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Moral Machines
Abstract
The human‐built environment is increasingly being populated by artificial agents that, through artificial intelligence (AI), are capable of acting autonomously. The software controlling these autonomous systems is, to‐date, “ethically blind” in the sense that the decision‐making capabilities of such systems does not involve any explicit moral reasoning. The title Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong refers to the need for these increasingly autonomous systems (robots and software bots) to become capable of factoring ethical and moral considerations into their decision making. The new field of inquiry directed at the development of artificial moral agents is referred to by a number of names including machine morality, machine ethics, roboethics, or artificial morality. Engineers exploring design strategies for systems sensitive to moral considerations in their choices and actions will need to determine what role ethical theory should play in defining control architectures for such systems.
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“Several expert committees have been created to this end, such as the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence appointed by the European Commission, the Expert Group on AI in Society of the OECD, and the Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence of the UK's House of Lords.153”
From Artificial Intelligence and Sustainable Decisions (2023) · cites this paper as [153]
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Smart Workplaces for older adults: coping ‘ethically’ with technology pervasiveness
Segkouli, S., Giakoumis, D., Votis, K., Triantafyllidis, A., Paliokas, I., & Tzovaras, D. (2021) · Universal Access in the Information Society · doi:10.1007/s10209-021-00829-9 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Wallach, W., & Allen, C.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-02-01
- OpenAlex
- W4247462173
- Cited by
- 711
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 70 · 2025: 60 · 2024: 99 · 2023: 47 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 56 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 22.38
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
- Keywords
- machine ethics, artificial morality, robot ethics, autonomous systems, ethical decision-making, control architecture, moral theory, robots, bots
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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