Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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Asymmetric morality: Blame is more differentiated and more extreme than praise
Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2019) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0213544 · Cited by 87
Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment.
Sylwester, K., Herrmann, B., & Bryson, J. J. (2013) · Journal of Neuroscience Psychology and Economics · doi:10.1037/npe0000009 · Cited by 84
“A cross-cultural analysis 315 of punishment in UGs and of TTP games revealed a consistent trend; as 316 the offered amount approached an equal split, recipients in the UG and 317 observers in TTP were less willing to punish (Henrich et al., 2006).”
ResultGeneralizability is not optional: insights from a cross-cultural study of social discounting
Tiokhin, L., Hackman, J., Munira, S., Jesmin, K., & Hruschka, D. (2019) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.181386 · Cited by 57
“Another is to invest in large-scale collaborative projects (e.g. AHRC Culture and the Mind [70]) that investigate the same phenomenon in diverse contexts [71–73].”
Like Me: A Homophily-Based Account of Human Culture
Haun, D. B. M., & Over, H. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-1387-9_6 · Cited by 83
Why humans might help strangers
Raihani, N., & Bshary, R. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00039 · Cited by 83
“Evidence for cross-cultural variation in cooperative tendency across societies (Henrich et al., 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Gächter et al., 2010; House et al., 2013) has been touted as key evidence for the existence of between-group variation in cooperative norms that could…”
BackgroundThe Superorganism Account of Human Sociality: How and When Human Groups Are Like Beehives
Kesebir, S. (2011) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868311430834 · Cited by 78
“In economic games, people are eager to punish defectors even if they have to pay for it (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundThe Acheulean Handaxe Technological Persistence: A Case of Preferred Cultural Conservatism?
Finkel, M., & Barkai, R. (2018) · Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society · doi:10.1017/ppr.2018.2 · Cited by 71
Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation
Dhaliwal, N. A., Patil, I., & Cushman, F. A. (2021) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2021.01.003 · Cited by 73
The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
Zhang, B., Li, C., Silva, H. D., Bednarik, P., & Sigmund, K. (2013) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7 · Cited by 78
“However, most investigations deal with so-called peer-punishment (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fowler 2005; Henrich et al. 2006; Casari 2007; Sigmund 2007; Carpenter 2007; Egas and Riedl 2008; Gächter et al. 2008; Chaudhuri 2011).”
Experimental Games and Games of Life among the Ju/’hoan Bushmen
Wiessner, P. (2009) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/595622 · Cited by 79
“I was hoping that somebody would offer more than $5 to see if the offer would be rejected to punish the proposer for acting like a “big shot,” but nobody made a high offer (see Henrich et al. 2006 and Tracer 2003 for interesting discussions of rejections of very high offers).”
BackgroundEvolutionary Social Psychology
Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2010) · Handbook of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002021 · Cited by 67
The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation
Marlowe, F. W., Berbesque, J. C., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Gurven, M., & Tracer, D. P. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2342 · Cited by 76
Self-citationSocial image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment
Grimalda, G. F., Pondorfer, A., & Tracer, D. P. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms12288 · Cited by 72
Self-citationHaun, D. B. M., & Over, H. (2013) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262019750.003.0005 · Cited by 66
Revising theory in light of experimental findings
Ostrom, E. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.008 · Cited by 74
The Linguistic Analogy: Motivations, Results, and Speculations
Dwyer, S., Huebner, B., & HAUSER, M. D. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01064.x · Cited by 79
Dopamine-system genes and cultural acquisition: the norm sensitivity hypothesis
Kitayama, S., King, A. P. J., Hsu, M., Liberzon, I., & Yoon, C. (2015) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.11.006 · Cited by 67
“We may assume social norms were utilized to breed much-needed within-group cooperation and coordination [47,48].”
MethodCompetition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs
Huber, C., Dreber, A., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Weitzel, U., Abellán, M., Adayeva, X., Ay, F. C., Barron, K., et al. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2215572120 · Cited by 66
“170; analytic approach B: χ(2)(5) = 9.”
The Moral-Conventional Distinction in Mature Moral Competence
Huebner, B., Lee, J. D., & HAUSER, M. D. (2010) · Journal of Cognition and Culture · doi:10.1163/156853710x497149 · Cited by 73
“Although the literature in experimental behavioral economics strongly suggests that all people have some sense of fairness (Henrich et al., 2005, 2006), there is also reason to believe that there will be some variation in the way that the concept ‘fair’ is implemented from culture to culture, at…”
BackgroundDoes injustice affect your sense of taste and smell? The mediating role of moral disgust
Skarlicki, D. P., Hoegg, J., Aquino, K. F., & Nadisic, T. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.03.011 · Cited by 73
“Folger (2001) theorized that these reactions involve evolutionary-based emotions such as anger and disgust that occur not only among victims ofmistreatment, but also among third parties who are not directly affected by the mistreatment (see also Henrich, 2006; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundDubljević, V., & Racine, É. (2014) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2014.939381 · Cited by 69
“In this context, of special relevance is the wealth of data on altruistic punishment (also known as “costly punishment” of unfair behavior) in various cultures around the world (Henrich et al. 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
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