Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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BackgroundSelf-citationPromoting cooperation by local contribution under stochastic win-stay-lose-shift mechanism
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Shibayama, S., Walsh, J. P., & Baba, Y. (2012) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/0003122412452874 · Cited by 67
Adoption of simultaneous different strategies against different opponents enhances cooperationPreprint
Wardil, L. L., & da Silva, J. K. L. (2009) · Nature Precedings · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/86/38001 · Cited by 53
Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.013 · Cited by 52
The evolution of war: theory and controversy
Lopez, A. C. (2015) · International Theory · doi:10.1017/s1752971915000184 · Cited by 54
Lévy, J., Yirmiya, K., Goldstein, A., & Feldman, R. (2019) · Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2019.100658 · Cited by 57
“Empathic responses to the pain of conspecifics, a capacity sculpted by a long history of mammalian evolution, is critical for species survival and supports the formation of social bonds and group-living (Dulac et al., 2014; Nowak, 2006).”
Maintaining Transient Diversity Is a General Principle for Improving Collective Problem Solving
Smaldino, P. E., Moser, C. J., Velilla, A. P., & Werling, M. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916231180100 · Cited by 82
“…, which means that interactions occur between individuals using the same behavioral strategies at rates higher than predicted by chance (Apicella & Silk, 2019; Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009; Nowak, 2006), allowing the benefits of cooperation to be preferentially bestowed on cooperative individuals.”
BackgroundCooperation in Context: Public Goods Games and Post-Soviet Collectives in Kamchatka, Russia
Gerkey, D. (2013) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/669856 · Cited by 70
“…and Boyd 2005), our failures often loom just as large, stimulating widespread interest among researchers who continue to debate the strengths of competing theories in the natural and social sciences (Cronk and Leech 2013; Gintis et al. 2005; Hammerstein 2003; Nowak 2006; Ostrom 1990, 2005).”
BackgroundCody, K. C., Smith, S. M., Cox, M. E., & Andersson, K. P. (2015) · Society & Natural Resources · doi:10.1080/08941920.2014.970736 · Cited by 61
“Much of the theory of collective action reduces to what counts as costs and benefits and how they are distributed (Axelrod 1984; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Nowak 2006); ecosystem services (e.”
BackgroundA naturalistic theory of economic organization
Stoelhorst, J. W., & Richerson, P. J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.012 · Cited by 56
Yamauchi, A., Tanimoto, J., & Hagishima, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.10.006 · Cited by 56
MATHEMATICS OF KIN- AND GROUP-SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?
Traulsen, A. (2009) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00899.x · Cited by 64
Engineering multicellular systems by cell–cell communication
Pai, A., Tanouchi, Y., Collins, C. H., & You, L. (2009) · Current Opinion in Biotechnology · doi:10.1016/j.copbio.2009.08.006 · Cited by 59
“This design also offers the ability to tune various aspects of cooperation, such as changing cost and benefit by replacing the antibiotic resistance with another costly but beneficial system, and could be used to study other aspects such as the conditions for cooperation and its stability [77].”
Social influence promotes cooperation in the public goods game
Wu, T., Fu, F., Dou, P., & Wang, L. (2014) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2014.06.040 · Cited by 54
Costly hide and seek pays: unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2014) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003 · Cited by 55
TESTING EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATIVE GRANDPARENTAL INVESTMENT
Kaptijn, R., Thomése, F., Liefbroer, A. C., & Silverstein, M. D. (2012) · Journal of Biosocial Science · doi:10.1017/s0021932012000612 · Cited by 58
Forgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma
Zagorsky, B. M., Reiter, J. G., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080814 · Cited by 62
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma [3–9] is the strongest form of a cooperative dilemma, where cooperation requires a mechanism for its evolution [10].”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe influence of age on wild rhesus macaques' affiliative social interactions
Liao, Z., Sosa, S., Wu, C., & Zhang, P. (2017) · American Journal of Primatology · doi:10.1002/ajp.22733 · Cited by 53
“…social partners than adults do, while old individuals may preferentially interact with several individuals to maintain strong and lasting bonds with specific partners (i.e., degree and strength) (Barrat, Barthelemy, Pastorsatorras, & Vespignani, 2004; Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman, & Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundNo Strategy Can Win in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Linking Game Theory and Computer Simulations
García, J., & van Veelen, M. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00102 · Cited by 46
Liu, J., Meng, H., Wei, W., Xie, Z., & Yu, Q. (2018) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.07.004 · Cited by 54
Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation
Dong, Y., Hao, G., Wang, J., Liu, C., & Xia, C. (2019) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2019.01.021 · Cited by 54
The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties
Segbroeck, S. V., Santos, F. C., Nowé, A., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2008) · BMC Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1186/1471-2148-8-287 · Cited by 53
“Different mechanisms to promote cooperative actions in this scenario have been proposed over the years [5].”
Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games
Gao, J., Li, Z. Z., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2010) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.04.018 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.