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War as a Commitment Problem
Abstract
Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: they often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict, and they give an odd reading of the history of some cases. This article describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis then shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem: (1) preventive war, (2) preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and (3) conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack on the status quo with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat to the status quo.
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“Even if it is possible to provide assurances around the day-to-day performance of most AI agents, in high-stakes situations there may be extreme pressures for agents to defect against others, making trust harder to establish, and potentially leading to conflict (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006, see also Section 2.2).”
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Powell, 2006
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Metadata
- Authors
- Powell, R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 169-203
- ISSN
- 0020-8183
- 1531-5088
- Cited by
- 585
- References
- 73
- Language
- en
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