Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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Roberts, G., Raihani, N., Bshary, R., Manrique, H. M., Fariña, A., Samu, F., & Barclay, P. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0290 · Cited by 123
“Yet despite this, sexual selection is rarely invoked in explaining cooperation, and a high profile review does not include it as one of the routes to cooperation [106].”
BackgroundInnovation, Cooperation, and the Perceived Benefits and Costs of Sustainable Agriculture Practices
Lubell, M. N., Hillis, V., & Hoffman, M. (2011) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-04389-160423 · Cited by 110
“Key Words: cooperation; innovation; knowledge networks; resilience; sustainability; sustainable agriculture”
BackgroundThe Moral brain: a multidisciplinary perspective
Decety, J., & Wheatley, T. (2015) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.192126 · Cited by 110
The Role of Cooperation in Responsible AI Development
Askell, A., Brundage, M., & Hadfield, G. K. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1907.04534 · Cited by 44
“49In an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, cooperation can be incentivized by things like the threat of retaliation and the promise of reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundSpatial invasion of cooperation
Langer, P., Nowak, M. A., & Hauert, C. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.11.002 · Cited by 120
“Over the last decades, different mechanisms have been proposed to promote and maintain cooperati n (Hamilton, 1964, Hauert et al., 2002, 2007, Nowak, 2006b, Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, Trivers, 1971, Wilson & Sober, 1994) including spatially structured populations with limited local interactions (Nowak…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationTopological effects of network structure on long‐term social network dynamics in a wild mammal
Ilany, A., Booms, A. S., & Holekamp, K. E. (2015) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/ele.12447 · Cited by 118
“Theory suggests that social structure can play an important role in the evolution of cooperation, with clusters of cooperators required to maintain cooperation (Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundApplications of evolutionary game theory in urban road transport network: A state of the art review
Ahmad, F., Shah, Z., & Al‐Fagih, L. (2023) · Sustainable Cities and Society · doi:10.1016/j.scs.2023.104791 · Cited by 124
Explosive Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Higher-Order Networks
Civilini, A., Sadekar, O., Battiston, F., Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., & Latora, V. (2024) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.132.167401 · Cited by 132
Effect of the degree correlation in public goods game on scale-free networks
Rong, Z., & Wu, Z.-X. (2009) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/87/30001 · Cited by 115
The Neuroscience of Compassion and Empathy and Their Link to Prosocial Motivation and Behavior
Chierchia, G., & Singer, T. (2016) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-805308-9.00020-8 · Cited by 124
MIGRATION AS A MECHANISM TO PROMOTE COOPERATION
HELBING, D., & YU, W. (2008) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s0219525908001866 · Cited by 112
Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma via a reward mechanism
Jiménez, R., Lugo, H., Cuesta, J. A., & Sánchez, Á. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.010 · Cited by 111
“How do cooperative individuals or populations survive or even thrive in the context of a PD, where defecting is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard-Smith, 1982; Nowak, 2006)?”
BackgroundInfluentialMultiple strategies in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Wage, N., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1016008108 · Cited by 106
Self-citationNash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Motor Interactions
Braun, D. A., Ortega, P. A., & Wolpert, D. M. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000468 · Cited by 117
“Consequently, a large number of studies have investigated experimental and theoretical conditions that allow for such cooperation [30–34].”
BackgroundNonparametric inference of interaction laws in systems of agents from trajectory data
Lu, F., Ming, Z., Tang, S., & Maggioni, M. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1822012116 · Cited by 154
“Even more challenging is modeling interactions between agents of multiple types, in complex and emergent physical and social phenomena [34, 57, 20, 55, 36].”
BackgroundGrowth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populations
Cremer, J., Melbinger, A., & Frey, E. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00281 · Cited by 104
Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game
Zhang, H.-F., Liu, R.-R., Wang, Z., Yang, H.-X., & Wang, B.-H. (2011) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/94/18006 · Cited by 106
LLMs and generative agent-based models for complex systems research
Lu, Y., Aleta, A., Du, C., Shi, L., & Moreno, Y. (2024) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2024.10.013 · Cited by 80
Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions
Su, Q., Allen, B., & Plotkin, J. B. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2113468118 · Cited by 104
Signalling and the Evolution of Cooperative Foraging in Dynamic Environments
Torney, C. J., Berdahl, A. M., & Couzin, I. D. (2011) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194 · Cited by 104
“Several explanations have been proposed for this apparent paradox [5], the most pervasive and all-encompassing being Hamilton’s notion of inclusive fitness [6].”
BackgroundEvans, R., & Ferguson, E. (2013) · Vox Sanguinis · doi:10.1111/vox.12080 · Cited by 105
Social mindfulness and social hostility
Lange, P. A. M. V., & Doesum, N. J. V. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2014.12.009 · Cited by 109
Xia, C., Meng, X.-K., & Wang, Z. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129542 · Cited by 107
“Borrowing from the analysis methods of statistical physics [6] and network science [7–11], network reciprocity is amongst the most well-known mechanisms that may sustain cooperation in evolutionary games [12].”
MethodExploiting rhizosphere microbial cooperation for developing sustainable agriculture strategies
Besset-Manzoni, Y., Rieusset, L., Joly, P., Comte, G., & Prigent‐Combaret, C. (2018) · Environmental Science and Pollution Research · doi:10.1007/s11356-017-1152-2 · Cited by 110
“Selection and evolution of cooperative relationships might be considered accordingly at the population or community levels, and not at the individual level as proposed by Nowak (2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.