Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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“Such a rejection is often considered to reflect costly punishment because the (potential) income of the first player is reduced by the rejection, and the second player has to bear opportunity costs (Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al., 2008).”
BackgroundPrivate Donations for Humanitarian Operations
Urrea, G., & Pedraza‐Martinez, A. J. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-91509-8_2 · Cited by 6
Confer, J. A., & Chopik, W. J. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102808 · Cited by 8
Real-life revenge may not effectively deter norm violations
Elshout, M., Nelissen, R. M. A., van Beest, I., Elshout, S., & DIJK, W. W. V. (2019) · The Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1080/00224545.2019.1681351 · Cited by 6
Coevolution of spatial ultimatum game and link weight promotes fairness
Deng, L., Zhang, X., & Wang, C. (2020) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125698 · Cited by 6
Molenmaker, W. E., Lelieveld, G., de Kwaadsteniet, E. W., & van Dijk, E. (2021) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.2243 · Cited by 6
“…to normative models of cooperation (e.g., Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Elster, 1989; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Fehr & Schurtenberger, 2018; Henrich et al., 2006), apply to one's own cooperative behavior as well as to the cooperative behavior of others.”
Background5. The Systemic Outcome of Common Good Dynamics
Sedmak, C. (2022) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0290.07 · Cited by 6
Constraints on cooperation shape hierarchical versus distributed structure in human groups
Zefferman, M. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-23454-9 · Cited by 7
The place of ethics in a unified behavioral science
Danielson, P. A. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000660 · Cited by 6
Vonk, J. M., & Aradhye, C. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-802652-6.00035-9 · Cited by 7
“A study across 15 cultures found that subjects in remote huntergatherer cultures were willing to accept lower offers from the proposers and generally seemed to not care about fairness (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundThe Moral Origins of God: Darwin, Durkheim, and the Homo Duplex Theory of Theogenesis
Marshall, D. A. (2016) · Frontiers in Sociology · doi:10.3389/fsoc.2016.00013 · Cited by 7
“More broadly, we (along with some of our fellow primates) pay our debts, force others to pay theirs, and work hard to right perceived injustices despite the costs and dangers these actions can entail (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundPublic Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation
Silva, H. D., & Sigmund, K. (2009) · Springer series in game theory · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5 · Cited by 6
“In real experiments, the observed behavior differs considerably from these predictions of what a card-board “homo economicus” ought to do. Indeed, in the trust game, responders often return a large part of their gift, and in the ultimatum game, responders often reject offers which they deem too small (Camerer 2003; He…”
BackgroundMethodThe Separation of Sexual Activity and Reproduction in Human Social Evolution
Morin, S. J., Keefe, D. L., & Naftolin, F. N. (2014) · Advances in experimental medicine and biology · doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-1031-1_14 · Cited by 6
Schelling Formalized: Strategic Choices of Non-Rational PersonasPreprint
Wolpert, D. H. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1172602 · Cited by 7
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests behind Altruistic Third-Party PunishmentPreprint
Ottone, S., Ponzano, F., & Zarri, L. (2008) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 7
How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public good settings?Preprint
Prediger, S. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.17192/es2024.0103 · Cited by 11
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of reputation and cooperation in human groups
McKee, K. R., Hughes, E., Zhu, T. O., Chadwick, M. J., Koster, R., Castaneda, A. G., Beattie, C., Graepel, T., Botvinick, M., & Leibo, J. Z. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2103.04982 · Cited by 5
“Group members also possess a “ticketing” tool, providing a mechanism for costly punishment [69, 70].”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.