, 1996, 2006) and modern evolutionary theory with a careful rehabilitation of the concept of group selection (Henrich, 2004, Hodgson, 2013a, 2014; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010; Sober and Wilson, 1998).”
ResultCompetition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Anti-Social Motivations
Goette, L. F., Huffman, D., Meier, S., & Sutter, M. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466 · Cited by 149
“These altruistic behaviors can survive because they enhance group fitness, and make groups composed of altruists more likely to survive environmental shocks (Henrich, 2004; Boyd et al., 2003).”
BackgroundMethodCan sustainable consumption be learned? A model of cultural evolution
Buenstorf, G., & Cordes, C. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.01.028 · Cited by 125
Language as an emergent group-level trait
Panchanathan, K., Mathew, S., & Perreault, C. (2014) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x13002860 · Cited by 142
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the FieldPreprint
Vélez, M., Stranlund, J., & Murphy, J. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.701262 · Cited by 141
“3 Our concept of conformity is similar to the notion of normative conformity used in cultural evolutionary models and the social learning literature (see Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004; McElreath et al., 2005).”
Kock, N. (2009) · MIS Q. · doi:10.2307/20650297 · Cited by 139
“In cultural evolution, for example, units of cultural transmission, sometimes called memes, are hypothesized to be copied through imitation by individuals until they spread to a large number of individuals of a cultural group (Blackmore 1999, 2001; Dawkins 1990; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundThe influence of cultural framing on play in the trust game: A maasai example
Cronk, L. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.05.006 · Cited by 136
“This may, in turn, contribute to a theoretically predicted (Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 2004) and empirically observed (Henrich, et al., 2004; Henrich, et al., 2006) pattern in which learning dynamics generates equilibria in beliefs about norms of social interaction that are stable and widely…”
BackgroundAn evolutionary anthropological perspective on modern human origins.
Marean, C. W. (2015) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-102313-025954 · Cited by 135
“…have deep-seated non-selfish preferences that are unique among living animals (Bowles & Gintis 2011, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003, Fehr & Gächter 2002, Henrich 2004, Henrich et al 2001, Henrich & Henrich 2006) while varying by cultural context (Henrich et al 2010, Henrich & Henrich 2006, House et al…”
BackgroundLimits to CBA in UK and European environmental policy: retrospects and future prospects
Turner, R. (2007) · doi:10.1007/s10640-007-9119-2 · Cited by 135
Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods
Ahn, T., Isaac, R., & Salmon, T. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007 · Cited by 134
Smith, K. M., Larroucau, T., Mabulla, I. A., & Apicella, C. L. (2018) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1101/313064 · Cited by 132
Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite
Levin, S. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400830111 · Cited by 123
“Such devices will give groups integrities that make collective action and collective benefits possible, and make cultural group selection feasible (91, 92).”
BackgroundRapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale cooperation
Boyd, R., Richerson, P., & Henrich, J. (2010) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1100-3 · Cited by 131
“Summaries and further references can be found in Richerson and Boyd (2005), Boyd and Richerson (2009), Henrich (2004, 2008), and Henrich and Henrich (2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationRicherson, P., & Henrich, J. (2012) · Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution · doi:10.21237/c7clio3112453 · Cited by 131
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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