Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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Fairness concerns predict medial frontal negativity amplitude in ultimatum bargaining
Boksem, M. A. S., & De Cremer, D. (2010) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470910903202666 · Cited by 208
“This “sense of fairness” has been show to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003 ), in various different cultures (Henrich et al, 2006 ) and in different age groups (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998 ).”
Free to punish: A motivated account of free will belief.
Clark, C. J., Luguri, J. B., Ditto, P. H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A. F., & Baumeister, R. F. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0035880 · Cited by 204
Altruism in insect societies and beyond: voluntary or enforced?
RATNIEKS, F., & WENSELEERS, T. (2008) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.09.013 · Cited by 204
“In a comparative study of 15 small-scale societies, levels of cooperation were correlated with the degree to which uncooperative individuals were punished [ 68 ].”
ResultNo third-party punishment in chimpanzees
Riedl, K., Jensen, K., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1203179109 · Cited by 204
“Third-party punishment has been demonstrated in a variety of cultures (14, 45), although there is some question about how third-party punishment could have evolved in humans.”
BackgroundSzolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Physical Review X · doi:10.1103/physrevx.3.041021 · Cited by 202
Virtual morality: Emotion and action in a simulated three-dimensional “trolley problem”.
Navarrete, C. D., McDonald, M. M., Mott, M. L., & Asher, B. (2012) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0025561 · Cited by 199
“bargaining games (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Güth & Tietz, 1990; Henrich et al., 2006; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno–Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991;Yamagishi, 1986), the willingness to transgress social norms in “broken window” studies (e.”
BackgroundInfluentialMiyamoto, Y., Yoo, J., Levine, C. S., Park, J., Boylan, J. M., Sims, T., Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S., Kawakami, N., Karasawa, M., et al. (2018) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000133 · Cited by 199
When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making
Declerck, C. H., Boone, C., & Emonds, G. (2013) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2012.09.009 · Cited by 198
“8 this is a large-scale experimental study across 15 different societies indicating that, for each culture, the incidence of punishment in experimental social dilemma games correlates positively with a measure of altruism (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundEvolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments
Silk, J. B., & House, B. R. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1100305108 · Cited by 198
Field Experiments Across the Social Sciences
Baldassarri, D., & Abascal, M. (2017) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112445 · Cited by 196
“The researchers’ first finding, that the willingness to engage in both prosocial behavior (Henrich et al. 2001) and costly punishment (Henrich et al. 2006) holds universally across societies, generalized one of the major findings of earlier BGs beyond the standard sample of undergraduates.”
BackgroundGossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation
Wu, J., Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep23919 · Cited by 194
Host sanctions and pollinator cheating in the fig tree–fig wasp mutualism
Jandér, K. C., & Herre, E. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.2157 · Cited by 194
Direct and indirect punishment of norm violations in daily life
Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Van Lange, P. A. M., & Balliet, D. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-17286-2 · Cited by 192
Böckler, A., Tusche, A., & Singer, T. (2016) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550616639650 · Cited by 189
“…started to reveal preconditions, constraints, and underpinnings of prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson, 2011; Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Fowler, 2005; Henrich et al., 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006; Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, &…”
BackgroundMethodAltruism in Forest Chimpanzees: The Case of Adoption
Boesch, C., Bolé, C., Eckhardt, N., & Boesch, H. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008901 · Cited by 187
“Similarly, in a comparison of 15 different human societies, the level of altruistic sharing varied with the level of market integration and group size [6–8].”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Pace of Cultural Evolution
Perreault, C. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045150 · Cited by 180
Regular rates of popular culture change reflect random copying
Bentley, R. A., Lipo, C. P., Herzog, H. A., & Hahn, M. W. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.002 · Cited by 180
“An alternative to the random-copying model is clearly some form of selection or that people choose the variant with the highest payoff with respect to some benefit (e.g., Baum et al., 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Gintis, in press; Henrich, 2001, 2006; Henrich et al., 2006).”
MethodThe mentalizing network orchestrates the impact of parochial altruism on social norm enforcement
Baumgartner, T., Götte, L., Gügler, R., & Fehr, E. (2012) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.21298 · Cited by 179
“Norm enforcement requires that even third parties—who are neither economically, physically, nor psychologically affected by the violations—be willing to punish [Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b; Henrich et al., 2006].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.