Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even in one-shot situations, may be part of human psychology and a key element in understanding our sociality. However, because most experiments have been confined to students in industrialized societies, generalizations of these insights to the species have necessarily been tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show that (i) all populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases, (ii) the magnitude of this punishment varies substantially across populations, and (iii) costly punishment positively covaries with altruistic behavior across populations. These findings are consistent with models of the gene-culture coevolution of human altruism and further sharpen what any theory of human cooperation needs to explain.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [21]
Citations
Cites
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · Cited by 4,816
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
The neural basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game.
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1082976 · Cited by 3,375
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1021 · Cited by 2,366
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Self-citationThe Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
de Quervain, D. J.-F., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1100735 · Cited by 1,768
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher, Evol. Hum. Behav.25, 63 (2003).
- J. Carter, M. Irons, J. Econ. Perspect.5, 171 (1991).
- W. T. Harbaugh, K. Krause, Econ. Inq.38, 95 (2000). · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00006.x · Paper page
- D. Tracer, in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, J. Henrich et al., Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 232–259.
- F. W. Marlowe, in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, J. Henrich et al., Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 168–193.
- M. Gurven, in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, J. Henrich et al., Eds. (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 2004), pp. 194–231.
- S. Gächter, B. Herrmann, C. Thoni, Behav. Brain Sci.28, 822 (2005).
Cited by
Items 501–600 of 1,000
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery
Engel, C., Goerg, S. J., & Yu, G. (2016) · American Law and Economics Review · doi:10.1093/aler/ahw005 · Cited by 31
A Meta-Analysis of Cultural Differences in Revenge and Forgiveness
Lennon, R. E. (2013) · University of North Florida Digital Commons (University of North Florida) · Cited by 31
Howe, E. L., Murphy, J. J., Gerkey, D., & West, C. T. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158940 · Cited by 31
Emotions, indigenous affective ties, and social network theory—The case of South Korea
Yang, I., & Horak, S. (2018) · Asia Pacific Journal of Management · doi:10.1007/s10490-017-9555-7 · Cited by 31
Evaluating social contract theory in the light of evolutionary social science
Seabright, P., Stieglitz, J., & der Straeten, K. V. (2021) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2021.4 · Cited by 40
Powers, S. T., van Schaik, C. P., & Lehmann, L. (2021) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21909 · Cited by 37
“Some experiments have also reported quite substantial cross-cultural variation in behaviour in these games (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Gerkey, 2013).”
BackgroundHahnel, U. J. J., & Fell, M. J. (2022) · Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.rser.2022.112419 · Cited by 33
Sekiguchi, T., & Nakamaru, M. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025 · Cited by 32
“The experimental studies show punishment promotes cooperation in the group (e.g. Fehr and Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2007), but punishing players reduces their own payoffs (Dreber et al.”
BackgroundDieckmann, A., Grimm, V., Unfried, M., Utikal, V., & Valmasoni, L. (2016) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.011 · Cited by 41
Punishment is strongly motivated by revenge and weakly motivated by inequity aversion
Deutchman, P., Bračič, M., Raihani, N., & McAuliffe, K. (2020) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.06.001 · Cited by 33
Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences
Molho, C., & Wu, J. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0289 · Cited by 32
“In experimental settings, individuals punish offenders even at a personal cost, though there is substantial cross-cultural variation in punishment norms [2,9,10].”
BackgroundHarsh but Expedient: Dominant Leaders Increase Group Cooperation via Threat of Punishment
Chen, F. X., Zhang, X., Laustsen, L., & Cheng, J. T. (2021) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09567976211031208 · Cited by 30
2. From Theory to Practice: A Matrix of Common Good Dynamics
Nebel, M., & Delgadillo, J. M. (2022) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0290.03 · Cited by 30
The ontogeny of children's social emotions in response to (un)fairness
Gerdemann, S. C., McAuliffe, K., Blake, P. R., Haun, D. B. M., & Hepach, R. (2022) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.191456 · Cited by 32
Quan, J., Cui, S., Chen, W., & Wang, X. (2022) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127703 · Cited by 43
Cross-societal variation in norm enforcement systems
Molho, C., Petrillo, F. D., Garfield, Z. H., & Slewe, S. (2024) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2023.0034 · Cited by 33
“In an influential exper-iment using economic decision-making tasks (i.e. ultimatum and third-party punishment games) across 15 diverse populations, Henrich et al. [31] observed that at least some individuals in each of these populations were willing to punish unfairness.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialStrategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model
Wolpert, D. H., Jamison, J., Newth, D., & Harré, M. (2011) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1593 · Cited by 30
“It may be possible to compare such predictions to anthropological data, for example, to an extended version of the data in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2006).”
When do we punish people who don't?Preprint
Martin, J. W., Jordan, J., Rand, D. G., & Cushman, F. A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3080990 · Cited by 35
How Strong Are Ethnic Preferences?Preprint
Berge, L. I. O., Bjorvatn, K., Galle, S., Miguel, E. A., Posner, D., Tungodden, B., & Zhang, K. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2693132 · Cited by 35
Gummerum, M., López‐Pérez, B., van Dijk, E., & van Dillen, L. F. (2019) · Social Development · doi:10.1111/sode.12387 · Cited by 31
The cognitive challenges of cooperation in human and nonhuman animals
Melis, A. P., & Raihani, N. (2023) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-023-00207-7 · Cited by 34
Feng, C., Azarian, B., Ma, Y., Feng, X., Wang, L., Luo, Y., & Krüeger, F. (2016) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.23454 · Cited by 31
“Fairness and justice are key social norms that constitute fundamental aspects of cultural worldviews across human societies [Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Henrich et al., 2006].”
BackgroundA COMMON FRAMEWORK FOR THEORIES OF NORM COMPLIANCE
Morris, A., & Cushman, F. A. (2018) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052518000134 · Cited by 34
Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?
Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2018.03.003 · Cited by 31
Understanding Norm Change: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach
De, S., Nau, D. S., & Gelfand, M. J. (2017) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.65109/tqkm4865 · Cited by 35
Public Goods Games in Japan: Cultural and Individual Differences in Reciprocity
Ishii, K., & Kurzban, R. (2008) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-008-9034-4 · Cited by 29
“, Insko et al. 1990; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989). Consistent with this hypothesis, Kurzban et al. (2001) demonstrated that players (American participants) contributed more in the increase-only (commitment) condition than in the increase/ decrease (cheap talk) condition, in which people could not only increase but al…”
ResultInternational Peacekeeping and Positive Peace: Evidence from Kosovo
Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2015) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715604886 · Cited by 52
Ode to the sea: Workplace Organizations and Norms of Cooperation
Uri Gneezy, B., Leibbrandt, A., & List, J. A. (2014) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w20234 · Cited by 29
The Origins of WEIRD PsychologyPreprint
Schulz, J., Barahmi-Rad, D., Beauchamp, J. P., & Henrich, J. (2018) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/d6qhu · Cited by 34
Self-citationStable distribution of reciprocity motives in a population
van Baar, J. M., Klaassen, F. H., Ricci, F., Chang, L. J., & Sanfey, A. G. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-74818-y · Cited by 29
Morality in the anthropocene: The perversion of compassion and punishment in the online world
Robertson, C. E., Shariff, A., & Bavel, J. J. V. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae193 · Cited by 34
“To be effective, it requires a real sacrifice, either in resources or in personal risk, to the group for the sake of justice (15, 18, 110, 113 – 115).”
BackgroundDafoe, A., Hatz, S., & Zhang, B. (2020) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002720957078 · Cited by 32
“Costly retaliation against unfair or hostile actions—referred to as the revenge instinct or negative reciprocity—is an almost universal behavioral impulse (Henrich et al. 2006; Rathbun and Kertzer 2015).”
BackgroundCooperation and competition in intercultural interactions
Matsumoto, D., & Hwang, H. C. (2011) · International Journal of Intercultural Relations · doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.02.017 · Cited by 30
“Within this literature, a large number of studies have demonstrated country, ethnic, or racial differences in game behavior (Henrich et al., 2001, 2006; Osterbeek, Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 2004), demonstrating that people of different cultures play these games differently.”
BackgroundAn Evolutionary Perspective on the Importance of Community Relations for Quality of Life
Grinde, B. (2009) · The Scientific World JOURNAL · doi:10.1100/tsw.2009.73 · Cited by 32
“In fact, the variation observed concerns many aspects of social life, including parameters such as generosity, nastiness, and altruistic punishment[55,56].”
BackgroundGroup size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms
Kamei, K. (2018) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002 · Cited by 30
Origins of possession: owning and sharing in development
(2015) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.188112 · Cited by 28
Boesch, C. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000051 · Cited by 30
To Punish or to Restore: How Children Evaluate Victims' Responses to Immorality
Liu, X., Yang, X., & Wu, Z. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.696160 · Cited by 28
Czura, K. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.07.009 · Cited by 33
Investment Behaviour, Risk Sharing and Social Distance
D’Exelle, B., & Verschoor, A. (2015) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12264 · Cited by 35
Religion and the Origins of Anti-Atheist Prejudice
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2013) · Religion, Intolerance, and Conflict · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640911.003.0007 · Cited by 27
Liu, Y., Li, L., Zheng, L., & Guo, X. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02066 · Cited by 29
“For instance, previous studies have shown that when people experienced an unfair economic distribution, they are willing to enforce the fair norms by punishing violator even at substantial personal costs (Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundGratitude increases third-party punishment
Vayness, J., Duong, F., & DeSteno, D. A. (2019) · Cognition & Emotion · doi:10.1080/02699931.2019.1700100 · Cited by 31
“Although varying in degree, evidence for TPP has been shown to exist cross-culturally (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundMacroevolutionary Theory and Archaeology: Is There a Big Picture?
Bettinger, R. L. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-0682-3_11 · Cited by 30
“This prediction is strongly supported by empirical work indicating that punishment, including third-party punishment (where I punish you if you cheat someone else) is near-universal, its intensity varying directly with observed altruistic cooperation (Henrich et al. 2006; see also Ostrom 1990).”
BackgroundThe evolutionary significance of costly punishment is still to be demonstrated
Rankin, D. J., dos Santos, M., & Wedekind, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0911990107 · Cited by 29
“We welcome their emphasis on cultural differences in experimental games (5), but we argue that these first tests (3, 4) are not yet conclusive with regard to the functional significance of costly punishment.”
BackgroundTowards a Biopsychological Understanding of Costly Punishment: The Role of Basal Cortisol
Pfattheicher, S., & Keller, J. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085691 · Cited by 27
“This is particularly noteworthy given that costly punishment of uncooperative individuals differs in a remarkable way across cultures and societies [86,87].”
BackgroundOfford, M., Gill, R. C., & Kendal, J. R. (2016) · Leadership & Organization Development Journal · doi:10.1108/lodj-07-2014-0119 · Cited by 27
“Cross-cultural experiments on punishment conducted by Henrich et al. (2006) showed that egalitarian behaviour remains a part of the human psyche.”
BackgroundNeural correlates of successful costly punishment in the Ultimatum game on a trial-by-trial basis
Mussel, P., Weiss, M. H., Rodrigues, J., Heekeren, H. R., & Hewig, J. S. (2022) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsab126 · Cited by 26
Russell, S. J., & Cain, K. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105392 · Cited by 30
Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
Deng, K., Li, Z., Kurokawa, S., & Chu, T. (2012) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005 · Cited by 26
Braithwaite, J. (2015) · BMJ Open · doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-006567 · Cited by 31
“Instead, by identifying the nature of gaps and boundaries, we can begin to focus on the efforts that are needed to join them up, and create more synergistic effort to improve care for the bene fi t of patients.”
BackgroundHétu, S., Luo, Y., D’Ardenne, K., Lohrenz, T. M., & Montague, P. R. (2017) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsx097 · Cited by 27
“1 Offers > 50% (hyperfair) are rarer in the USA than unfair offers or equal splits (Henrich et al. , 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialRodrigues, J., & Hewig, J. S. (2026) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2026.e44831 · Cited by 26
Amygdala Lesion Profoundly Alters Altruistic Punishment
Scheele, D., Mihov, Y., Kendrick, K. M., Feinstein, J. S., Reich, H., Maier, W., & Hurlemann, R. (2012) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.01.028 · Cited by 29
The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans
Smirnov, O. A., Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., & McElreath, R. L. (2010) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00768.x · Cited by 26
“Various forms of costly self-enforcement of cooperative behavior are customary in communities around the world (Henrich et al., 2006), and it is common to punish those who free ride on others’ personally costly efforts to use natural resources like fisheries, water, grazing lands, forests, and…”
Self-citationThe Normative Nature of Language
Enfield, N. J., & Sidnell, J. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190846466.003.0013 · Cited by 26
The development of egalitarian norm enforcement in childhood and adolescence
Bašić, Z., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2019) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.014 · Cited by 28
“More speci cally, we take the most commonly-used third-party punishment game where a third-party is added to a regular dictator game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Henrich et al., 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006; Lewisch et al., 2011; Kriss et al., 2016), adapt it for children's understanding and run an experiment wit…”
InfluentialDo bystanders react to bribery?
Guerra, A., & Zhuravleva, T. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.008 · Cited by 28
Ultrasocial: The Evolution of Human Nature and the Quest for a Sustainable Future
Gowdy, J. M. (2021) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108974264 · Cited by 26
Ire and punishment: Incidental anger and costly punishment in children, adolescents, and adults
Gummerum, M., López‐Pérez, B., van Dijk, E., & van Dillen, L. F. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2022.105376 · Cited by 26
Prosocial punishment bots breed social punishment in human players
Shen, C., He, Z., Ши, Л., Wang, Z., & Tanimoto, J. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0019 · Cited by 27
“[4] Joseph Henrich, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako,”
BackgroundNatural and human economies compared
Vermeij, G. J., & Leigh, E. G. (2011) · Ecosphere · doi:10.1890/es11-00004.1 · Cited by 27
Klein, E. D., Evans, T. A., Schultz, N. B., & Beran, M. J. (2012) · Journal of comparative psychology · doi:10.1037/a0029057 · Cited by 26
“…in which risks and rewards are compared (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), in situations in which goods are distributed among various partners (e.g., Henrich et al., 2006), in situations in which past and future costs are weighed (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985), and in situations in which…”
Social influence on third-party punishment: An experiment
Fabbri, M., & Carbonara, E. (2017) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.003 · Cited by 27
Neural correlates of decision making after unfair treatment
Wu, Y. H., Zang, Y., Yuan, B., & Tian, X. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00123 · Cited by 25
“…cost to themselves if the offers are unfair (Camerer and Thaler, 1995), irrespective of the stake size (Lisa, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2002), anonymity (Bolton and Zwick, 1995), the bargaining domain (Berger et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2012), or their cultural backgrounds (Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundFrom Grooming to Giving Blood: The Origins of Human Altruism
Silk, J. B., & Boyd, R. T. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02725-3_10 · Cited by 30
Sakai, J. T., Dalwani, M. S., Mikulich‐Gilbertson, S. K., McWilliams, S. K., Raymond, K. M., & Crowley, T. J. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0151678 · Cited by 27
“This common human tendency, called "costly punishment", has been demonstrated worldwide [43] and has been proposed as an important mechanism of social cooperation [44].”
BackgroundNo evidence for inequity aversion in non-human animals: a meta-analysis of accept/reject paradigms
Ritov, O., Völter, C. J., Raihani, N., & Engelmann, J. M. (2024) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2024.1452 · Cited by 24
Cooperation dynamics on hypergraphs with punishment and Q-learning
Zou, K., & Huang, C. (2025) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.128989 · Cited by 25
Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs
Vukov, J., Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868 · Cited by 24
“Recently, altruistic punishment (which occurs when one individual accepts to pay a cost to impose a higher loss to a peer) was proposed as an efficient mechanism promoting cooperation, based on laboratory experiments showing also that individuals embedded in different contexts punish quantitatively in different ways […”
BackgroundEspín, A. M., Moreno‐Herrero, D., Sánchez‐Campillo, J., & Martín, J. A. R. (2016) · Journal of Happiness Studies · doi:10.1007/s10902-016-9828-8 · Cited by 27
“This average DG behavior is within the range typically observed in field and representative experiments (e.g., Henrich et al. 2006, Bellemare et al. 2008, Cardenas & Carpenter 2008).”
The motive cocktail in altruistic behaviors
Wu, X., Ren, X., Liu, C., & Zhang, H. (2024) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-024-00685-6 · Cited by 32
“In one laboratory experiment ( N = 157) and one preregistered online replication ( N = 1,258), across 100 different situations, we found that both third-party punishment and third-party helping behaviors (that is, an unaffected individual punishes the transgressor or helps the victim) aligned best…”
On the neglected behavioural variation among neighbouring primate groups
van de Waal, E. (2018) · Ethology · doi:10.1111/eth.12815 · Cited by 25
Acute psychosocial stress increases third-party helping but not punishing behavior
Zhen, Z., Wang, H., Zhu, R., Zhang, S., Jin, T., Qin, S., & Liu, C. (2020) · Stress · doi:10.1080/10253890.2020.1825672 · Cited by 24
“, perishing together unless the allotment is fair) is defined as costly/altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006) or as strong reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000) for its essential role in enforcing social norms (i.”
BackgroundAre Emotions Natural Kinds After All? Rethinking the Issue of Response Coherence
Sznycer, D., & Cohen, A. S. (2021) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/14747049211016009 · Cited by 26
House, B. R. (2016) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/desc.12466 · Cited by 25
Enge, S., Mothes, H., Fleischhauer, M., Reif, A., & Strobel, A. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-02594-3 · Cited by 25
Fairness in multi-agent systems
de Jong, S. (2009) · Research Publications (Maastricht University) · doi:10.26481/dis.20090604sj · Cited by 27
Terrorism as altruism: an evolutionary model for understanding terrorist psychology
O’Gorman, R., & Silke, A. (2015) · UEL Research Repository (University of East London) · doi:10.4324/9781315772424-13 · Cited by 25
Resting-State Functional Connectivity Underlying Costly Punishment: A Machine-Learning Approach
Feng, C., Zhu, Z., Gu, R., Wu, X., Luo, Y., & Krüeger, F. (2018) · Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2018.05.052 · Cited by 23
Strategy Competition Dynamics of Multi-Agent Systems in the Framework of Evolutionary Game Theory
Zhang, J., & Cao, M. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Circuits & Systems II Express Briefs · doi:10.1109/tcsii.2019.2910893 · Cited by 23
“Current research has also highlighted two factors boosting cooperation in public goods interactions, namely, punishment of defectors [16], [17] and the option to abstain from the joint enterprise.”
BackgroundEvolutionary theory and the classification of crime
Durrant, R. (2020) · Aggression and Violent Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.avb.2020.101449 · Cited by 25
Power to which people? Explaining how electrification targets voters across party rotations in Ghana
Briggs, R. C. (2021) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105391 · Cited by 26
Capuchins (Sapajus apella) and their Aversion to Inequity
Schweinfurth, M. K., & Call, J. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-16-2028-7_11 · Cited by 26
Reflexive or reflective? Group bias in third-party punishment in Chinese and Western cultures
Guo, Z., Guo, R., Xu, C., & Wu, Z. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104284 · Cited by 25
Does third-party punishment in children aim at equality?
Lee, Y.-E., & Warneken, F. (2022) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/dev0001331 · Cited by 24
A Common Good Approach to Development: Collective Dynamics of Development Processes
Nebel, M., Garza-Vázquez, O., & Sedmak, C. (2022) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0290 · Cited by 23
Why do children and adults think other people punish?
Marshall, J., Gollwitzer, A., & Bloom, P. (2022) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/dev0001378 · Cited by 27
“In line with these examples, research has examined whether children and adults will punish others even when they are unaffected — so-called, third-party punishment (e.g., Marshall & McAuliffe, 2022; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundNorm violations and punishments across human societies
Garfield, Z. H., Ringen, E. J., Buckner, W., Medupe, D., Wrangham, R. W., & Glowacki, L. (2023) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2023.7 · Cited by 39
“Instead, they lend support to perspectives suggesting that violations of moral norms are commonly punished (Bowles & Gintis, 2005; Henrich et al., 2006; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialÚbeda, F., & Duéñez‐Guzmán, E. A. (2010) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01194.x · Cited by 23
“Increments in punishment increase cooperative behaviors across human societies (Heinrich et al. 2006).”
BackgroundTrust matters: a cross-cultural comparison of Northern Ghana and Oaxaca groups
Acedo‐Carmona, C., & Gomila, A. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00661 · Cited by 25
“To test some of the previous hypotheses, authors have used methods such as game theory (Henrich et al., 2004, 2006; Hoffman et al., 2007; Marlowe et al., 2008; Ermisch et al., 2009; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011).”
MethodYou did not mean it: Perceived good intentions alleviate sense of unfairness
Ma, Q., Meng, L., Zhang, Z., Xu, Q. S., Wang, Y., & Shen, Q. (2015) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2015.03.011 · Cited by 23
Economic Behavior in the Face of Resource Variability and Uncertainty
McAllister, R. R. J., Tisdell, J. G., Reeson, A. F., & Gordon, I. J. (2011) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-04075-160306 · Cited by 26
“…confirming sanctions, communication, and group boundaries, i.e., property rights (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1992, Schmitt et al. 2000, Tisdell et al. 2004, Henrich et al. 2006, Ahn et al. 2009, Janssen et al. 2010), are important elements in promoting reciprocity when managing contested resources.”
BackgroundYin, Y., Yu, H., Su, Z., Zhang, Y., & Zhou, X. (2017) · European Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1111/ejn.13653 · Cited by 23
“flict with the selfish interest of certain parties in social exchanges, some sorts of sanction are adopted to enforce the fairness norm (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006; Montague & Lohrenz, 2007).”
BackgroundOtten, K., Buskens, V., Przepiorka, W., & Ellemers, N. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-73314-7 · Cited by 28
Li, X., Molleman, L., & van Dolder, D. (2021) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.04.002 · Cited by 26
“…norms of cooperation and punishment, our setup complements cross-cultural experiments on punishment that rely on natural variation in social context (G ¨ achter & Herrmann, 2009; Henrich, 2016; Henrich et al., 2001, 2010, 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Roth et al., 1991).”
BackgroundEffect of holding office on the behavior of politicians
Enemark, D. P., Gibson, C. C., McCubbins, M. D., & Seim, B. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1511501113 · Cited by 26
“Behavior in the Trust and Dictator Games is used to explain human behavior in the fields of psychology (59–62), anthropology (63, 64), neuroscience and evolutionary biology (65–67), economics (68–70), and political science (3, 33, 34, 71–74).”
BackgroundSeasonal Scarcity and Sharing Norms
Bartoš, V. (2016) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.019 · Cited by 25
Agents’ beliefs and the evolution of institutions for common-pool resource management
Bravo, G. (2011) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463110387268 · Cited by 26
“cooperation and to punish noncooperators (e.g. Barclay, 2006; Cardenas et al., 2000; Fehr and Gäcther, 2000, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D., & Ziker, J.
- Affiliations
- California Institute of Technology (US)
- Department of Anthropology, Emory University, 1557 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
- Boise State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-06-23
- Volume
- 312
- Issue
- 5781
- Pages
- 1767-1770
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2114340103
- Cited by
- 1,771
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 86 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 108 · 2022: 103 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 143 · 2018: 103 · 2017: 105 · 2016: 84 · 2015: 115 · 2014: 88 · 2013: 101 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 183.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Scholar Works (Boise State University) (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (M571255001)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- costly punishment, human cooperation, altruism, gene-culture coevolution, cross-cultural comparison, inequality aversion, one-shot games, human sociality
- MeSH terms
- Africa, Age Factors, Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Cross-Cultural Comparison, Cultural Evolution, Educational Status, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Melanesia, Punishment, Regression Analysis, Sex Factors, Siberia, Social Behavior, Socioeconomic Factors, South America, United States
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.