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The nature of human altruism
Abstract
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene-culture co-evolution.
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“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [46]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher 2003
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
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“Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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In the citing paper
“Yet, when the PGG is repeated over multiple rounds, contributions tend to decline with the number of rounds; this is due to a few individuals who free ride in the first round, thereby triggering further free riding in subsequent rounds11,14,27.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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“Parametric regressors were not orthogonalized in the design matrix, ensuring that parameter estimates were not confounded by spurious correlations due to signals related to other regressors 59 .”
From Oxytocin modulates social value representations in the amygdala (2019) · cites this paper as [59]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [16]
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“Many theories explaining various types of cooperation have been proposed in biology and economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but a theoretical explanation of unconditional altruism (de W ned as bene W ting others at a cost to oneself, Wilson, 1976) has remained elusive to date.”
From Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence (2007) · cites this paper as Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003
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“Third, we address the question of why people cooperate in oneshot situations (for example, in laboratory experiments, such as the dictator game) (37).”
BackgroundBrand personality: theory and dimensionality
Davies, G., Rojas‐Méndez, J. I., Whelan, S., Mete, M., & Loo, T. (2018) · Journal of Product & Brand Management · doi:10.1108/jpbm-06-2017-1499 · Cited by 130
“However, the same literature often emphasises the signalling of status (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Griskevicius et al., 2007; Nelissen and Meijers, 2011), and while status is relevant to Aaker’s original definition of brand personality (the set of human characteristics associated with a brand), it…”
BackgroundEmotional pathways to climate change responses
Davidson, D. J., & Kecinski, M. (2021) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change · doi:10.1002/wcc.751 · Cited by 149
“2 There are many other examples of how social preferences impact individual and group decision making, e.g. reciprocity (see for example Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) and spite (Hamilton, 1970; Riechmann, 2006; Schaffer, 1989).”
BackgroundVicarious reinforcement in rhesus macaques (Macaca Mulatta)
Chang, S. W. C., Winecoff, A. A., & Platt, M. L. (2011) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2011.00027 · Cited by 124
“Such observations endorse the idea that neural mechanisms supporting vicarious reinforcement are derived specializations of the human brain, which support complex social behavior including observational learning, cooperation, and even altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialSubiaul, F., Vonk, J. M., Okamoto, S., & Barth, J. (2008) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6 · Cited by 130
“Economists have suggested that, because reputation judgments may be used to predict future behavioral interactions, they represent an essential feature of cooperative exchanges among humans (Brandt et al. 2003; Brandt and Sigmund 2005; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Sigmund et al. 2001; Wedekind an…”
Backgroundvan Zomeren, M. (2016) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12322 · Cited by 137
“…should make those choices catering for the maximization of short-term self-interest, definitions such as these typically lead to research on individual choices in economic games, with clear pay-off matrices provided for each choice to be made in the situation (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundSylwester, K., & Roberts, G. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.009 · Cited by 123
Toddlers and infants expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim’s aggressor
Ting, F., He, Z., & Renée Baillargeon, B. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1817849116 · Cited by 130
“The analysis yielded only a significant Condition × Event interaction, F(2, 48) = 11.”
MethodHow chimpanzees cooperate in a competitive world
Suchak, M., Eppley, T. M., Campbell, M., Feldman, R. A., Quarles, L. F., & de Waal, F. Β. Μ. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1611826113 · Cited by 122
“Human cooperation has been called a “huge anomaly” in the animal kingdom (7), whereas our closest relative, the chimpanzee, is used as a foil marked by limited cooperation, lacking in shared intentionality (11), and cognitively more adapted to competition than cooperation (12).”
BackgroundThe evolution of hyperactivity, impulsivity and cognitive diversity
Williams, J. H., & Taylor, E. (2005) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2005.0102 · Cited by 134
“Interactions between learning and evolution are not trivial (Hinton 1987); adding cooperating subgroups within a species brings a new level of complexity (Aoki 2001; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Nowak & Sigmund 2004).”
Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of general intelligence
Millet, K., & Dewitte, S. (2007) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.04.002 · Cited by 121
“proposed in biology and economics ( Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gurven, 2004) but”
BackgroundCooperation and the Scale of Competition in Humans
West, S. A., Gardner, A., Shuker, D. M., Reynolds, T., Burton-Chellow, M., Sykes, E. M., Guinnee, M. A., & Griffin, A. S. (2006) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2006.03.069 · Cited by 172
Investigating the genetic basis of altruism: the role of the COMT Val158Met polymorphism
Reuter, M., Frenzel, C., Walter, N. T., Markett, S. A., & Montag, C. (2010) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsq083 · Cited by 131
Stanford, P. K. (2017) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17001911 · Cited by 123
“The Innate Mind 3:367–91. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019. [SA] Haidt, J., Koller, S. H. & Dias, M. G. (1993) Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:613–28.”
BackgroundInfluentialRunaway Social Selection for Displays of Partner Value and Altruism
Nesse, R. M. (2007) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot.2007.2.2.143 · Cited by 126
NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER, INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY?
Carpenter, J. P., & Matthews, P. H. (2012) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01059.x · Cited by 121
“This estimate is remarkably close to the 0.625 reported in Fehr and Fischbacher (2003).”
ResultInfluentialThe price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment
Nelissen, R. M. A. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001 · Cited by 127
Evaluating the self‐domestication hypothesis of human evolution
Sánchez‐Villagra, M. R., & van Schaik, C. P. (2019) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21777 · Cited by 115
The cultural wealth of nations
Pagel, M., & Mace, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/428275a · Cited by 217
Evolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour
Bergmüller, R., Schürch, R., & Hamilton, I. M. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0124 · Cited by 127
“While altruistic punishment has been hypothesized to result from relatively complex evolutionary mechanisms , such as cultural group selection (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003), animal personality provides a simpler alternative explanation.”
War as a moral imperative (not just practical politics by other means)
Ginges, J., & Atran, S. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2384 · Cited by 121
Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups
Suzuki, S., & Akiyama, E. (2005) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2005.3072 · Cited by 119
“However, cooperation among genetically non-related individuals is often observed in actual ecosystems and in human societies (Connor & Norris 1982; Wilkinson 1984; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundMen behaving nicely: Public goods as peacock tails
van Vugt, M., & Iredale, W. (2012) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02093.x · Cited by 125
Chetty, R., Saez, E., & Sándor, L. (2014) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.3.169 · Cited by 124
“We analyze four sets of outcomes: 1) agreement to submit a review, 2) time taken to submit the review, 3) report quality, and 4) performance at other journals.”
Towards community-centered support for peer-to-peer service exchange
Bellotti, V. M. E., Cambridge, S., Hoy, K., Shih, P. C., Handalian, L. R., Han, K., & Carroll, J. M. (2014) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/2556288.2557061 · Cited by 116
“Other researchers suggest that reciprocity is a powerful, deeply-held belief, likely based on genetically and culturally evolved ‘hardwiring’ that shapes human behavior across many cultures (e.g., [22,48]).”
BackgroundBachner‐Melman, R., Gritsenko, I., Nemanov, L., Zohar, A. H., Christian Dina, C., & Ebstein, R. P. (2005) · Molecular Psychiatry · doi:10.1038/sj.mp.4001635 · Cited by 115
Takimoto, A., Kuroshima, H., & Fujita, K. (2009) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0262-8 · Cited by 115
“Primates 49:153-156 736 Kuroshima H, Fujita K, Adachi I, Iwata K, Fuyuki A (2003) A Capuchin monkey 737 (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food. 738 Anim Cogn, 6:283-291 739 Kuroshima H, Fujita K, Fuyuki A, Masuda T (2002) Understanding of the relationship 740 between seeing and k…”
BackgroundInfluentialMüller-Hansen, F., Schlüter, M., Mäs, M., Hegselmann, R., Donges, J. F., Kolb, J. J., Thonicke, K., & Heitzig, J. (2017) · Earth System Dynamics · doi:10.5194/esd-8-977-2017 · Cited by 127
“Exceptions are procedural (Hansson, 1996; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and other-regarding preferences (Mueller, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundGao, X., Yu, H., Sáez, I., Blue, P. R., Zhu, L., Hsu, M., & Zhou, X. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1802523115 · Cited by 119
The social neuroscience of reputation
Izuma, K. (2012) · Neuroscience Research · doi:10.1016/j.neures.2012.01.003 · Cited by 119
“These observations are not easily explained in an evolutionary framework, and have been used as evidence for the unique social structure of humans (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundAging Increases Prosocial Motivation for Effort
Lockwood, P. L., Abdurahman, A., Gabay, A. S., Drew, D., Tamm, M., Husain, M., & Apps, M. A. J. (2021) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797620975781 · Cited by 115
“Social cohesion depends on motivation and on people being willing to incur costs to help others (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundEnabling Institutional Investors’ Collective Action
Gond, J., & Piani, V. (2012) · Business & Society · doi:10.1177/0007650312460012 · Cited by 126
“Communication is essential to the emergence of trust and cooperative behaviors (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Ostrom, 1998, pp. 6-7).”
BackgroundOhtsuki, H., & Iwasa, Y. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018 · Cited by 112
“We believe that in this process language capability of humans must play an important role (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundA Three-Tier Hierarchy of Self-Potency
Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., Luke, M. A., O’Mara, E. M., & Gebauer, J. E. (2013) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-407188-9.00005-3 · Cited by 113
“It lies at the heart of economists’ ongoing dispute on whether human decision making is necessarily self-oriented or can be otheroriented (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundLotz, S., Baumert, A., Schlösser, T. M., Gresser, F., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011) · Negotiation and Conflict Management Research · doi:10.1111/j.1750-4716.2011.00084.x · Cited by 119
“It has been termed altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Heckathorne, 1989), strong reciprocity (e.g., Gintis, 2000), norm enforcement (e.g., Horne & Cutlip, 2002), third-party revenge (Tripp & Bies, 2009), or deontic justice (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003;…”
BackgroundMethodNeuroscientific approaches and applications within anthropology
Rilling, J. K. (2008) · American Journal of Physical Anthropology · doi:10.1002/ajpa.20947 · Cited by 115
“Behavioral economics experiments suggest that large-scale cooperation depends on the willingness of at least some individuals to endure the costs of punishing free riders (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich and Henrich, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialHuman cooperation in social dilemmas: comparing the Snowdrift game with the Prisoner's Dilemma
Kümmerli, R., Betto-Colliard, C., Fiechter, N., Petitpierre, B., Russier, F., & Keller, L. (2007) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.0793 · Cited by 116
“However, cooperation remains a problem in species such as humans, where cooperation often occurs between non-relatives (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundEspinosa, M. P., & KovářÃk, J. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00088 · Cited by 130
“…effects, economic games, altruism Introduction Prosociality is defined as any voluntary behavior intended to benefit other people and economic games have proven useful tools to learn about the nature of social preferences and motivations behind this behavior (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundRunaway Social Selection for Displays of Partner Value and Altruism
Nesse, R. M. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6287-2_10 · Cited by 113
“The challenge is how to get the benefits of trading favors without being exploited (Krebs and Dawkins 1984; Alexander 1987; Cosmides 1989; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).”
BackgroundBen‐Ner, A., & Kramer, A. (2010) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.04.024 · Cited by 111
“…sacrifices for unrelated others who are likely to provide at least as much help in the future in a reciprocal fashion, so it entails an evolved ability to recognize potential partners to transactions and the likelihood that they will indeed reciprocate (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Trivers, 1971).”
Kiyonari, T., Yamagishi, T., Cook, K. S., & Cheshire, C. (2006) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.1177/019027250606900304 · Cited by 110
“Thus the truster’s unwillingness to transfer some of his endowment to his trustee can be attributed to inequity aversion (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, 2004; Fehr and Gächter 2000).”
BackgroundZhao, K., Ferguson, E., & Smillie, L. D. (2015) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12237 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-10
- Volume
- 425
- Issue
- 6960
- Pages
- 785-791
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1481402319
- Cited by
- 3,475
- References
- 60
- Citations by year
- 2026: 142 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 166 · 2023: 161 · 2022: 189 · 2021: 232 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 186 · 2017: 136 · 2016: 179 · 2015: 202 · 2014: 159 · 2013: 173 · 2012: 157
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- selfishness, cooperation, individual heterogeneity, cultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution, social evolution
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Reward
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