Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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Citations
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Neighborhood Diversity Promotes Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
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“of these mechanisms can virtually be reduced to five mechanisms for elevating the level of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, as well as group selection [20].”
BackgroundLearning to Trust: From Relational Exchange to Generalized Trust in China
Nee, V. G., Holm, H. J., & Opper, S. (2018) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2018.1213 · Cited by 66
“Not surprisingly, a defining feature of China’s market development has been its strong reliance on relational exchange in markets and with politicians, rather than arm’s-length transactions (Xin and Pearce 1996, Tsui and Farh 1997, Guthrie 1998, Peng and Luo 2000, Park and Luo 2001).”
BackgroundAaldering, H., & BOHM, R. M. (2019) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550619841627 · Cited by 65
“To survive and thrive, humans need to cooperate within groups (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundSimulations reveal challenges to artificial community selection and possible strategies for success
Xie, L., Yuan, A. E., & Shou, W. (2019) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3000295 · Cited by 68
Selection on non‐social traits limits the invasion of social cheats
Morgan, A. D., Quigley, B. J. Z., Brown, S. P., & Buckling, A. (2012) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2012.01805.x · Cited by 64
“Assuming new patches are founded by cooperating cells, as patches of cooperators are more productive and so produce more migrants (Hamilton 1963, 1964; Nowak 2006), beneficial mutations are more likely to arise by chance in the numerically dominant cooperator population, than in rare invading cheats.”
BackgroundInfluentialEffects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma
Wu, Z.-X., & Holme, P. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.80.026108 · Cited by 62
The spatial Ultimatum game revisited
Iranzo, J., Román, J. S., & Sánchez, Á. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.02.020 · Cited by 60
“Today, this topic remains a very active field, and different mechanisms are being proposed to understand the evolutionary origin of cooperation (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundModeling altruism and selfishness in welfare dynamics: The role of nonlinear interactions
Dolfin, M., & Lachowicz, M. (2014) · Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1142/s0218202514500237 · Cited by 60
Religious Motivations for Cooperation: An Experimental Investigation Using Explicit Primes
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Haque, O. S., Kane, R. J., Nowak, M. A., & Coakley, S. (2012) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2013.775664 · Cited by 64
“…Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Fudenberg, Rand, & Dreber, 2012; Levin, 2006; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Nowak, 2006, 2011; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Ostrom, 1990; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak 2009; Rand & Nowak, 2011; Rockenbach & Milinski,…”
Self-citationUnderstanding Cooperative Behavior Based on the Coevolution of Game Strategy and Link Weight
Huang, K., Zheng, X., Li, Z., & Yang, Y. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep14783 · Cited by 60
Evolutionary dynamics under interactive diversity
Su, Q., Li, A., & Wang, L. (2017) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/aa8feb · Cited by 63
Spatial vs. non-spatial eco-evolutionary dynamics in a tumor growth model
You, L., Brown, J. S., Thuijsman, F., Cunningham, J. J., Gatenby, R. A., Zhang, J., & Staňková, K. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.022 · Cited by 63
Effects of Flood Control Strategies on Flood Resilience Under Sociohydrological Disturbances
Sung, K., Jeong, H., Sangwan, N., & Yu, D. J. (2018) · Water Resources Research · doi:10.1002/2017wr021440 · Cited by 60
“A replicator equation (Nowak, 2006) is used to model this process as shown in equation (9).”
MethodIntercellular cooperation in a fungal plant pathogen facilitates host colonization
Peyraud, R., Mbengué, M., Barbacci, A., & Raffaele, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1811267116 · Cited by 61
“At the population level, genetic relatedness, reciprocity, and group selection can lead to the emergence of cooperation (8).”
BackgroundChen, C., Mu, C., Liu, J., Liu, C., Boccaletti, S., Ши, Л., & Wang, Z. (2019) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ab0999 · Cited by 61
Reputation-based strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
He, J., Wang, J., Yu, F., & Zheng, L. (2020) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126703 · Cited by 60
The non-equilibrium nature of culinary evolution
Kinouchi, O., Garcia, R. W. D., Holanda, A. J., Zambianchi, P., & Roque, A. C. (2008) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/10/7/073020 · Cited by 65
Mechanisms of Generalized Exchange: Towards an Integrated ModelPreprint
Baker, W. E., & Levine, S. S. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1352101 · Cited by 65
An Institutional Mechanism for Assortment in an Ecology of Games
Smaldino, P. E., & Lubell, M. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023019 · Cited by 62
“Though there are many mechanisms by which cooperation may be promoted [9], each involves positive assortment the tendency for individuals to associate at a rate higher than chance.”
Scent Marking of Key Food Sources in the Eurasian Otter
Remonti, L., Balestrieri, A., Smiroldo, G., & Prigioni, C. (2011) · Annales Zoologici Fennici · doi:10.5735/086.048.0503 · Cited by 59
“A pattern of scent communication which includes benefits for individuals other than the signaller entails some form of cooperative behaviour, which may compensate for the costs of altruistic acts (Novak 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.