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The nature of human altruism
Abstract
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.
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“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher 2003
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In the citing paper
“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Parametric regressors were not orthogonalized in the design matrix, ensuring that parameter estimates were not confounded by spurious correlations due to signals related to other regressors 59 .”
From Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala (2019) · cites this paper as [59]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [16]
In the citing paper
“Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003
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Pfattheicher, S., & Schindler, S. (2015) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.2003 · Cited by 59
“…free riders (altruistic punishment) because the motives underlying altruistic punishment reflect equality concerns (Fowler, Johnson, & Smirnov, 2004), group orientation (Barclay, 2006) and fairness concerns (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, Singer & Steinbeis, 2009, Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008).”
BackgroundFarrelly, D. (2010) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1348/000712610x532896 · Cited by 59
When good overcomes bad: The impact of volunteers on those they help
Ronel, N. (2006) · Human Relations · doi:10.1177/0018726706068802 · Cited by 62
“While Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) suggest a description of altruism based on evolutionary grounds and claim that ‘[a]ltruistic behaviour in real-life circumstances can almost always be attributed to different motives’, others (e.g. Batson et al., 2002; Clohesy, 2000) define altruism as a unique…”
BackgroundChill-inducing music enhances altruism in humans.
Fukui, H., & Toyoshima, K. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01215 · Cited by 62
“Altruism is a recognized feature of human society, and it goes far beyond that which has been observed in the animal world (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), and extends beyond reciprocal altruism and reputation-based cooperation, taking the form of strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002).”
BackgroundMechanisms of Generalized Exchange: Towards an Integrated ModelPreprint
Baker, W. E., & Levine, S. S. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1352101 · Cited by 60
Cooperation across social borders in bonobos
Samuni, L., & Surbeck, M. (2023) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.adg0844 · Cited by 58
Five‐year‐olds punish antisocial adults
Kenward, B., & Östh, T. (2014) · Aggressive Behavior · doi:10.1002/ab.21568 · Cited by 61
Uncertainty, rationality and cooperation in the context of climate change
Raihani, N., & Aitken, D. (2011) · Climatic Change · doi:10.1007/s10584-010-0014-4 · Cited by 63
“A common paradigm in the study of human cooperation is the multi-player public good/common-pool resource game, where players can cooperate by investing in a communal resource (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Cinyabugama et al. 2005; Milinski et al. 2006, 2008).”
BackgroundRodrigues, J., Ulrich, N., Mussel, P., Carlo, G., & Hewig, J. S. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02119 · Cited by 59
The social world as an experimental game
Murnighan, J. K., & Wang, L. (2016) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.02.003 · Cited by 62
Contreras-Huerta, L. S., Lockwood, P. L., Bird, G., Apps, M. A. J., & Crockett, M. J. (2020) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/emo0000813 · Cited by 55
“These behaviors lie at the core of healthy social relationships and are a key facilitator of social cohesion and group bonding (de Waal, 2008; Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundHuman ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for prosocial motivation
Lockwood, P. L., Cutler, J., Drew, D., Abdurahman, A., Jeyaretna, D. S., Apps, M. A. J., Husain, M., & Manohar, S. (2024) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-024-01899-4 · Cited by 65
“These ‘prosocial’ behaviours are crucial for human success as they allow us to cooperate and address global challenges, and have important benefits for the individual, society and the recipient 35,36 .”
The evolution of social and moral behavior: Evolutionary insights for public policy
Manner, M., & Gowdy, J. M. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.04.021 · Cited by 58
“Behavioral research has shown that individuals with altruistic preferences, armed with punishment mechanisms, are capable of enforcing widespread cooperation ( Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003 ).”
BackgroundInfluentialSocial image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment
Grimalda, G. F., Pondorfer, A., & Tracer, D. P. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms12288 · Cited by 67
Altruistic behavior: mapping responses in the brain
Filkowski, M. M., Cochran, R. N., & Haas, B. W. (2016) · Neuroscience and Neuroeconomics · doi:10.2147/nan.s87718 · Cited by 64
“9 Fehr and Fischbacher 3 suggest that if two strangers are allowed to engage in repeated anonymous monetary exchanges in the laboratory, there exists a high probability that altruistic behavior will spontaneously emerge.”
The origins of human prosociality: Cultural group selection in the workplace and the laboratory
François, P., Fujiwara, T., & van Ypersele, T. (2018) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aat2201 · Cited by 57
“Thoni (13) summarizes a large literature on this as showing that sur vey measures of trust are informative with regard to the cooperative ness of others, but there are sometimes discordant findings between play in incentivized games and answers to trust questions (9, 12) and studies showing that other factors are al…”
BackgroundSocial Preferences in Primates
Silk, J. B. (2009) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374176-9.00018-x · Cited by 56
“In humans, altruism seems to be motivated at least in part by social preferences based on empathy, concern for the welfare of others, and a preference for equity ( Batson, 1991 ; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003 ; see also Chapter 19 of this volume).”
BackgroundChildren’s altruistic behavior in context: The role of emotional responsiveness and culture
Rajhans, P., Altvater‐Mackensen, N., Vaish, A., & Großmann, T. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep24089 · Cited by 65
“Critically, there was no main effect of culture as a between-subjects factors on the latency to the first fixation on the emotional target faces measure, F (1, 91) = 0.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives
Dong, Y., Zhang, B., & Tao, Y. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep28809 · Cited by 61
Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals and groups
Romano, A., Saral, A. S., & Wu, J. (2021) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.003 · Cited by 59
“Prosocial behavior can be defined as a costly act that confers benefits on other people [3,4].”
The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity
Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0291 · Cited by 61
Yang, R., Wang, W.-X., Lai, Y., & Grebogi, C. (2010) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.3431629 · Cited by 56
The surprising empathic abilities of rodents
Mogil, J. S. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.012 · Cited by 56
Do Genes Contribute to the “Gender Gap”?
Hatemi, P., Medland, S. E., & Eaves, L. J. (2009) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381608090178 · Cited by 56
“…nuclear family, antipathy for strangers, self-motivated learning, exploratory behavior, territoriality, fear, ethical behavior, authority acceptance, cooperation, play, group affiliation, aggression, competitiveness, and hierarchical groups (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Gachter 2000).”
BackgroundThe developmental emergence of direct reciprocity and its influence on prosocial behavior
Leimgruber, K. L. (2018) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.01.006 · Cited by 59
The cognitive foundations of cooperation
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Garagnani, M. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.019 · Cited by 56
Using survey questions to measure preferences: Lessons from an experimental validation in Kenya
Bauer, M., Chytilová, J., & Miguel, E. A. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103493 · Cited by 51
“…help to establish and maintain cooperative and fair group outcomes even in situations with limited scope for reputation-building (Bowles 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003), anti- social preferences (such as spitefulness and aggressive competitiveness) can contribute to the deterioration of…”
BackgroundConceptualization and Measurement of Adolescent Prosocial Behavior: Looking Back and Moving Forward
Mallah, S. E. (2019) · Journal of Research on Adolescence · doi:10.1111/jora.12476 · Cited by 62
“Economic games, the most common experimental paradigm employed in the study of prosocial behavior, serve as a powerful tool to uncover social preferences and the underlying motivations of prosociality (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
Evolutionary dynamics of group fairness
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., Paiva, A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.025 · Cited by 53
Role expansion as a persuasion process
Grant, A. M., & Hofmann, D. A. (2011) · Organizational Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/2041386610377228 · Cited by 60
“…personal obligations, drawing on principles of social exchange (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gouldner, 1960), procedural justice and fair treatment (Tepper et al., 2001), and relational forms of psychological…”
BackgroundLoch, C. H., Galunic, D. C., & Schneider, S. (2006) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.1294 · Cited by 54
Development of Equity Preferences in Boys and Girls Across Adolescence
Meuwese, R., Crone, E. A., de Rooij, M., & Güroğlu, B. (2014) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.12290 · Cited by 60
“Prior research has shown that most individuals value a sense of equity in social decisions (Camerer, 2003; Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989).”
BackgroundKameda, T., Tsukasaki, T., Hastie, R., & Berg, N. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0020699 · Cited by 55
“…experiments on social dilemmas show that average contributions to public goods deteriorate significantly after a few iterations if no punishment opportunity exists (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008; for reviews, see Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Ledyard, 1995).”
BackgroundA Theoretical Model in the Context of Economic Globalization
Siegrist, J. (2016) · Aligning perspectives on health, safety and well-being · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32937-6_1 · Cited by 61
Settepani, V., Schou, M. F., Greve, M., Grinsted, L., Bechsgaard, J., & Bilde, T. (2017) · Molecular Ecology · doi:10.1111/mec.14196 · Cited by 55
Coercive Enforcement of International Law
Thompson, A. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139107310.025 · Cited by 54
Altruistic behaviors relieve physical pain
Wang, Y., Ge, J., Zhang, H., Wang, H., & Xie, X. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1911861117 · Cited by 58
“This yielded main effects of group [F(1, 38) = 5.”
BackgroundNatural Sciences, Management Theory, and System Transformation for Sustainability
Wasieleski, D. M., Waddock, S. A., Fort, T. R., & da Costa, N. G. (2020) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/0007650319898384 · Cited by 64
“In keeping with recent efforts to incorporate biological evolution into the organizational sciences (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Frederick, 2012; Ilies et al., 2006; Nicholson & White, 2006; Saad, 2006), our goal in this volume is to inform sustainability research about novel ways to motivate…”
BackgroundLee, Y.-E., & Warneken, F. (2020) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104374 · Cited by 54
Minimum Cost Consensus With Altruism Utility Constraints in Social Network Group Decision Making
Zhang, Y., Chen, X., Witold Pedrycz, C., & Dong, Y. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2023.3260307 · Cited by 55
“Altruism was first put forward by Auguste Comte, the founder of French sociology, in 1875, and has been extensively studied in various fields (e.g., [1], [10], [18], [19], and [38]).”
BackgroundIndirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer
Suzuki, S., & Kimura, H. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01435 · Cited by 53
“Given equation (4) and G1(p, q) 5 1 for any (p, q), we can see that Gt11(p*, q*) depends on p* but not q* for any moral assessment rules.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 425
- Issue
- 6960
- Pages
- 785-791
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1481402319
- Cited by
- 3,475
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward
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