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The nature of human altruism
Abstract
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.
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“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher 2003
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In the citing paper
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Parametric regressors were not orthogonalized in the design matrix, ensuring that parameter estimates were not confounded by spurious correlations due to signals related to other regressors 59 .”
From Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala (2019) · cites this paper as [59]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [16]
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“Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003
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“Empathy and morality are fundamental human traits (Alexander 1987; de Waal 2009; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
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“This human behavior can be analyzed in the light of the social forces mentioned in [15] and [42] and the spontaneous reciprocal altruism [43] (also referred to as mutual utility maximization in [16]).”
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“This results in the inference that the costly decisions that players make knowingly inflict a personal cost in order to benefit others [3].”
BackgroundResultThe Neurochemistry of Fairness
Crockett, M. J. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04506.x · Cited by 91
Cultural evolution of genetic heritability
Uchiyama, R., Spicer, R., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000893 · Cited by 103
Moynihan, D. P., DeLeire, T., & Enami, K. (2013) · The American Review of Public Administration · doi:10.1177/0275074013493657 · Cited by 98
“The GSS measure is more directly a measure of happiness rather than life satisfaction and the framing of the question (“these days”) emphasizes current feelings rather than the long-term framing of the WLS (“when you look back at the story of your life”).”
Selfishness, Altruism and Message Spreading in Mobile Social Networks
Hui, P., Xu, K., Li, V. O. K., Crowcroft, J., Latora, V., & Lió, P. (2009) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS) · doi:10.1109/infcomw.2009.5072186 · Cited by 92
“Human altruism has been intensively studied [9] [10] [18].”
BackgroundAttentional priorities drive effects of time pressure on altruistic choice
Teoh, Y. Y., Yao, Z., Cunningham, W. A., & Hutcherson, C. A. C. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-17326-x · Cited by 97
Massen, J. J. M., van den Berg, L. M., Spruijt, B. M., & Sterck, E. H. M. (2011) · American Journal of Primatology · doi:10.1002/ajp.21014 · Cited by 92
“Humans are considered highly cooperative [Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003] and they prefer an equal pay-off of effort and reward in a cooperative act, and react aversive to unequal pay-offs, a preference known as inequity aversion (IA) [Adams, 1963].”
BackgroundSteinbeis, N., Engert, V., Linz, R., & Singer, T. (2015) · Psychoneuroendocrinology · doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2015.08.003 · Cited by 96
“ince costly punishment has been argued to measure social norm nforcement (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) rather than the desire o inflict harm, we added a game known as the money burnng game.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Role of Social and Intergenerational Equity in Making Changes in Human Well-Being Sustainable
Summers, J. K., & Smith, L. M. (2014) · AMBIO · doi:10.1007/s13280-013-0483-6 · Cited by 90
Theft in an ultimatum game: chimpanzees and bonobos are insensitive to unfairness
Kaiser, I., Jensen, K., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2012) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2012.0519 · Cited by 93
Shdo, S. M., Ranasinghe, K. G., Gola, K. A., Mielke, C. J., Sukhanov, P., Miller, B. L., & Rankin, K. P. (2017) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.02.010 · Cited by 97
“These studies reveal a causal relationship in which the social reward was experienced as a result of being liked or simply of producing a helping behavior, and this mechanistic understanding of the role of reward in prosocial behaviors is widely held (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
Cooperation: The roles of interpersonal value and gratitude
Smith, A., Pedersen, E. J., Forster, D. E., McCullough, M. E., & Lieberman, D. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.08.003 · Cited by 98
“…of cooperative relationships observed among non-kin in humans—and non-humans as well—has been reciprocal altruism, also known simply as reciprocity (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Trivers, 1971).”
Why We Should Use Animals to Study Economic Decision Making – A Perspective
Kalenscher, T., & van Wingerden, M. (2011) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2011.00082 · Cited by 93
“…costs to improve the well-being of others, or in a counter-utilitaristic way, e.g., in parochial situations where the well-being of others is reduced at a cost and without direct benefit to the actor (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, 2003; Camerer, 2003; Baron, in press).”
BackgroundSpirituality and religiosity as cross-cultural aspects of human experience.
Dy-Liacco, G. S., Piedmont, R. L., Murray‐Swank, N. A., Rodgerson, T. E., & Sherman, M. F. (2009) · Psychology of Religion and Spirituality · doi:10.1037/a0014937 · Cited by 91
Neural basis of conditional cooperation
Suzuki, S., Niki, K., Fujisaki, S., & Akiyama, E. (2010) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsq042 · Cited by 90
“Furthermore, many experimental reports described that humans actually behave as conditional cooperators in broadly various situations (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
Social Preferences and Political Participation
Dawes, C. T., Loewen, P. J., & Fowler, J. H. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381611000508 · Cited by 90
Moral Nativism: A Sceptical Response
Sterelny, K. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01390.x · Cited by 89
Capraro, V., & Cococcioni, G. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.0237 · Cited by 89
“Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation has typically a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a cooperative setting and with no previous experience in…”
Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala
Liu, Y., Li, S., Lin, W., Li, W., Yan, X., Wang, X., Pan, X., Rutledge, R. B., & Ma, Y. (2019) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-019-0351-1 · Cited by 89
Adopted Utility Calculus: Origins of a Concept of Social Affiliation
Powell, L. J. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916211048487 · Cited by 91
Big Questions in Ecology and Evolution
Sherratt, T. N., & Wilkinson, D. M. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199548606.001.0001 · Cited by 89
Fletcher, G. E. (2008) · American Journal of Primatology · doi:10.1002/ajp.20576 · Cited by 87
Capraro, V., & Cococcioni, G. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep27219 · Cited by 90
“Linear regression predicting “cooperation” as a function of a dummy variable, named “depletion”, which takes value 1 if a subject participated in the depletion condition, and 0 if the subject participated in the no-depletion condition, confirms that there is a significant and negative effect of “depletion” on “coopera…”
BackgroundInfluentialGetting together: Social contact frequency across the life span.
Sander, J., Schupp, J., & Richter, D. (2017) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/dev0000349 · Cited by 106
“Support provided in voluntary, informal relationships can also be reciprocated later (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1991) and in different ways (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundSi, Y., Wu, X., Li, F., Zhang, L., Duan, K., Li, P., Song, L., Jiang, Y., Zhang, T., Zhang, Y., et al. (2018) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhy294 · Cited by 89
“cept of trait-like differences in negative affect (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Kirk et al. 2011).”
BackgroundZarychta, A., Grillos, T., & Andersson, K. P. (2019) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13132 · Cited by 98
Adaptive Reputation Promotes Trust in Social Networks
Hu, Z., Li, X., Wang, J., Xia, C., Wang, Z., & Perc, M. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2021.3103771 · Cited by 90
“The areas shadowed in blue, green and red denote the game interaction groups with agent 2, 5 and 8 as the focal agent.”
BackgroundSharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity
Zhou, X., & Wu, Y. H. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.12.017 · Cited by 87
“Strong reciprocity—the combination of altruistic punishment and altruistic reward—has been crucial in the evolution of human cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundMa, Y., Wang, C., & Han, S. (2011) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.003 · Cited by 91
“Recent studies uncover different forms of human altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) such as direct and indirect reciprocal altruism (Boyd et al.”
BackgroundReimers, L., & Diekhof, E. K. (2015) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2015.00183 · Cited by 88
“Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly observed that humans display a tendency toward cooperation (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundEvolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032 · Cited by 85
“Yet, human societies are remarkably successful in maintaining cooperative norms even in groups of considerable size (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), suggesting that large-scale cooperation is based on additional mechanisms.”
BackgroundBonobos Prefer Individuals that Hinder Others over Those that Help
Krupenye, C., & Hare, B. A. (2018) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2017.11.061 · Cited by 93
“This early-emerging prosocial preference may be a derived motivation that accounts for many human forms of cooperation that occur beyond dyadic interactions and are not exhibited by other animals [9, 10].”
Pedersen, E. J., McAuliffe, W. H. B., & McCullough, M. E. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000410 · Cited by 89
Charitable Triad Theory: How donors, beneficiaries, and fundraisers influence charitable giving
Chapman, C. M., Louis, W. R., Masser, B., & Thomas, E. F. (2022) · Psychology and Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21701 · Cited by 86
THE EVOLUTION OF FAIRNESS IN A BIOLOGICAL MARKET
André, J., & Baumard, N. (2011) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01232.x · Cited by 93
King, A. A., & Toffel, M. W. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511627170.006 · Cited by 86
Kümmerli, R., Burton-Chellew, M. N., Ross‐Gillespie, A., & West, S. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1000829107 · Cited by 86
DISCRETE MODEL OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE ACCOUNTING FOR MIGRATION
Vitanov, N. K., Ausloos, M., & Rotundo, G. (2012) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s021952591250049x · Cited by 85
“5There is also the ”service and welfare support” to the need of the population, - which is not really mass media propaganda nor conversation, but rather an opinion ”formation” due to some ”theoretically gratuitous altruism” [40, 41, 42, 43, 44] by ”charitable organisations” following resources transfer, with political…”
BackgroundThe role of inhibition in young children’s altruistic behaviour
Pardo, D. R. A., Arias, R. M., & Colmenares, F. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0552-6 · Cited by 99
“…when both partners increase their immediate benefits; altruism, when the recipient obtains a benefit at a cost to the actor; and altruistic punishment, when the actor's behaviour is detrimental to both the actor and the recipient, but increases third-parties' payoffs (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundAVPR1A Variant Associated with Preschoolers' Lower Altruistic Behavior
Avinun, R., Israel, S., Shalev, I., Gritsenko, I., Bornstein, G., Ebstein, R. P., & Knafo‐Noam, A. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025274 · Cited by 89
“due to widespread exhibitions of other-oriented behaviors directed toward genetically-unrelated individuals [2].”
BackgroundThe roles of the medial prefrontal cortex and striatum in reputation processing
Izuma, K., Saito, D. N., & Sadato, N. (2009) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910903202559 · Cited by 89
“Social scientists and evolutionary biologists have long studied the question of why humans cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals, which seems to be a distinguishing feature of our species (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
InfluentialThe Ultimatum Game in complex networks
Sinatra, R., Iranzo, J., Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., Floría, L. M., Latora, V., & Moreno, Y. (2009) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2009/09/p09012 · Cited by 83
Effort shapes social cognition and behaviour: A neuro-cognitive framework
Contreras-Huerta, L. S., Pisauro, M. A., & Apps, M. A. J. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.08.003 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 425
- Issue
- 6960
- Pages
- 785-791
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1481402319
- Cited by
- 3,475
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward
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