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The nature of human altruism
Abstract
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.
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“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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In the citing paper
“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher 2003
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In the citing paper
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Parametric regressors were not orthogonalized in the design matrix, ensuring that parameter estimates were not confounded by spurious correlations due to signals related to other regressors 59 .”
From Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala (2019) · cites this paper as [59]
In the citing paper
“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [16]
In the citing paper
“Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003
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The power of reputations: The role of third party information in the admission of new group members.
Stiff, C., & van Vugt, M. (2008) · Group Dynamics Theory Research and Practice · doi:10.1037/1089-2699.12.2.155 · Cited by 33
“Reputations are known to influence decisions about who people interact with and who they avoid (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Milinski, Semman, & Krambeck, 2002).”
BackgroundRonel, N., Haski‐Leventhal, D., Ben‐David, B. M., & York, A. S. (2008) · International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology · doi:10.1177/0306624x07312792 · Cited by 34
“As a focus of study, altruism usually falls into the conflict between those who perceive it as being rooted in selfish motives (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Khalil, 2004) and those who perceive it as an authentic experience (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2002; Clohesy, 2000).”
BackgroundThe Development of Theory of Mind and Positive and Negative Reciprocity in Preschool Children
Schug, J. R., Takagishi, H., Benech, C., & Okada, H. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00888 · Cited by 38
“ORIGINAL RESEARCH published: 29 June 2016 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00888 Edited by: Yusuke Moriguchi, Kyoto University, Japan Reviewed by: Frank Krueger, George Mason University, USA Mark Sheskin, École Normale Supérieure, France Antonella Marchetti, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,…”
InfluentialNurturing breakthroughs: lessons from complexity theory
Sornette, D. (2008) · Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination · doi:10.1007/s11403-008-0040-8 · Cited by 33
Pisauro, M. A., Fouragnan, E. F., Arabadzhiyska, D. H., Apps, M. A. J., & Philiastides, M. G. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-34509-w · Cited by 38
“(2) a stick function at (ii) response timemodulated by trial by trial changes in the level of cooperation chosen by the player (Pcoop).”
BackgroundFarmers' Decisions Regarding Carbon Sequestration: A Metaeconomic View
Sautter, J. A., Czap, N. V., Kruse, C., & Lynne, G. D. (2010) · Society & Natural Resources · doi:10.1080/08941920903012502 · Cited by 32
Income Inequality or Performance Gap? A Multilevel Study of School Violence in 52 Countries
Contreras, D., Elacqua, G., Martinez, M., & Miranda, Á. (2015) · Journal of Adolescent Health · doi:10.1016/j.jadohealth.2015.08.002 · Cited by 32
“In fact, some researchers argue that this aversion to inequity is an innate part of human behavior and would have played a key role in the evolution of cooperation among human beings [34,35].”
BackgroundEli, B., Zhou, Y., Liang, Y., Cheng, J., Wang, J., Huang, C., Xi, X., & Liu, Z. (2021) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph18020440 · Cited by 33
“Thus, prosocial behaviors re central to th form tion and maintenance of heal hy i t rpersonal relationships [15], which may protect children and adolescents from the risk of maladjustment and further increase positive mood.”
BackgroundInfluentialKim, S. S. Y., Huang-Isherwood, K. M., Weiwei, Z., & Williams, D. C. (2022) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2022.107291 · Cited by 39
“And, not surprisingly, reciprocal individuals achieve a positive reputation in society (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).”
BackgroundOverpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
Dercole, F., Carli, M. D., Rossa, F. D., & Papadopoulos, A. V. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.11.034 · Cited by 32
“(2006) (and in most of the related experiments; de Quervain et al., 2004; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundResultThe Evolutionary Origins of Human Generosity
Komter, A. E. (2010) · International Sociology · doi:10.1177/0268580909360301 · Cited by 36
“Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002) have argued that human cooperation may involve ‘strong reciprocity’. This is a combination of altruistic rewarding (i.e. rewarding others for cooperative behaviour) and altruistic punishment (imposing sanctions on others for non-cooperative behaviour). Whereas recipr…”
BackgroundAltered Social Decision Making in Borderline Personality Disorder: An Ultimatum Game Study
Polgár, P., Fogd, D., Unoka, Z., Sirály, E., & Csukly, G. (2014) · Journal of Personality Disorders · doi:10.1521/pedi_2014_28_142 · Cited by 32
Why Sociology is Better Conditioned to Explain Economic Behaviour than Economics
Folmer, H. (2009) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2009.00435.x · Cited by 32
Society–nature coevolution: interdisciplinary concept for sustainability
Weisz, H., & Clark, E. (2011) · Geografiska Annaler Series B Human Geography · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0467.2011.00382.x · Cited by 32
“See Hodgson (1993), Nelson and Winter (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) and Hodgson and Knudsen (2006) on economic theory, the emergence and role of human cooperation, and the rise and fall of firms; Wilson (1998) and Richerson and Boyd (2005) on genetic constraints on cultural evolution and vice…”
BackgroundChen, F., Chen, H., Yang, J., Long, R., & Li, Q. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10103617 · Cited by 32
“Scholars regard this concern for one’s family, friends, or country as altruistic rather than self-interested (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) [29], and this belief has led to the emergence of the theory of altruistic behavior, which is broadly defined as providing time, resources, or the ability to…”
BackgroundThe Neurobiology of Cooperation and Altruism
Rilling, J. K. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-9520-9_17 · Cited by 33
“Behavioral economics experiments suggest that large-scale cooperation depends on the willingness of at least some individuals to endure the costs of punishing free riders ( Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich and Henrich, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialSocial dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors
Wu, Z.-X., & Yang, H.-X. (2014) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.89.012109 · Cited by 30
Bedwell, B., Leygue, C., Goulden, M., McAuley, D., Colley, J., Ferguson, E., Banks, N., & Spence, A. (2014) · Technology Analysis and Strategic Management · doi:10.1080/09537325.2014.978276 · Cited by 31
“…to be less stressful for individuals involved (Aiello and Kolb 1995), yet also provides the opportunity for individuals to freeride, that is, rely on others’ efforts to reach a common goal (Karau and Williams 1993) or to use more than an equal (‘fair’) share (Dawes 1980; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundWhy multilevel selection matters
Field, A. (2008) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1007/s10818-007-9018-1 · Cited by 22
Deciphering the modulatory role of oxytocin in human altruism
Hurlemann, R., & Marsh, N. (2017) · Reviews in the Neurosciences · doi:10.1515/revneuro-2016-0061 · Cited by 31
“Insights from the evolution of cooperation suggest that the motivations for human altruism are diverse and deeply rooted in the neuroendocrine architecture of the social brain (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004).”
BackgroundEvidence for strategic cooperation in humans
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Mouden, C. E., & West, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2017.0689 · Cited by 29
“Experiments using economic games have shown that humans routinely cooperate, sacrificing personal earnings in ways that benefit others [1,2].”
BackgroundQuinn, L. K., Schuster, L., Aguilar‐Rivera, M., Arnold, J., Ball, D., Gygi, E., Holt, J. R., Lee, D. J., Taufatofua, J., Wiles, J., et al. (2018) · Animal Behavior and Cognition · doi:10.26451/abc.05.04.04.2018 · Cited by 34
“For example, humans feel obligated to “return the favor” towards a specific individual when an act of kindness is directed towards them (Watanabe et al., 2014), and will exert effort to help others in need of help (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998).”
BackgroundRescue-like Behaviour in Mice is Mediated by Their Interest in the Restraint Tool
Ueno, H., Suemitsu, S., Murakami, S., Kitamura, N., Wani, K., Takahashi, Y., Matsumoto, Y., Okamoto, M., & Ishihara, T. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-46128-5 · Cited by 31
Minimizing the total travel time with limited unfairness in traffic networks
Angelelli, E., Morandi, V., & Speranza, M. G. (2020) · Computers & Operations Research · doi:10.1016/j.cor.2020.105016 · Cited by 31
Punishment is strongly motivated by revenge and weakly motivated by inequity aversion
Deutchman, P., Bračič, M., Raihani, N., & McAuliffe, K. (2020) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.06.001 · Cited by 30
Is the hand of God involved in human cooperation?
Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2009) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/03068290910921190 · Cited by 30
“Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), however, show that people continue to cooperate even after the reasons given in above explanations are eliminated and controlled for.”
Ohl, C., Johst, K., Meyerhoff, J., Beckenkamp, M., Grüsgen, V., & Drechsler, M. (2009) · Ecological Complexity · doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2009.10.002 · Cited by 31
Xiao, F., Zheng, Z., Wang, Y., Cui, J., & Chen, Y. (2015) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2014.1003598 · Cited by 31
Folmer, H., & Johansson‐Stenman, O. (2011) · Environmental and Resource Economics · doi:10.1007/s10640-010-9454-6 · Cited by 31
“(2010) for some recent experimental contributions to the literature on social preferences and Fehr and schmidt (2006) for a corresponding survey, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) for evolutionary arguments behind social preferences, and Sen (1987) for a more general treatment of ethics and economics.”
BackgroundSeip, E. C., DIJK, W. W. V., & Rotteveel, M. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x · Cited by 31
Ohdaira, T. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep25413 · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 425
- Issue
- 6960
- Pages
- 785-791
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1481402319
- Cited by
- 3,475
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward
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