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The nature of human altruism
Abstract
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.
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“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher 2003
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In the citing paper
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
In the citing paper
“Parametric regressors were not orthogonalized in the design matrix, ensuring that parameter estimates were not confounded by spurious correlations due to signals related to other regressors 59 .”
From Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala (2019) · cites this paper as [59]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [16]
In the citing paper
“Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003
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BackgroundSinger, T. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374176-9.00017-8 · Cited by 85
Kraak, S. (2010) · Fish and Fisheries · doi:10.1111/j.1467-2979.2010.00372.x · Cited by 75
“…2003) and nonanonymity with the possibility of direct or indirect reciprocity and reputation building (Milinski et al. 2002b, Milinski et al. 2002a, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fehr and Rockenbach 2004, Zak et al. 2004, Nowak and Sigmund 2005), face-to-face communication (Ostrom 2001) and physical…”
BackgroundInfluentialIncreasing generosity by disrupting prefrontal cortex
Christov‐Moore, L., Sugiyama, T., Grigaityte, K., & Iacoboni, M. (2016) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2016.1154105 · Cited by 68
“…Dictator Game show outcomes inconsistent with a self-maximizing drive (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Engel, 2011; Liebe & Tutic, 2010), leading some to conclude that prosocial outcomes may have a subjective reward value or utility during decision-making (Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundVardy, T., & Atkinson, Q. D. (2019) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797619826972 · Cited by 79
“This research has identified, among other motives, a general willingness to share windfall gains with anonymous strangers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gächter & Herrmann, 2009) and to establish norms of fairness (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002)—behaviors thought to be critical to the…”
BackgroundKesenheimer, J. S., & Greitemeyer, T. (2021) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su13063560 · Cited by 90
“Moral concerns about the welfare of strangers beyond one’s in-group characterize honesty–humility [35].”
BackgroundAmici, F., Visalberghi, E. M., & Call, J. (2014) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.1699 · Cited by 71
“[2–4]; but see [5]).”
Will, G., Crone, E. A., van den Bos, W., & Güroğlu, B. (2013) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0032299 · Cited by 71
“Importantly, decisions in these economic games are strongly influenced by prior experiences with, and social knowledge about, the people these games are played with (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundI TO WE: THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS TRANSFORMATION IN COMPASSION AND ALTRUISM
Vieten, C., Amorok, T., & Schlitz, M. M. (2006) · Zygon® · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2006.00788.x · Cited by 71
“Experience of the authentic self as inherently valuable as connected to a larger whole, by extension implies the inherent worthiness of others.”
BackgroundMindfulness training increases cooperative decision making in economic exchanges: Evidence from fMRI
Kirk, U., Gu, X., Sharp, C., Hula, A., Fonagy, P., & Montague, P. R. (2016) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.05.075 · Cited by 71
“…of norm violating behavior evident in the MT group is unorthodox in the existing literature on fairness sensitivity (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) and furthermore contrasts the involvement of the anterior insula in the context of violation of social norms and mistrust…”
Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Andersson, P., & Lindholm, T. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2016.09.004 · Cited by 73
Reputation and household recycling practices: Field experiments in Costa Rica
Alpízar, F., & Gsottbauer, E. (2015) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.003 · Cited by 70
“Pro-sociality can be defined as behavior that benefits others at a cost to oneself (Andreoni, 1989; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).”
BackgroundAltruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings
Clavien, C., & Chapuisat, M. (2012) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-012-9317-3 · Cited by 83
“Gigerenzer 2008/2007; Kahneman et al. 1982), evolutionary anthropology (Henrich et al. 2001), evolutionary game theory (Gintis 2000) as well as in economics (Simon 1996/1969), and the subfield experimental economics (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrimate Sociality to Human Cooperation
Hawkes, K. (2013) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-013-9184-x · Cited by 73
“Some nominate escalated altruistic preferences (Fehr and Fischbacker 2003; House et al. 2012; Silk 2009) or multiple differences in prosociality, tendency to punish, and concern for fairness (Silk and House 2011).”
BackgroundAgent Based Modeling and Adaptation to Climate Change
Patt, A., & Siebenhüner, B. (2005) · Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung · doi:10.3790/vjh.74.2.310 · Cited by 70
“…a Nash equilibrium, with the deviations dependent on features of the information flow between players, as well as the country in which the games were played (see e.g. Kahneman et al. 1986, Bolton et al. 1998, Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee 1998, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Marwell and Ames 1982).”
BackgroundChapter 3 Altruistic Behavior and Altruistic Motivations
Elster, J. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)01003-7 · Cited by 76
Kleiman, T., & Hassin, R. R. (2011) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.02.007 · Cited by 69
Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment.
Sylwester, K., Herrmann, B., & Bryson, J. J. (2013) · Journal of Neuroscience Psychology and Economics · doi:10.1037/npe0000009 · Cited by 70
“41 Moreover, it inspired a new theory of the evolution of human cooperation 42 - strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2000).”
BackgroundPeople recognise when they are really anonymous in an economic game
Lamba, S., & Mace, R. H. (2010) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.02.002 · Cited by 71
Applying evolutionary theory to human behaviour: past differences and current debates
Brown, G. R., & Richerson, P. J. (2013) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1007/s10818-013-9166-4 · Cited by 72
“Based on this and other experiments devised by experimental economists, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) suggest that cultural group selection and gene–culture coevolution might be required to explain human patterns of cooperation.”
MethodHumans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms10915 · Cited by 62
A behavioral economic assessment of individualizing versus binding moral foundations
Clark, C. B., Swails, J. A., Pontinen, H. M., Bowerman, S. E., Kriz, K. A., & Hendricks, P. S. (2017) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.02.052 · Cited by 74
Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates
Burkart, J. M., Brügger, R. K., & van Schaik, C. P. (2018) · Frontiers in Sociology · doi:10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017 · Cited by 80
“In dictator games, which are used by behavioral economists to quantify other-regarding preferences, humans typically contribute a nonzero amount of money even if they could keep this money for themselves without any negative consequences, consistent with proactive other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 200…”
Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications
Mažar, N., & Dan Ariely, C. (2006) · Journal of Public Policy & Marketing · doi:10.1509/jppm.25.1.117 · Cited by 69
“Economists such as Ernst Fehr (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, 2004; Fehr and Figure 1.”
BackgroundSex-Linked Neuroanatomical Basis of Human Altruistic Cooperativeness
Yamasue, H., Abe, O., Suga, M., Yamada, H., Rogers, M. A., Aoki, S., Kato, N., & Kasai, K. (2008) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm254 · Cited by 68
“Human altruistic cooperation is one of the most important components of our highly organized society and of what characterizes us as human (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialEmpathy, motivation, and P300 BCI performance
Kleih, S. C., & Kübler, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00642 · Cited by 72
“However, to be purely intrinsic, the reasons for study participation would have to be solely joy or altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) which could both lead to a flow experience (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi, 1992; Csikszentmihalyi and Charpentier, 2008).”
BackgroundKlein, I., & Ben-Elia, E. (2016) · Transportation Research Part C Emerging Technologies · doi:10.1016/j.trc.2016.09.005 · Cited by 68
Institutional and Individual Influences on Scientists' Data Sharing Practices
Kim, Y., & Stanton, J. M. (2012) · The Journal of Computational Science Education · doi:10.22369/issn.2153-4136/3/1/6 · Cited by 67
“Interestingly, in situations where an individual’s reputation is important, competitive altruism appears to be a powerful strategy [11].”
BackgroundMultiple-Brain Connectivity During Third Party Punishment: an EEG Hyperscanning Study
Ciaramidaro, A., Toppi, J., Casper, C., Freitag, C. M., Siniatchkin, M., & Astolfi, L. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-24416-w · Cited by 71
Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
Sade, O., Schnitzlein, C. R., & Zender, J. F. (2005) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj005 · Cited by 68
Fairness in Non-human Primates?
Bräuer, J., & Hanus, D. (2012) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-012-0159-6 · Cited by 67
London, M. (2010) · Journal of Management Development · doi:10.1108/02621711011025768 · Cited by 70
Variation in Cleaner Wrasse Cooperation and Cognition: Influence of the Developmental Environment?
Wismer, S., Pinto, A. I., Vail, A. L., Grutter, A. S., & Bshary, R. (2014) · Ethology · doi:10.1111/eth.12223 · Cited by 70
Chimpanzees return favors at a personal cost
Schmelz, M., Grueneisen, S., Kabalak, A., Jost, J., & Tomasello, M. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1700351114 · Cited by 70
Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game
Baran, N. M., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15654 · Cited by 65
Inequality of Opportunity, Income Inequality and Economic Mobility: Some International ComparisonsPreprint
Brunori, P., Ferreira, F. H. G., & Peragine, V. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2210795 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 425
- Issue
- 6960
- Pages
- 785-791
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1481402319
- Cited by
- 3,475
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward
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