Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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“Henrich et al 2006 found that the norms that influence decisions vary by culture.”
BackgroundHonesty and beliefs about honesty in 15 countriesPreprint
Hugh-Jones, D. (2015) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 13
Greasing (small) palms: Early rejection of bribery
Reyes‐Jaquez, B., & Koenig, M. A. (2022) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.13814 · Cited by 12
Shen, C., Song, Z., Ши, Л., Tanimoto, J., & Wang, Z. (2024) · Science China Information Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11432-023-4170-3 · Cited by 13
Across six societies children engage in costly third-party punishment of unfair sharing
McAuliffe, K., Bangayan, S., Callaghan, T. C., Corbit, J. D., Dixson, H. G. W., Dunham, Y. C., Finkel, A., Otali, E., Riddick, S., Tusiime, P. K., et al. (2025) · Communications Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44271-025-00220-x · Cited by 15
“While third-party punishment of this kind has been observed in adults across diverse societies, the extent to which people are willing to punish shows striking cross-cultural variation 2 .”
The emergence of cooperative behaviors, norms, and strategies across five diverse societies
Amir, D., Ahl, R. E., Jordan, M. R., Bolotin, H. L., Bogese, M. J., González, G. T., Callaghan, T. C., Sugiyama, L. S., Otali, E., Tusiime, P. K., et al. (2026) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.adw9995 · Cited by 12
“Although the content of norms regarding cooperation can vary extensively across societies ( 13 ), there is some evidence for cross-cultural regularities in norm psychology .”
Personality and Reputation: A Complex Relationship in Virtual Environments
Collodi, S., Panerati, S., Imbimbo, E., Stefanelli, F., Duradoni, M., & Guazzini, A. (2018) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi10120120 · Cited by 13
“, unfair proposers) [38], we hypothesize that they will reward proposers with high reputation, accepting more probably their offers.”
BackgroundFisktjønmo, G. L. H., Næss, M. W., & Bårdsen, B. (2021) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-021-09416-6 · Cited by 12
Strengths of social ties modulate brain computations for third-party punishment
Tang, Z., Qu, C., Hu, Y., Bénistant, J., Moisan, F., Derrington, E. A., & Dreher, J. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-37286-8 · Cited by 14
Foreign-language effects in cross-cultural behavioral research: Evidence from the Tanzanian Hadza
Stibbard‐Hawkes, D. N. E., Abarbanell, L., Mabulla, I. A., Endeko, E. S., Legare, C. H., & Apicella, C. L. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae218 · Cited by 12
“Risk preference and ethical dilemmas are both important topics in the human behavioral sciences, and while many cross-cultural studies have employed first languages (52, 53, 55, 56), not all have.”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.