Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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“This may reflect the effects of conformism [11], norm enforcement [38,39], parochialism [40–42], group coordination [43], barriers to trade across ethnolinguistic groups [1,24] or the need for close proximity to models [44].”
BackgroundRisk attitudes and economic well-being in Latin America
Cárdenas, J.-C., & Carpenter, J. P. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.008 · Cited by 108
“cross-culturally (Henrich et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2006) at samples frommostly isolated small-scale societies, or samples of college educated people in urban settings (Herrman et al.”
BackgroundConditionality & Coercion: Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe
Mares, I., & Young, L. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198832775.001.0001 · Cited by 194
Böckler, A., Tusche, A., Schmidt, P., & Singer, T. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-31813-8 · Cited by 107
A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., & Gowdy, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.017 · Cited by 118
Promoting cooperation and trust in "noisy" situations: The power of generosity.
Klapwijk, A., & Lange, P. A. M. V. (2009) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0012823 · Cited by 125
The ontogeny of human prosociality: behavioral experiments with children aged 3 to 8
House, B. R., Henrich, J., Brosnan, S. F., & Silk, J. B. (2012) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.10.007 · Cited by 111
“…unlikely to meet again, impose costly punishment on wrongdoers, and adhere to costly group-beneficial social norms (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005, 2006; Marlowe et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCorrupting cooperation and how anti-corruption strategies may backfire
Muthukrishna, M., François, P., Pourahmadi, S., & Henrich, J. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0138 · Cited by 115
Self-citationThe effects of endowment size and strategy method on third party punishment
Jordan, J., McAuliffe, K., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-015-9466-8 · Cited by 114
“…games have demonstrated that impartial third-party observers are often willing to pay costs to punish selfish behavior (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Henrich et al. 2006; Charness et al. 2008; Almenberg et al. 2010; Nikiforakis and Mitchell 2013).1 In these experiments, an ‘‘actor’’ typically has…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSocial mindfulness and social hostility
Lange, P. A. M. V., & Doesum, N. J. V. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2014.12.009 · Cited by 109
Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep06025 · Cited by 98
Dominance, Power, and Politics in Nonhuman and Human Primates
Watts, D. P. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_5 · Cited by 107
“Likewise, a growing body of evidence indicates that people often engage in third-party punishment at some cost to themselves, although considerable cross-cultural variation in willingness to do so exists (Henrich et al. 2006; Gurven and Winking 2008) and people’s behavior in economic games may not match that in the re…”
BackgroundConsumer Trust in Social Responsibility Communications: The Role of Supply Chain Visibility
Kraft, T., Valdés, L., & Zheng, Y. (2019) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13808 · Cited by 116
“Thus, he is more prosocial (Gummerum et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2006).”
The psychology of deterrence explains why group membership matters for third-party punishment
Delton, A. W., & Krasnow, M. M. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.07.003 · Cited by 111
“On this group norm maintenance view, humans have an evolved psychology designed to acquire social norms from the local social environment, act on them, and enforce them in others (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006, 2010; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).”
BackgroundGender differences in social risk taking
Friedl, A., Pondorfer, A., & Schmidt, U. (2019) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2019.06.005 · Cited by 113
The reputational and social network benefits of prosociality in an Andean community
Lyle, H. F., & Smith, E. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1318372111 · Cited by 109
“In many societies, collective action is stabilized by the punishment of free riders or by the allocation of differential shares of the collective good to those who contribute more (9, 30).”
BackgroundUniversal and variable leadership dimensions across human societies
Garfield, Z. H., Syme, K. L., & Hagen, E. H. (2020) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.07.012 · Cited by 91
“of punishment in promoting cooperation (e.g., Marlowe et al., 2008; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; J. Henrich, Ensminger, et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundReflexive intergroup bias in third-party punishment.
Yudkin, D. A., Rothmund, T., Twardawski, M., Thalla, N., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2016) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000190 · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.