Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
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Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
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Rooks, G., Tazelaar, F., & Snijders, C. C. P. (2010) · European Sociological Review · doi:10.1093/esr/jcp062 · Cited by 42
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Christ, M. H., & Vance, T. W. (2017) · Accounting Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2017.10.003 · Cited by 39
Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in promoting cooperation
Huang, F., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-18727-7 · Cited by 34
Fessler, D. M. T., & Gervais, M. M. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_12 · Cited by 43
“In contrast, although the proportions in which they occur likely 18 differ across cultures, moral outrage, moral disgust, and moral approbation are all readily 19 observable in any human society (for example, see Henrich et al. 2006).”
The Distributional Preferences of Americans
Fisman, R. J., Jakiela, P., & Kariv, S. (2014) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w20145 · Cited by 34
Humanistic Wellbeing: Toward a Value-Based Science of the Good Life
Vittersø, J. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-69292-5 · Cited by 40
Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior
Efferson, C. M., Roca, C. P., Vogt, S., & Helbing, D. (2015) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.003 · Cited by 36
“…the larger puzzle is that humans routinely cooperate with genetically unrelated individuals in situations where reciprocal behavior is either not possible or cannot produce future bene fi ts for the reciprocator (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich et al., 2006; Raihani & Bshary, 2015).”
Smith, R., Lagarde, M., Blaauw, D., Goodman, C. A., English, M., Mullei, K., Pagaiya, N., Tangcharoensathien, V., Erasmus, E., & Hanson, K. (2012) · Journal of Public Health · doi:10.1093/pubmed/fds066 · Cited by 40
Human Cooperation and Its Underlying Mechanisms
Strang, S., & Park, S. Q. (2016) · Current topics in behavioral neurosciences · doi:10.1007/7854_2016_445 · Cited by 33
Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space
García, J., & Traulsen, A. (2019) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2019.0127 · Cited by 38
Indirect reciprocity with simple records
Clark, D., Fudenberg, D., & Wolitzky, A. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1921984117 · Cited by 37
Chiang, Y.-S. (2008) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463108089544 · Cited by 37
“Recent studies have shown that subjects sometimes rejected offers that are too benevolent (Henrich et al. 2006).”
BackgroundReciprocity as a Foundation of Financial Economics
Johnson, T. C. (2013) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2257-x · Cited by 36
“Older people from societies where exchange plays a significant role are more likely to demand a fairer split of the pot than young children or adults from isolated communities (Murnighan and Saxon 1998; Henrich et al. 2004, 2006; Jensen et al. 2007).”
Culture and Prosocial Behavior
Schroeder, D. A., Graziano, W. G., Feygina, I., & Henry, P. J. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399813.013.009 · Cited by 37
Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment
Morese, R., Rabellino, D., Sambataro, F., Perussia, F., Valentini, M. C., Bara, B. G., & Bosco, F. M. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0166357 · Cited by 37
Lu, T., & McKeown, S. (2018) · Journal of Applied Social Psychology · doi:10.1111/jasp.12558 · Cited by 33
Prosociality predicts individual behavior and collective outcomes in the COVID-19 pandemic
Fang, X., Freyer, T., Ho, C.-Y., Chen, Z., & Goette, L. F. (2022) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.115192 · Cited by 34
“Our paper is inspired by a number of previous studies that measure individual and geographical variation of (pro-)social behavior and preferences in order to advance our understanding of how collective societal outcomes may be shaped by the prevalent values, norms and preferences in the population, and vice versa, how…”
Cui, F., Huang, X., Jing, Y., Luo, Y., Liu, J., & Gu, R. (2022) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhac017 · Cited by 34
“Therefore, altruistic sharing is valued as a traditional virtue across many cultures (Henrich et al. 2006) and it is theoretically meaningful to investigate its tenacity.”
The bystander effect in an N-person dictator game
Panchanathan, K., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Silk, J. B. (2013) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.06.008 · Cited by 43
“Observers punished low transfers, as in other third-party punishment studies (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Marlowe et al., 2008).”
On Hotheads and Dirty Harries: The Primacy of Anger in Altruistic Punishment
Seip, E. C., DIJK, W. W. V., & Rotteveel, M. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04503.x · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.