Towards Post-Quantum Blockchain: A Review on Blockchain Cryptography Resistant to Quantum Computing Attacks
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Abstract
Blockchain and other Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) have evolved significantly in the last years and their use has been suggested for numerous applications due to their ability to provide transparency, redundancy and accountability. In the case of blockchain, such characteristics are provided through public-key cryptography and hash functions. However, the fast progress of quantum computing has opened the possibility of performing attacks based on Grover's and Shor's algorithms in the near future. Such algorithms threaten both public-key cryptography and hash functions, forcing to redesign blockchains to make use of cryptosystems that withstand quantum attacks, thus creating which are known as post-quantum, quantum-proof, quantum-safe or quantum-resistant cryptosystems. For such a purpose, this article first studies current state of the art on post-quantum cryptosystems and how they can be applied to blockchains and DLTs. Moreover, the most relevant post-quantum blockchain systems are studied, as well as their main challenges. Furthermore, extensive comparisons are provided on the characteristics and performance of the most promising post-quantum public-key encryption and digital signature schemes for blockchains. Thus, this article seeks to provide a broad view and useful guidelines on post-quantum blockchain security to future blockchain researchers and developers.
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“Similarly, there are numerous issues with postquantum blockchains, as pointed out in [94].These include large key and signature sizes with correspondent impacts on performance.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [94]
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BackgroundFernández‐Caramés, T. M., Froiz-Míguez, I., Blanco-Novoa, Ó., & Fraga‐Lamas, P. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19153319 · Cited by 160 · cited 1×
“Such features have popularized blockchain in the last years and it has already been suggested as a key technology for different applications related to smart health [6], mea-”
BackgroundSelf-citationSoK of used cryptography in blockchain
Raikwar, M., Gligoroski, D., & Kralevska, K. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2946983 · Cited by 153 · cited 1×
“Finally, it is worth mentioning that hash functions are used in blockchains for generating user addresses (i.e., user public/private keys) or for shortening the size of public addresses [29], [30].”
BackgroundAn Anti-Quantum Transaction Authentication Approach in Blockchain
Yin, W., Wen, Q., Li, W., Zhang, H., & Jin, Z. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2017.2788411 · Cited by 135 · cited 2×
“For example, in [215] the researchers present a quantum-safe transaction authentication scheme based on lattice-based cryptography and provide a standard transaction model to prevent quantum attacks.”
BackgroundSecuring Edge Devices in the Post-Quantum Internet of Things Using Lattice-Based Cryptography
Liu, Z., Choo, K. R., & Großschädl, J. (2018) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2018.1700330 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“, deep learning [72]), has experienced a significant growth in the last years [73]–[77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78]–[82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption.”
BackgroundNew Differential-Algebraic Attacks and Reparametrization of Rainbow
Ding, J., Yang, B., Chen, C.-H. O., Chen, M.-S., & Cheng, C.-M. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68914-0_15 · Cited by 126 · cited 9×
“Regarding GeMSS, Rainbow and SPHINCS, their execution speed is impacted significantly by the amount of time devoted to key generation.”
BackgroundInfluentialA New Lattice-Based Signature Scheme in Post-Quantum Blockchain Network
Li, C.-Y., Chen, X.-B., Chen, Y.-L., Hou, Y.-Y., & Li, J. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2886554 · Cited by 126 · cited 2×
“Finally, it is worth mentioning the lattice-based signature schemes presented in [174], [175].”
BackgroundA New Variant of the Matsumoto-Imai Cryptosystem through Perturbation
Ding, J. (2004) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24632-9_22 · Cited by 125 · cited 1×
“Currently, some of the most promising multivariate-based schemes are the ones based on the use of square matrices with random quadratic polynomials, the cryptosystems derived from Matsumoto-Imai’s algorithm and the schemes that rely on Hidden Field Equations (HFE) [91], [92], [93].”
BackgroundSuárez-Albela, M., Fernández-Caramés, T., Fraga-Lamas, P., & Castedo, L. (2017) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s17091978 · Cited by 125 · cited 1×
“…that IoT, like other emerging technologies (e.g., deep learning [72]), has experienced a significant growth in the last years [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], which are limiting to…”
BackgroundSelf-citationSuárez-Albela, M., Fraga‐Lamas, P., & Fernández‐Caramés, T. M. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18113868 · Cited by 125 · cited 1×
“current due to the complexity of the performed operations [83], [84].”
BackgroundSelf-citationDesign Principles for HFEv- Based Multivariate Signature Schemes
Petzoldt, A., Chen, M.-S., Yang, B., Tao, C., & Ding, J. (2015) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48797-6_14 · Cited by 123 · cited 1×
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MethodEfficient Encryption From Random Quasi-Cyclic Codes
Aguilar-Melchor, C., Blazy, O., Deneuville, J.-C., Gaborit, P., & Zemor, G. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.2018.2804444 · Cited by 122
Enigma: Decentralized Computation Platform with Guaranteed PrivacyPreprint
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“An example of the use of SMPC on a blockchain is Enigma [249], which first stores hashes on a blockchain and then the related data on”
MethodSAFE: SDN-Assisted Framework for Edge–Cloud Interplay in Secure Healthcare Ecosystem
Aujla, G. S., Chaudhary, R., Kaur, K., Garg, S., Kumar, N., & Ranjan, R. K. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2018.2866917 · Cited by 117 · cited 1×
“As of writing, the most promising lattice-based cryptosystems are based on polynomial algebra [118], [120], [121]”
BackgroundAn Anti-Quantum E-Voting Protocol in Blockchain With Audit Function
Gao, S., Zheng, D., Guo, R., Jing, C., & Hu, C. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2935895 · Cited by 117 · cited 2×
“It is also worth mentioning the work in [10], where it is presented a blockchain-based transparent e-voting protocol that makes use of Niederreiter’s code-based cryptosystem to proof the”
BackgroundMethodIdentification Protocols and Signature Schemes Based on Supersingular Isogeny Problems
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Efficient Compression of SIDH Public Keys
Costello, C., Jao, D., Longa, P., Naehrig, M., Renes, J., & Urbanik, D. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56620-7_24 · Cited by 108 · cited 1×
“Therefore, it is necessary to address key size issues when implementing isogeny-based cryptosystems and Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH), especially in the case of resource-constrained devices, which need to use key compression techniques that often involve computationally intensive steps [196], [197].”
BackgroundQuantum Blockchain Using Entanglement in Time
Rajan, D., & Visser, M. (2019) · Quantum Reports · doi:10.3390/quantum1010002 · Cited by 106 · cited 1×
“Besides the use of cryptosystems to transition from pre-quantum to post-quantum blockchain, several researchers proposed quantum-computing based blockchains [221], [222], [223].”
MethodTorres, W. A. A., Steinfeld, R., Sakzad, A., Liu, J. K., Kuchta, V., Bhattacharjee, N., Au, M. H., & Cheng, J. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_32 · Cited by 104 · cited 1×
“Some researchers have already suggested quantumresistant lattice-based schemes to secure ring signatures [231]–[233] and applied them in blockchain developments [234].”
BackgroundA Quantum Algorithm for Computing Isogenies between Supersingular Elliptic Curves
Biasse, J., Jao, D., & Sankar, A. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13039-2_25 · Cited by 99 · cited 1×
“[126], [127], whose key size is usually in the order of a few thousand bits [128].”
BackgroundA Post-quantum Digital Signature Scheme Based on Supersingular Isogenies
Yoo, Y., Azarderakhsh, R., Jalali, A., Jao, D., & Soukharev, V. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_9 · Cited by 98 · cited 2×
“4, the scheme detailed in [195], for a 128-bit quantum security level, makes use of 2,688-bit”
BackgroundKey Compression for Isogeny-Based Cryptosystems
Azarderakhsh, R., Jao, D., Kalach, K., Koziel, B., & Leonardi, C. (2016) · doi:10.1145/2898420.2898421 · Cited by 96 · cited 1×
“Therefore, it is necessary to address key size issues when implementing isogeny-based cryptosystems and Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH), especially in the case of resource-constrained devices, which need to use key compression techniques that often involve computationally intensive steps [196], [197].”
BackgroundChoosing Parameters for NTRUEncrypt
Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J. C., Schanck, J. M., Silverman, J. H., Whyte, W., & Zhang, Z. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_1 · Cited by 95
Post-Quantum Cryptoprocessors Optimized for Edge and Resource-Constrained Devices in IoT
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“, deep learning [72]), has experienced a significant growth in the last years [73]–[77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78]–[82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption.”
BackgroundPractical homomorphic encryption: A survey
Rafferty, C., O'Neill, M. P., O’Sullivan, E., Doröz, Y., & Sunar, B. (2014) · IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings · doi:10.1109/iscas.2014.6865753 · Cited by 91 · cited 1×
“ing unencrypted data to them [240], [241].”
Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack
Stewart, I., Ilie, D., Zamyatin, A., Werner, S. M., Torshizi, M. F., & Knottenbelt, W. J. (2018) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.180410 · Cited by 88 · cited 1×
“Another mechanism is proposed in [220], where it is presented a simple commit-delay-reveal”
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Self-citationSuccinct Arguments in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
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“In addition, it is possible to make use of SNAGS (Succinct NonInteractive Arguments), whose quantum-resistivity is still being studied by the research community [248].”
BackgroundCryptanalysis of the Original McEliece Cryptosystem
Canteaut, A., & Sendrier, N. (2000) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-49649-1_16 · Cited by 83
Reverse engineering and security evaluation of commercial tags for RFID-based IoT applications
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“…growth in the last years [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption. ï Small signature and hash…”
BackgroundSelf-citationA Cost-Effective IoT System for Monitoring Indoor Radon Gas Concentration
Blanco-Novoa, Ó., Fernández‐Caramés, T. M., Fraga‐Lamas, P., & Castedo, L. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18072198 · Cited by 80 · cited 1×
“, deep learning [72]), has experienced a significant growth in the last years [73]–[77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78]–[82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption.”
BackgroundSelf-citationPost-quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir
Unruh, D. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_3 · Cited by 78 · cited 1×
“Nonetheless, it must be noted that, Fiat-Shamir signatures are not known to be completely secure against quantum attacks [157] (only under certain circumstances [158]), so alternatives like the Unruh transformation should be considered [157].”
BackgroundNewHope without reconciliation.Preprint
Alkım, E., Ducas, L., Pöppelmann, T., & Schwabe, P. (2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 76
Towards Quantum-Secured Permissioned Blockchain: Signature, Consensus, and Logic
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“Besides the use of cryptosystems to transition from pre-quantum to post-quantum blockchain, several researchers proposed quantum-computing based blockchains [221]–[223].”
MethodXiong, F., Xiao, R., Ren, W., Zheng, R., & Jiang, J. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2937917 · Cited by 73 · cited 2×
“For instance, in [8] it is introduced a private-key distribution method to help recover lost private keys that is based in secret sharing and in network protocols that guarantee the security of”
BackgroundMethodSelecting Parameters for the Rainbow Signature Scheme
Petzoldt, A., Bulygin, S., & Buchmann, J. A. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_16 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“Despite their resistance to quantum attacks, it is necessary further research for improving their decryption speed (due to the involved ‘‘guess work’’) and to reduce their large key size and ciphertext overhead [90].”
BackgroundCryptanalysis of HFEv and Internal Perturbation of HFE
Ding, J., & Schmidt, D. S. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30580-4_20 · Cited by 69 · cited 1×
“random quadratic polynomials, the cryptosystems derived from Matsumoto-Imai’s algorithm and the schemes that rely on Hidden Field Equations (HFE) [91]–[93].”
MethodBlockchained Post-Quantum Signatures
Chalkias, K., Brown, J., Hearn, M., Lillehagen, T., Nitto, I., & Schroeter, T. (2018) · 2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData) · doi:10.1109/cybermatics_2018.2018.00213 · Cited by 69 · cited 2×
“have suggested new faster algorithms that seem to be practical for blockchain [202], [203].”
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“Although some researchers have speculated on the real reasons behind such an NSA announcement [37], long-term public-key cryptography seems to be threatened and developers need to prepare current blockchains for the post-quantum era.”
BackgroundSecurity and Privacy of Blockchain and Quantum Computation
Ikeda, K. (2018) · Advances in computers · doi:10.1016/bs.adcom.2018.03.003 · Cited by 66
Rojas, D. L. H., Fernández‐Caramés, T. M., Fraga‐Lamas, P., & Escudero, C. J. (2017) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s18010057 · Cited by 65
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“variant BLISS-B is also susceptible to cache attacks that are able to recover the secret signing key after 6,000 signature generations [169].”
BackgroundDistributed Storage Meets Secret Sharing on the Blockchain
Raman, R. K., & Varshney, L. R. (2018) · Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA) · doi:10.1109/ita.2018.8503089 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“Another example can be found in [239], where the authors use secret sharing to distribute transaction data securely among peers in a blockchain.”
BackgroundA Quantum Money Solution to the Blockchain Scalability Problem
Coladangelo, A., & Sattath, O. (2020) · Quantum · doi:10.22331/q-2020-07-16-297 · Cited by 61
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“For instance, in [224] and [225], the authors propose to migrate Bitcoin to quantum computers, while others”
BackgroundTowards lightweight Identity-Based Encryption for the post-quantum-secure Internet of Things
Güneysu, T. E., & Oder, T. (2017) · International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED) · doi:10.1109/isqed.2017.7918335 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“IBE and IBBE are interesting for closed groups of users like private blockchains [235] and there are already implementations [236] (even for embedded systems [237]), but their need for a trusted third-party”
BackgroundUsing Blockchains to Implement Distributed Measuring Systems
Melo, W. S., Bessani, A., Neves, N., Santin, A. O., & Carmo, L. F. R. D. C. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement · doi:10.1109/tim.2019.2898013 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“suring systems [7], logistics [8], [9], e-voting [10] or smart factories [11], [12].”
BackgroundqBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Quantum Cash System
Ikeda, K. (2018) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-01174-1_58 · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“For instance, in [224] and [225], the authors propose to migrate Bitcoin to quantum computers, while others”
BackgroundA Lattice-Based Linkable Ring Signature Supporting Stealth Addresses
Liu, Z., Nguyen, K., Yang, G., Wang, H., & Wong, D. S. (2019) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_35 · Cited by 49 · cited 1×
“Some researchers have already suggested quantumresistant lattice-based schemes to secure ring signatures [231]–[233] and applied them in blockchain developments [234].”
BackgroundEvaluation of Post-Quantum Distributed Ledger Cryptography
Campbell, R. (2019) · The Journal of British Blockchain Association · doi:10.31585/jbba-2-1-(4)2019 · Cited by 46 · cited 1×
“Other schemes like qTESLA are fast (as it will be later observed in Section V), but their major drawback is their large key sizes [192].”
BackgroundThe Cubic Simple Matrix Encryption Scheme
Ding, J., Petzoldt, A., & Wang, L.-C. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11659-4_5 · Cited by 43 · cited 3×
“random quadratic polynomials, the cryptosystems derived from Matsumoto-Imai’s algorithm and the schemes that rely on Hidden Field Equations (HFE) [91]–[93].”
MethodOuroboros: A Simple, Secure and Efficient Key Exchange Protocol Based on Coding Theory
Deneuville, J.-C., Gaborit, P., & Zémor, G. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59879-6_2 · Cited by 43
Tighter Security Proofs for Generic Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
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Tractable Rational Map Signature
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“Other relevant multivariate-based digital signature schemes have been proposed, like the ones based on pseudo-random multi-variate quadratic equations [161] or on Rainbow-like signing schemes (e.g., TTS [162], TRMS [163] or Rainbow [164]).”
BackgroundA New Post-Quantum Blind Signature From Lattice Assumptions
Zhang, P., Jiang, H., Zheng, Z., Hu, P.-C., & Xu, Q. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2833103 · Cited by 38 · cited 1×
“Researchers have also developed lattice-based blind signature schemes [171], which were introduced by David Chaum in the early 80s for creating an untraceable payment system [172].”
BackgroundA New Anti-Quantum Proxy Blind Signature for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Things
Li, C., Xu, G., Chen, Y., Ahmad, H., & Li, J. (2019) · Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print) · doi:10.32604/cmc.2019.06279 · Cited by 36 · cited 2×
“For instance, a lattice-based blind signature scheme is detailed in [173], which was specifically conceived for providing user anonymity and untraceability in distributed”
BackgroundMethodToward Quantum-Resistant Strong Designated Verifier Signature from Isogenies
Sun, X., Tian, H., & Wang, Y. (2012) · International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS) · doi:10.1109/incos.2012.70 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“for creating post-quantum digital signature schemes [193], but there are not in the literature many of such schemes and they still suffer from poor performance.”
BackgroundSuárez-Albela, M., Fraga-Lamas, P., Castedo, L., & Fernández-Caramés, T. M. (2018) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19010015 · Cited by 35 · cited 1×
“current due to the complexity of the performed operations [83], [84].”
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Reverse engineering the communications protocol of an RFID public transportation card
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“…growth in the last years [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption. ï Small signature and hash length.”
BackgroundSelf-citationSampling Methods for Shortest Vectors, Closest Vectors and Successive Minima
Blömer, J., & Naewe, S. (2007) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-73420-8_8 · Cited by 31
Post-quantum cryptography based on codes: State of the art and open challenges
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“blockchains or modifications of current blockchains to tackle the quantum threat [206]–[208].”
BackgroundEfficient Implementation of a CCA2-Secure Variant of McEliece Using Generalized Srivastava Codes
Cayrel, P.-L., Hoffmann, G., & Persichetti, E. (2012) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30057-8_9 · Cited by 29
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“described how to accelerate mining by modifying Grover’s algorithm [226].”
MethodCAKE: Code-Based Algorithm for Key Encapsulation
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A Methodology for Evaluating Security in Commercial RFID Systems
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“…growth in the last years [73], [74], [75], [76], [77], but IoT devices still face some important challenges, mainly regarding security [78], [79], [80], [81], [82], which are limiting to some extent its jointly use with blockchain and its widespread adoption. ï Small signature and hash length.”
BackgroundSelf-citationLong-Term Public Blockchain: Resilience against Compromise of Underlying Cryptography
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Sharper Ring-LWE Signatures.Preprint
Barreto, P. S. L. M., Longa, P., Naehrig, M., Ricardini, J. E., & Zanon, G. H. M. (2016) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 24
Code-Based Identification and Signature Schemes in Software
Alaoui, S. M. E. Y., Cayrel, P.-L., Bansarkhani, R. E., & Hoffmann, G. (2013) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40588-4_9 · Cited by 21 · cited 2×
“Other code-based signing algorithms have been proposed in the literature, such as identification protocols related to the application of Fiat-Shamir transformation [155], which in some cases outperform cryptosystems like CFS [156].”
MethodHayouni, H., & Hamdi, M. (2016) · IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control (ICNSC) · doi:10.1109/icnsc.2016.7479039 · Cited by 20 · cited 1×
“ing unencrypted data to them [240], [241].”
Anonymous Post-Quantum Cryptocash
Zhang, H., Zhang, F., Tian, H., & Au, M. H. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-58387-6_25 · Cited by 18 · cited 1×
“Some researchers have already suggested quantum-resistant lattice-based schemes to secure ring signatures [231], [232], [233] and applied them in blockchain developments [234]. ñ Identity-Base Encryption (IBE).”
BackgroundBitcoin Security with Post Quantum Cryptography
Semmouni, M. C., Nitaj, A., & Belkasmi, M. (2019) · International Conference on Networked Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31277-0_19 · Cited by 17 · cited 1×
“In the case of [211], the authors propose to improve Bitcoin (which uses the Koblitz curve secp256k1 and SHA-256 dur-”
MethodPost-quantum hybrid security mechanism for MIMO systems
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“Different authors have already proposed post-quantum blockchains or modifications of current blockchains to tackle the quantum threat [206], [207], [208].”
BackgroundPunctured Reed–Muller code‐based McEliece cryptosystems
Lee, W., No, J., & Kim, Y. (2017) · IET Communications · doi:10.1049/iet-com.2016.1268 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“, LowDensity Parity-Check (LDPC) codes, Quasi-Cyclic LowRank Parity-Check (QC-LRPC) codes) and specific coding techniques [88].”
Long-Term Public Blockchain: Resilience against Compromise of Underlying Cryptography
Sato, M., & Matsuo, S. (2017) · IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW) · doi:10.1109/eurospw.2017.49 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“For instance, in [218] the authors propose a scheme to extend”
BackgroundParametric Hash Function Resistant to Attack by Quantum Computer
Sazonova, P., & Krendelev, S. (2018) · Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems · doi:10.15439/2018f254 · Cited by 15 · cited 3×
“to resist quantum attacks [39], it is usually recommended to increase the output size of traditional hash functions.”
BackgroundTowards Encrypting Industrial Data on Public Distributed Networks
Preece, J. D., & Easton, J. M. (2018) · IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) · doi:10.1109/bigdata.2018.8622246 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“For instance, in [209] it is proposed a framework aimed at sharing sensitive industrial data in public distributed networks.”
BackgroundImplementation Security of Quantum Cryptography: Introduction, challenges, solutions
Alléaume, R. (2018) · HAL · Cited by 15
Aggregation of Gamma-Signatures and Applications to Bitcoin.Preprint
Zhao, Y. (2018) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 13
Smart contracts meet quantum cryptographyPreprint
Coladangelo, A. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1902.05214 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“Moreover, some authors have already suggested using quantum cryptography to implement smart contracts [227].”
BackgroundQChain: Quantum-resistant and decentralized PKI using Blockchain
An, H., & Kim, K. (2018) · Cited by 10
Secure digital archiving in post-quantum era
Člupek, V., Malina, L., & Zeman, V. (2015) · International Conference on Telecommunications and Signal Processing (TSP) · doi:10.1109/tsp.2015.7296338 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
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BackgroundSecure Scheme Against Compromised Hash in Proof-of-Work Blockchain
Chen, F., Liu, Z., Long, Y., Liu, Z., & Ding, N. (2018) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-02744-5_1 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
“However, the transition scheme may actually imply a hardfork of the blockchain, but, to avoid it, a soft-fork mechanism may be implemented [219].”
BackgroundOn multivariate signature-only public key cryptosystems.
Courtois, N. T. (2001) · Cited by 8
Post-quantum algorithms for digital signing in Public Key Infrastructures
Sjöberg, M. (2017) · KTH Publication Database DiVA (KTH Royal Institute of Technology) · Cited by 7
NSA keys into quantum computing
Cartwright, J. (2014) · Physics World · doi:10.1088/2058-7058/27/02/10 · Cited by 5 · cited 1×
“National Security Agency (NSA) seem to have not made significant progress on large quantum computers [35].”
Background
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- 2019, PROMETHEUS Publications
- 2019, SAFECrypto Contributions
- 2019, PQCrypto Contributions
- 2019, NIST’s Announcement of the First Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Conference
- 2019, Workshop on Cybersecurity in a Post-Quantum World
- 2019, ETSI/IQC 2018 Quantum Safe Workshop
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Cited by
The Evolution of Quantum Key Distribution Networks: On the Road to the Qinternet
Cao, Y., Zhao, Y., Wang, Q., Zhang, J., Ng, S. X., & Hanzo, L. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3144219 · Cited by 505
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406
“Similarly, there are numerous issues with post-quantum blockchains, as pointed out in [94].”
Background6G Wireless Systems: A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future Directions
Khan, L. U., Yaqoob, I., Imran, M., Han, Z., & Hong, C. S. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.3015289 · Cited by 384
“by enabling higher speeds that users have never experienced until now [71], [72].”
BackgroundBlockchain for Electronic Voting System—Review and Open Research Challenges
Jafar, U., Aziz, M. J. A., & Shukur, Z. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21175874 · Cited by 275
“If the number is high, some of the efficiency is reduced to provide better security [82].”
BackgroundBlockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends
Wenhua, Z., Qamar, F., Abdali, T.-A. N., Hassan, R., Jafri, S. T. A., & Nguyen, Q. N. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12030546 · Cited by 282
Metadata
- Authors
- Fernandez-Carames, T. M., & Fraga-Lamas, P.
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 21091-21116
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3000833961
- Semantic Scholar
- 239bf45c13b3f6d38c74026b535f785febf9cd08
- Cited by
- 607
- References
- 172
- Citations by year
- 2026: 80 · 2025: 134 · 2024: 124 · 2023: 104 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 17
- FWCI
- 26.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- RUC (Universidade Da Coruña) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Xunta de Galicia (ED431G2019/01)
- Agencia Estatal de Investigación (TEC2016-75067-C4-1-R, RED2018-102668-T)
- European Regional Development Fund
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Keywords
- post-quantum cryptography, blockchain, distributed ledger technology, Grover's algorithm, Shor's algorithm, public-key cryptography, hash functions, digital signatures, public-key encryption, blockchain security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.