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The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness

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Phillips, Ian · 2018 · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Cited by 128

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Is phenomenal consciousness constitutively related to cognitive access? Despite being a fundamental issue for any science of consciousness, its empirical study faces a severe methodological puzzle. Recent years have seen numerous attempts to address this puzzle, either in practice, by offering evidence for a positive or negative answer, or in principle, by proposing a framework for eventual resolution. The present paper critically considers these endeavours, including partial-report, metacognitive and no-report paradigms, as well as the theoretical proposal that we can make progress by studying phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that the methodological puzzle remains obdurately with us and that, for now, we must adopt an attitude of humility towards the phenomenal. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access’.

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Phillips, I.
Venue
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2018-07-30
Volume
373
Issue
1755
Pages
20170347
ISSN
  • 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-2970
OpenAlex
W2884123791
Cited by
128
References
22
FWCI
10.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze
Licence
royalsociety.org/journals/ethics-policies/data-sharing-mining/ (tdm)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1098/rstb.2017.0347
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Phillips, I. (2018). The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0347

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