Cited by 152Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic Detection

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 261 of the 261 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 219 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Data and Model Poisoning Backdoor Attacks on Wireless Federated Learning, and the Defense Mechanisms: A Comprehensive Survey

Open access
Wan, Yichen, Qu, Youyang, Ni, Wei, Xiang, Yong, Gao, Longxiang, Hossain, Ekram·2024·IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials

Abstract

Due to the greatly improved capabilities of devices, massive data, and increasing concern about data privacy, Federated Learning (FL) has been increasingly considered for applications to wireless communication networks (WCNs). Wireless FL (WFL) is a distributed method of training a global deep learning model in which a large number of participants each train a local model on their training datasets and then upload the local model updates to a central server. However, in general, nonindependent and identically distributed (non-IID) data of WCNs raises concerns about robustness, as a malicious participant could potentially inject a “backdoor” into the global model by uploading poisoned data or models over WCN. This could cause the model to misclassify malicious inputs as a specific target class while behaving normally with benign inputs. This survey provides a comprehensive review of the latest backdoor attacks and defense mechanisms. It classifies them according to their targets (data poisoning or model poisoning), the attack phase (local data collection, training, or aggregation), and defense stage (local training, before aggregation, during aggregation, or after aggregation). The strengths and limitations of existing attack strategies and defense mechanisms are analyzed in detail. Comparisons of existing attack methods and defense designs are carried out, pointing to noteworthy findings, open challenges, and potential future research directions related to security and privacy of WFL.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This survey reviews backdoor attacks and defenses in wireless federated learning (WFL), classifying attacks by target and phase and defenses by training stage. It reports that model poisoning attacks generally achieve higher backdoor accuracy and longer lifespan than data poisoning attacks, while defenses during or after aggregation perform best but often conflict with secure aggregation.

Key findings

  • On FMNIST with 100 participants and 10 selected per iteration, global model replacement [37] achieved the highest attack performance: BAR 79.86% and MAR 91.68%, versus local model replacement [32] at BAR 71.96%/MAR 88.91%, coordinated trigger [116] at BAR 57.06%/MAR 75.57%, and label flipping [29] at BAR 46.6%/MAR 65.03%; no-attack MAR was 92.92%.
  • Backdoor lifespan after 50 clean iterations: label flipping and coordinated trigger attacks dropped to 0% BAR, local model replacement retained 12.95% BAR, and global model replacement retained 49.51% BAR.
  • Defense performance on FMNIST: model stability [228] gave BAR 9.72%/MAR 78.17%; norm clipping and DP [124] gave BAR 6.59%/MAR 86.12%; model similarity [218] gave BAR 1.12%/MAR 89.53%; WFL with forgetting mechanism [224] gave BAR 0.24%/MAR 94.76%.
  • The survey concludes that data poisoning attacks are lower-cost but weaker and more easily diluted, while model poisoning attacks have higher attack success and stealthiness at higher cost; defenses during and after aggregation handle model poisoning well but often require historical information and are not compatible with SecAgg.

Methods

  • Comprehensive survey reviewing over 200 papers from 2015 to 2023, collected from IEEE Xplore, Elsevier, MDPI, and arXiv, with attacks classified by target (data vs. model poisoning) and phase (local data collection, local training, aggregation), and defenses classified by stage (local training, before aggregation, during aggregation, after aggregation).
  • Experimental comparison used the FMNIST dataset, 100 total participants, 10 randomly selected per training iteration, 100 training iterations, and compromised client rates of 0.1, 0.2, or 0.5 for four representative attacks; metrics were BAR and MAR, with lifespan tested over 50 additional clean iterations.
  • Defense comparison used FMNIST with representative methods from each defense phase, reporting BAR and MAR under specified norm-clipping thresholds and Gaussian noise parameters.

Limitations

  • The paper states that existing defenses often rely on threshold design, require historical information about attacks, assume attackers participate consistently, may not be compatible with SecAgg, and can degrade main-task accuracy; it also notes that many defenses target only specific attack types and struggle with novel attacks.
  • Evident from the text: the survey’s own experimental comparison is limited to FMNIST and a small set of representative attacks and defenses, so the reported numbers may not generalize to other datasets, non-IID settings, or decentralized WFL.
  • Evident from the text: the survey identifies open challenges rather than proposing a new unified defense, and it notes that OTA-WFL and decentralized WFL remain under-explored for backdoor detection and defense.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/comst.2024.3361451

Cites

261 of 261 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 219 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

Show all 159 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 116
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 113
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
197 of 197
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The security threats induced by WCN are inevitable when discussing the influence of backdoor attacks on WFL.

    “Nevertheless, the security threats induced by WCNare inevitable when discussing the influence of backdoor attacks on WFL.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The training datasets of WFL participants are non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID).

    “The training datasets of WFL participants are non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The broadcast nature of wireless (radio) channels allows misbehaved or compromised participants in WFL to overhear the local model parameters of multiple or all benign participants.

    “Particularly, the broadcast nature of wireless (radio) channels allows misbehaved or compromised participants in WFL to overhear the local model parameters of multiple or all benign participants.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The malicious attacker cannot inject completed backdoor patterns in a short time.

    “The malicious attacker cannot inject completed backdoor patterns in a short time, thus improving the robustness of the global model.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The methods in [215]-[218] assume that the attacker is malicious all the time and uploads adversarial models in every round.

    “The methods proposed in [215]-[218] assume that the attacker should be malicious all the time. The attacker needs to upload adversarial models in every round.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In practical scenarios, the attacker can decide to inject the backdoor at a random round.

    “In practical scenarios, the attacker can decide to inject the backdoor at a random round.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The attacker knows all possible defense patterns, can conduct attacks at any time, and multiple attackers can conduct coordinated attacks.

    “It is assumed that the attacker knows all possible defense patterns, can conduct attacks at any time, and multiple attackers can conduct coordinated attacks.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Defense mechanisms working on the server side are more powerful than those on the client side.

    “It is reasonable to assume that the defense mechanisms working on the server side are more powerful than those on the client side.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    If the attacker could make use of data imbalances and intentionally control compromised clients to acquire more data from the WCN, the trigger rate will increase.

    “If the attacker could make use of such imbalances and intentionally control compromised clients to acquire more data from the WCN, it is reasonable to assume that the trigger rate will also increase.”
9 of 9

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Canon example cites an unrelated reference title

    Minor

    The Canon printer account cites [34], whose listed title concerns backdoors in AccessPress themes and plugins rather than Canon printers.

  • Total client count is assigned to both m and N

    Minor

    Table II defines N as the total number of clients and m as the number selected for an iteration. The performance-analysis section instead calls m the total number of clients.

  • MAR is defined both to include malicious inputs and to use only clean inputs

    Minor

    The evaluation-metrics section includes outputs from backdoored inputs in MAR, whereas the experimental section says MAR is prediction accuracy on clean inputs.

  • Table IV excludes multiple clients from local model replacement

    Minor

    Table IV marks the Multiple compromised-client column × for local model replacement, but Table VII says this attack can control one or multiple compromised clients.

  • Before-aggregation defense is located on both client and server

    Minor

    The summary says defenses before aggregation are mounted on the client side, but the section's norm-clipping defense has the central server scale client updates.

  • Lifespan table reports BAR, not the stated MAR

    Minor

    The text says Table XI records changes in main task accuracy (MAR), but the table labels all three measured columns as backdoor accuracy rate (BAR).

6 of 6

Citations

Cites

Items 201–261 of 261

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Eilertsen, Backdoor found in themes and plugins from accesspress themes
  2. Odirichukwu, 2021, Interoperable protocols of the Internet of Things and Internet of Robotic Things: A review, Int. J. Comput. Intell. Security Res., 1, 101
  3. Haji, 2021, Comparison of optimization techniques based on gradient descent algorithm: A review, PalArch’s J. Archaeol. Egypt/Egyptol., 18, 2715
  4. Lu, Where to attack: A dynamic locator model for backdoor attack in text classifications, 984
  5. Pan, Hidden trigger backdoor attack on NLP models via linguistic style manipulation, 3611
  6. Qi, Revisiting the assumption of latent separability for backdoor defenses, 1

Cited by

Sorted by citations

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Metadata

Authors
Wan, Y., Qu, Y., Ni, W., Xiang, Y., Gao, L., & Hossain, E.
Affiliations
  • Deakin University (AU)
  • Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (AU)
  • Qilu University of Technology (CN)
  • University of Manitoba (CA)
Venue
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Published
2024
Volume
26
Issue
3
Pages
1861-1897
ISSN
  • 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
  • 2373-745X
OpenAlex
W4391620743
Cited by
152
References
251
Citations by year
2026: 53 · 2025: 79 · 2024: 20
FWCI
22.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
  • National Key Research and Development Program of China (2022ZD0116800)
  • Taishan Scholars Program (TSQNZ20230621, TSQN202211214)
  • Shandong Excellent Young Scientists Fund Program (2023HWYQ-113)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
Keywords
wireless federated learning, backdoor attacks, data poisoning, model poisoning, non-IID data, defense mechanisms, malicious participants, model aggregation, federated learning security, privacy

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