Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
(1976) · Cited by 10,423
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“An infinitely large population of cooperators cannot be invaded by defectors under deterministic selection dynamics (32).”
BackgroundEvolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Self-citationFehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Wilson EO. Sociobiology. Harvard Univ. Press; Cambridge, MA: 1975. [Google Scholar]
- Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books; New York: 1984. [Google Scholar]
- Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Am Econ Rev. 1990;80:274. [Google Scholar]
- Michod RE. Darwinian Dynamics. Princeton Univ. Press; Princeton, NJ: 1999. [Google Scholar]
- Nowak MA. Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard Univ. Press; Cambridge: 2006. [Google Scholar]
- Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y. Evol Ecol Res. 2005;7:853. [Google Scholar]
Cited by
Items 901–1,000 of 1,029
The evolution of offensive realism: Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present
JOHNSON, D. D. P., & Thayer, B. A. (2016) · Politics and the Life Sciences · doi:10.1017/pls.2016.6 · Cited by 64
Global dynamics of microbial communities emerge from local interaction rules
van Vliet, S., Hauert, C., Fridberg, K., Ackermann, M., & Co, A. D. (2022) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009877 · Cited by 47
Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games
Wu, B., Zhou, D., & Wang, L. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.046111 · Cited by 50
Partner choice promotes cooperation: The two faces of testing with agent-based models
Campennì, M., & Schino, G. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.11.019 · Cited by 44
Healey, D., Axelrod, K., & Gore, J. (2016) · Molecular Systems Biology · doi:10.15252/msb.20167033 · Cited by 47
Behavior-based cellular automaton model for pedestrian dynamics
Huang, K., Zheng, X., Cheng, Y., & Yang, Y. (2016) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2016.07.002 · Cited by 44
Li, J., Zhang, C., Sun, Q., Chen, Z., & Zhang, J. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2016.2628385 · Cited by 45
“Nevertheless, an individual’s bad behavior can also reduce its reputation, not just the good behavior can increase the reputation, partially inspired by the work of Nowak and Sigmund [12] and Tanimoto [40].”
BackgroundInfluentialHauke, J., Lorscheid, I., & Meyer, M. (2017) · Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation · doi:10.18564/jasss.3238 · Cited by 44
“Theoretical Population Biology, 69(3), 333-338 4 Nowak2006 NOWAK, M. A. (2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialHilbig, B. E., Kieslich, P. J., Henninger, F., Thielmann, I., & Zettler, I. (2018) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.2149 · Cited by 46
“…cooperate in social dilemmas (Colman, 2003; Sally, 1995; Zelmer, 2003) and that the evolution of cooperation hinges on both a willingness to refrain from exploitation and a willingness to forgive noncooperators to a certain extent and reestablish cooperation (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundUncertainty about social interactions leads to the evolution of social heuristics
van den Berg, P., & Wenseleers, T. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-04493-1 · Cited by 50
Collapse and rescue of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks
Akçay, E. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-05130-7 · Cited by 47
“These pathways include population structure (Hamilton, 1964), phenotypic feedbacks (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), payoff synergies (Queller, 1985), partner choice (Bull and Rice, 1991), among others (e.g., see reviews in Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; West et al., 2007; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundHigh-reputation individuals exert greater influence on cooperation in spatial public goods game
Shen, Y., Yin, W., Kang, H., Zhang, H., & Wang, M. (2022) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2022.127935 · Cited by 45
Facilitating the evolution of cooperation through altruistic punishment with adaptive feedback
Hua, S., & Liu, L. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113669 · Cited by 47
Behavioral evolution in evacuation crowd based on heterogeneous rationality of small groups
Huang, K., Zheng, X., Yang, Y., & Wang, T. (2015) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2015.05.065 · Cited by 46
Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
Nathanson, C., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615 · Cited by 45
“The s parameter has been explicitly calculated for a number of models including games on graphs, games in phenotype space, games in set structured populations and a simple model of multi-level selection [42].”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationFan, R., Zhang, Y., Luo, M. J., & Zhang, H. (2016) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2016.08.039 · Cited by 44
Duan, S., Declerck, S., Feng, G., & Zhang, L. (2023) · Environmental Microbiology · doi:10.1111/1462-2920.16333 · Cited by 43
Atherton, G., Morimoto, Y., Nakashima, S., & Cross, L. (2023) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/00220221231169945 · Cited by 47
“While social reciprocity and cooperation are arguably fundamental to the human experience (Nowak, 2006), there are cultural manifestations of being socially reciprocal.”
BackgroundSupporting punishment via taxation in a structured population
Lee, H., Cleveland, C., & Szolnoki, A. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.114385 · Cited by 46
“To avoid the negative consequences of “ratio-nal” strategy selection, we must identify conditions and incentives that promote the evolution of cooperation [3].”
BackgroundResource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition
Levine, S., Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Cushman, F. A. (2024) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x24001067 · Cited by 59
“…adaptive dynamics favor (although do not always guarantee) cooperative Nash bargaining solutions in many cases of conflicting interest (Bruner 2021; André et al. 2022; Skyrms 2014; Alexander 2000), and competitive equilibria predicted by game theory in others (Smith and Price 1973; Nowak 2006).”
Integrating biodiversity and conservation with modern agricultural landscapes
Kumaraswamy, S., & Kunte, K. K. (2013) · Biodiversity and Conservation · doi:10.1007/s10531-013-0562-9 · Cited by 50
“Further, unplanned changes in farmlands also result in depletion of local species, primitive varieties and wild relatives, which are a source of ecosystem services unique to a landscape (Negri 2005; Jarvis et al. 2006).”
BackgroundAuclair, Y., König, B., Ferrari, M., Perony, N., & Lindholm, A. K. (2014) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2014.03.008 · Cited by 45
“Individuals initiating cooperative behaviours are always susceptible to exploitation by others, as shown in a wide range of taxa from bacteria to fish, birds and mammals (Andersson & Eriksson, 1982; Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Nowak, 2006; Velicer & Vos, 2009).”
BackgroundThe protective layer of biofilm: a repellent function for a new class of amphiphilic proteins
Kovács, Á. T., van Gestel, J., & Kuipers, O. P. (2012) · Molecular Microbiology · doi:10.1111/j.1365-2958.2012.08101.x · Cited by 51
“Therefore, additional mechanisms are required to explain its evolutionary maintenance, besides the direct benefits it delivers to the colony (e.g. group-level selection; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundA homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure
Zschaler, G., Traulsen, A., & Groß, T. (2010) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093015 · Cited by 45
Programed Death is Favored by Natural Selection in Spatial Systems
Werfel, J., Ingber, D. E., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2015) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.114.238103 · Cited by 48
Wang, Y., Zhang, Z., Jing, Y., Valadez, E. A., & Simons, R. F. (2016) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsw079 · Cited by 47
“Specifically, even if social encounters will not repeat between two strangers, a good reputation of being trusting and trustworthy will enhance the individual’s chance of being selected and rewarded by other partners (indirect reciprocity; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundDoes coevolution setup promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game?
Shen, C., Lü, J., & Ши, Л. (2016) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2016.05.044 · Cited by 43
An improved public goods game model with reputation effect on the spatial lattices
Zhou, T., Ding, S., Fan, W., & Wang, H. (2016) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2016.10.003 · Cited by 43
Neuromolecular correlates of cooperation and conflict during territory defense in a cichlid fish
Weitekamp, C. A., & Hofmann, H. A. (2017) · Hormones and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2017.01.001 · Cited by 44
“A cooperator pays a cost for another individual to receive a benefit, often resulting in an average increase in direct fitness (Brosnan and Bshary, 2010; Nowak, 2006).”
Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
Wu, Y., Zhang, B., & Zhang, S. (2017) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.06.015 · Cited by 45
The inclusive fitness controversy: finding a way forward
Birch, J. (2017) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.170335 · Cited by 50
“Both sides accept that kin selection occurs [27,28].”
BackgroundEvolutionary Game Dynamics of Multiagent Systems on Multiple Community Networks
Zhang, J., Zhu, Y., & Chen, Z. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2018.2854294 · Cited by 43
“As was demonstrated in [34] and [35] the structure of social networks is recognized as a key factor with direct implications for strategy dynamics and potential counter measures.”
BackgroundThe effect of multigame on cooperation in spatial network
Li, Z., Jia, D., Guo, H., Geng, Y., Shen, C., Wang, Z., & Li, X. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.12.059 · Cited by 44
Marshall, R. C., & Whitworth, D. E. (2019) · BioEssays · doi:10.1002/bies.201800247 · Cited by 45
Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game
Cardinot, M., O’Riordan, C., Griffith, J., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ab3064 · Cited by 43
Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game
Belloc, M., Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & D’Alessandro, S. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-50556-8 · Cited by 43
Rats play tit-for-tat instead of integrating social experience over multiple interactions
Schweinfurth, M. K., & Taborsky, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2019.2423 · Cited by 48
Paying it forward: The development and underlying mechanisms of upstream reciprocity
Beeler-Duden, S., & Vaish, A. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2019.104785 · Cited by 45
Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma
Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2020) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ab6a3b · Cited by 44
Mutualism between antagonists: its ecological and evolutionary implications
Zhang, Z., Yan, C., & Zhang, H. (2020) · Integrative Zoology · doi:10.1111/1749-4877.12487 · Cited by 43
Pool-rewarding in N-person snowdrift game
Li, K., Mao, Y., Wei, Z., & Cong, R. (2020) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110591 · Cited by 47
Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game
Podder, S., Righi, S., & Pancotto, F. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0293 · Cited by 46
Why Are There Six Degrees of Separation in a Social Network?
Samoylenko, I., Aleja, D., Primo, E., Alfaro-Bittner, K., Vasilyeva, E. E., Kovalenko, K., Мусатов, Д. В., Raigorodskii, A. M., Criado, R., Romance, M., et al. (2023) · Physical Review X · doi:10.1103/physrevx.13.021032 · Cited by 55
“Our study points out, therefore, that evolutionary rules of the kind traditionally associated with human cooperation and altruism [29 – 33] can in fact account also for the emergence of this attribute of social networks.”
BackgroundRaxworthy, J. (2006) · QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) · Cited by 43
CRONIN, K. A., & SÁNCHEZ, A. (2012) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s021952591250066x · Cited by 40
“Several such mechanisms have been identified in the literature, ranging from kin selection through reciprocity to assortativity or network reciprocity [45].”
BackgroundBlocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X. (2020) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125430 · Cited by 43
“Several mechanisms have already been identified, which highlight the importance of different forms of reciprocity [9].”
Kin and kinship psychology both influence cooperative coordination in Yasawa, Fiji
McNamara, R. A., & Henrich, J. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.09.004 · Cited by 42
“Kin selection (Eberhard, 1975; Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006; Read & Grushka-Cockayne, 2011; Smith, 1964) explains how some traits can evolve in a population through an organism’s own reproductive success and their genetic relatives’ success.”
BackgroundClark, J. A., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2014) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9240-0 · Cited by 50
“At the most elementary level, extensive cooperation, the hallmark feature of our species, can only have evolved in conjunction with the capacity to assess another’s character and maintain a stable mental representation thereof (Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundHow the Social Economy Produces Innovation
Potts, J., & Hartley, J. (2015) · Review of Social Economy · doi:10.1080/00346764.2015.1067756 · Cited by 48
“This line of argument increasingly rests in the evolved nature of the humans as a highly cooperative species (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Bruni et al. 2014; Nowak 2006, 2011).”
BackgroundThe Sex in Your Violence: Patriarchy and Power in Anthropological World Building and Everyday Life
Nelson, R. G. (2021) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/711605 · Cited by 45
“All rights reserved. is not required for strong reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundSocial mobility and network reciprocity shape cooperation in collaborative networks
Li, W., Chen, Z., Wang, J., Jiang, L.-L., & Perc, M. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113378 · Cited by 46
Can evolutionary design of social networks make it easier to be ‘green’?
Dickinson, J. L., Crain, R. L., Reeve, H. K., & Schuldt, J. P. (2013) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2013.05.011 · Cited by 50
“Sensitivity to third-party assessment, which underlies cooperation in indirect reciprocity and some public-goods games [38], can be triggered with visual symbols of human peer-policing or surveillance, as when an image of watching eyes decreased free-riding and increased the level of monetary…”
Mertins, V., Schote, A. B., Hoffeld, W., Grießmair, M., & Meyer, J. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020959 · Cited by 44
“Public goods settings are of considerable concern in various fields such as economics [17], biology [18] and psychology [2].”
BackgroundCourtiol, A., Raymond, M., & Faurie, C. (2009) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.09.016 · Cited by 52
Proper aspiration level promotes generous behavior in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Rong, Z., Zhao, Q., Wu, Z.-X., Zhou, T., & Tse, C. K. (2016) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2016-70286-0 · Cited by 42
Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation
Wang, X., Nie, S., Jiang, L.-L., Wang, B.-H., & Chen, S. (2016) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2016.08.014 · Cited by 42
Smith, E. R. (2014) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868314530515 · Cited by 49
“Gossip has also been addressed from perspectives more distant from the social and behavioral sciences, including evolutionary biology, especially with regard to its role in the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundEvolution of cooperation with interactive identity and diversity
Su, Q., Li, A., & Wang, L. (2018) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.01.021 · Cited by 45
The replicator dynamics for multilevel selection in evolutionary games
Cooney, D. B. (2019) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-019-01352-5 · Cited by 42
Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
Shu, F., Liu, Y., Liu, X., & Zhou, X. (2018) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.10.055 · Cited by 42
Power, E. A., & Ready, E. (2019) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2018.0070 · Cited by 44
Aspiration-dependent strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Zhang, L., Huang, C., Li, H., & Dai, Q. (2019) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/126/18001 · Cited by 43
Redistribution promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games under aspiration dynamics
Du, J. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124629 · Cited by 44
Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
Quan, J., Yang, W., Li, X., Wang, X., & Yang, J. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124994 · Cited by 46
Sustainable Groundwater Management in California: A Grand Experiment in Environmental Governance
Lubell, M. N., Blomquist, W. A., & Beutler, L. (2020) · Society & Natural Resources · doi:10.1080/08941920.2020.1833617 · Cited by 42
New evolutionary foundations: Theoretical requirements for a science of sustainability
Waring, T. M. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.10.017 · Cited by 46
The edge of neutral evolution in social dilemmas
Cremer, J., Reichenbach, T., & Frey, E. (2009) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/9/093029 · Cited by 51
“A large body of work is currently devoted to the identification of mechanisms that can reinforce cooperative behavior [15], e.”
BackgroundRunaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
Nakamaru, M., & Dieckmann, U. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.004 · Cited by 45
“Even though several general mechanisms are widely recognized to facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation (as reviewed, e.g., by Nowak, 2006), many questions of a more detailed nature are still unresolved.”
BackgroundBiocultural theory: The current state of knowledge.
Carroll, J., Clasen, M., Jonsson, E., Kratschmer, A., McKerracher, L., Riede, F., Svenning, J., & Kjærgaard, P. C. (2015) · Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1037/ebs0000058 · Cited by 52
“The most advanced thinking in the field has already moved past this controversy by foregrounding the internalization of norms, “social selection” for preferential interaction with cooperators, leadership, “strong reciprocity” (third-party enforcement of norms), the institutionalization of strong reciprocity in institu…”
BackgroundReputation-based coevolution of link weights promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Guo, H., Chen, C., Shen, C., & Ши, Л. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.02.035 · Cited by 42
The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary gamesPreprint
Traulsena, A., & Galla, T. (2012) · Cited by 42
Learning interaction kernels in heterogeneous systems of agents from multiple trajectoriesPreprint
Lu, F., Maggioni, M., & Tang, S. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.04832 · Cited by 82
“a growing literature on modelling interactions between animals of multiple types for the study of animal motion, see Escobedo et al. (2014); Parrish and EdelsteinKeshet (1999); Cohn and Kumar (2009); Nowak (2006); Fryxell et al. (2007). We consider a rst-order Predator-Swarm system, modelling interactions between a gr…”
BackgroundImitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information
Wang, X., Zhou, L., McAvoy, A., & Li, A. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x · Cited by 58
Incorporating reputation into reinforcement learning can promote cooperation on hypergraphs
Zou, K., & Huang, C. (2024) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115203 · Cited by 41
Study of tree shrew biology and models: A booming and prosperous field for biomedical research
Yao, Y., Lü, L., Ni, R., Bi, R., Chen, C., Chen, J., Fuchs, E., Gorbatyuk, M., Lei, H., Li, H., et al. (2024) · 动物学研究 · doi:10.24272/j.issn.2095-8137.2024.199 · Cited by 51
“Furthermore, with proper equipment and behavioral paradigms, complex behaviors such as cooperation (Nowak, 2006, 2012; West et al., 2021) and social avoidance (Gellner et al., 2021; Toth & Neumann, 2013), as reported in other species, can also be investigated in tree shrews.”
BackgroundInterdependency enriches the spatial reciprocity in prisoner’s dilemma game on weighted networks
Meng, X.-K., Sun, S., Li, X., Wang, L., Xia, C., & Sun, J. (2015) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2015.08.031 · Cited by 42
Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory
Stefano, A. D., Scatà, M., Corte, A. L., Lió, P., Catania, E., Guardo, E., & Pagano, S. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140646 · Cited by 43
“Previous works on evolution of cooperation have identified some mechanisms, other than kin selection [11], related to interactions among individuals which can favour it, such as direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, and multilevel selection [12].”
BackgroundCommunal nesting in an ‘asocial’ mammal: social thermoregulation among spatially dispersed kin
Williams, C. T., Gorrell, J. C., Lane, J. E., McAdam, A. G., Humphries, M. M., & Boutin, S. A. (2013) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-013-1499-4 · Cited by 41
Vilone, D., Ramasco, J. J., Sánchez, Á., & Miguel, M. S. (2014) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.90.022810 · Cited by 46
Random diffusion and cooperation in continuous two-dimensional space
Antonioni, A., Tomassini, M., & Buesser, P. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.11.018 · Cited by 41
“Many mechanisms have been suggested to explain these behaviors, such as direct and indirect reciprocity, kin reciprocity, group reciprocity, and population structure among others (see e.g. Nowak, 2006 and references therein for a summary of this vast amount of work).”
BackgroundFranke, M. (2013) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12015 · Cited by 53
The Durability of Public Goods Changes the Dynamics and Nature of Social Dilemmas
Brown, S. P., & Taddéi, F. (2007) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593 · Cited by 44
“Whereas classic approaches to spatially-extended cooperative games have focused on the role of aggregation in cooperators [7,9], a spatially-extended durable public goods game would focus equally on the role of aggregation in public goods, and would track the degree of concordance between aggregates of cooperators and…”
BackgroundEvidence of cultural group selection in territorial lobstering in Maine
Waring, T. M., & Acheson, J. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0501-x · Cited by 41
Memory-based snowdrift game on a square lattice
Shu, F., Liu, X., Fang, K., & Chen, H. (2017) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2017.12.109 · Cited by 41
Kinship underlies costly cooperation in Mosuo villages
Thomas, M. G., Ji, T., Wu, J., He, Q.-Q., Tao, Y., & Mace, R. H. (2018) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.171535 · Cited by 45
Sun, Z., Koffel, T., Stump, S. M., Grimaud, G. M., & Klausmeier, C. A. (2019) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.01.009 · Cited by 41
Q-learning boosts the evolution of cooperation in structured population by involving extortion
Ding, H., Zhang, G.-S., Wang, S.-H., Li, J., & Wang, Z. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.122551 · Cited by 45
Gao, J., & Chen, W. (2019) · Cities · doi:10.1016/j.cities.2019.102460 · Cited by 41
Wang, J., He, J., & Yu, F. (2021) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110887 · Cited by 43
How Children Invented Humanity: The Role of Development in Human Evolution
Bjorklund, D. F. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190066864.001.0001 · Cited by 46
Carter, G. (2015) · Figshare · doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.1618828 · Cited by 43
Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip
Giardini, F. (2011) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-011-0421-0 · Cited by 43
“Theories of indirect reciprocity show how cooperation in large groups can emerge when agents are endowed with or can build a reputation (Alex-ander 1987; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003; Nowak 2006; Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003).”
BackgroundEffects of cost threshold and noise in spatial snowdrift games with fixed multi-person interactions
Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2010) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/90/38003 · Cited by 41
Perspectives on Tissue Interactions in Development and Disease
Strand, D. W., Franco, O. E., Basanta, D., Anderson, A. R. A., & Hayward, S. W. (2010) · Current Molecular Medicine · doi:10.2174/156652410791065363 · Cited by 43
Genetic and environmental influences on prosocial behavior.
Knafo‐Noam, A., & Israel, S. (2010) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/12061-008 · Cited by 45
“(indirect reciprocity) (see Nowak, 2006, for a review).”
Spatial prisoner's dilemma games with zealous cooperators
Matsuzawa, R., Tanimoto, J., & Fukuda, E. (2016) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.94.022114 · Cited by 41
Su, Q., Li, A., & Wang, L. (2016) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2016.10.095 · Cited by 42
Evolution of cooperation driven by zealotsPreprint
Masuda, N. (2012) · Cited by 40
Reinforcement learning explains various conditional cooperation
Geng, Y., Liu, Y., Lu, Y., Shen, C., & Ши, Л. (2022) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127182 · Cited by 54
Explaining the evolution of gossip
Pan, X., Hsiao, V., Nau, D. S., & Gelfand, M. J. (2024) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2214160121 · Cited by 63
“Such a scenario, also known as a cooperation game, has been widely applied in research to capture human interactions (see Materials and Methods for more information) (7, 19–21).”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.