Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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“This finding is crucial, as social preferences vary substantially between societies (Henrich et al., 2006, 2010).”
BackgroundWhat makes a sanction “stick”? The effects of financial and social sanctions on norm compliance
Nelissen, R. M. A., & Mulder, L. B. (2012) · Social Influence · doi:10.1080/15534510.2012.729493 · Cited by 49
“Researchers in social psychology (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), behavioral economics (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), and anthropology (Henrich et al., 2006) have argued that social norms are paramount to a profound understanding of human behavior.”
BackgroundCut From the Same Cloth: Similarly Dishonest Individuals Across Countries
Mann, H., Garcia‐Rada, X., Hornuf, L., Tafurt, J., & Ariely, D. (2016) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/0022022116648211 · Cited by 59
“Although others have shown that cultural variation matters for cooperation and punishment (Gächter et al., 2010; Henrich, Ensminger, et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008), our data suggest that cross-national differences in dishonesty run only skin deep.”
BackgroundBehavioral Responses to Natural DisastersPreprint
Castillo, M. E., & Carter, M. R. (2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 72
Rejecting unfairness: emotion-driven reaction or cognitive heuristic?
Civai, C. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00126 · Cited by 47
“Furthermore, less-equal distributions are consistently rejected more often among different human populations (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundA neural trait approach to exploring individual differences in social preferences
Nash, K. A., Gianotti, L. R. R., & Knoch, D. (2015) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00458 · Cited by 47
“However, gender, economic status, age, and education have difficulty explaining sources of individual differences in social behavior (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialNeurocircuits underlying cognition–emotion interaction in a social decision making context
Ho, S.-H. S., Gonzalez, R. D., Abelson, J. L., & Liberzon, I. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.07.017 · Cited by 49
“Indeed, this interpretation may explain a body of literature suggesting that while individuals may have some social preferences for equity in payoffs—potentially represented in the vmPFC—they care about others’ payoffs considerably less than their own, potentially due to the lack of the amygdala's salience signals wit…”
Gerfo, E. L., Gallucci, A., Morese, R., Vergallito, A., Ottone, S., Ponzano, F., Locatelli, G., Bosco, F. M., & Lauro, L. J. R. (2019) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2019.06.047 · Cited by 46
Studying Power with the Social-Ecological System Framework
Epstein, G., Bennett, A. E., Gruby, R. L., Acton, L., & Nenadović, M. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-8959-2_6 · Cited by 63
Fairness in multi-agent systems
JONG, S. D., Tuyls, K., & Verbeeck, K. (2008) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s026988890800132x · Cited by 51
“Interestingly, Henrich et al. (2006) show that punishment and altruism are indeed correlated in human societies: more altruistic societies punish more, et vice versa.”
BackgroundQuan, J., Liu, W., Chu, Y., & Wang, X. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 · Cited by 45
“→ + p x y C D P L x y ( ) , , { , , , }, (5) x y i j k y i j k x i j k ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )”
Eye spots do not increase altruism in children
Vogt, S., Efferson, C. M., Berger, J. L., & Fehr, E. (2014) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.007 · Cited by 47
Power Asymmetries and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable Cooperative Investment
Bone, J. E., Wallace, B., Bshary, R., & Raihani, N. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0155773 · Cited by 45
Mieth, L., Buchner, A., & Bell, R. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-89675-6 · Cited by 51
Facilitating the evolution of cooperation through altruistic punishment with adaptive feedback
Hua, S., & Liu, L. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113669 · Cited by 47
Metarelational models: Configurations of social relationships
Fiske, A. P. (2011) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.847 · Cited by 54
Choi, T., & Robertson, P. J. (2018) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muy068 · Cited by 51
Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism
Silva, H. D., Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K. (2009) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8 · Cited by 44
“Punishment of free riders is widespread in human societies (Henrich et al 2006, Sigmund 2007).”
BackgroundCRONIN, K. A., & SÁNCHEZ, A. (2012) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s021952591250066x · Cited by 40
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
About these checks
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.